Europe's Value Edge Is in Plain Sight. Active Management Is How You Capture It.

There is a peculiar irony in missing what is directly in front of you. Andrew Lyddon, Fund Manager at Schroders, opens his case for European value equities1 with a confession: despite spending four years studying in Bath, he never once visited the Roman baths. "Inertia," he argues, "can lead us to miss out on compelling experiences and opportunities that are easy to see but not notice." He applies that same logic to the investment community's persistent underweighting of European equities.

The parallel is deliberate and pointed.

Outperformance Without Acknowledgment

Lyddon begins with a fact that many investors appear to have filed under "interesting but irrelevant": European value equities have outperformed the S&P 500 over one, three, and five years. "This fact seems to be treated by investors like a piece of trivia," he observes, "an interesting quirk of the data but ultimately of little fundamental importance."

That casual dismissal, in his view, comes with real costs. At current U.S. valuations, a heavy American tilt "likely limits prospective long-term investment returns and increases risk by reducing diversification." He names the logical bind plainly: "portfolio positioning that both reduces potential returns whilst simultaneously increasing risk should be robustly questioned."

The U.S. now accounts for 72% of the MSCI World index. That concentration leaves investors exposed not just geographically, but stylistically, with growth stocks dominating the benchmark. European value, with its very low correlation to U.S. equities and particularly to U.S. growth, represents a genuine diversifier, not merely a geographic rotation.

The Problem With Passive Value

Here Lyddon shifts from the macro argument to the structural one, and the critique is sharp. Passive value indices, it turns out, do not consistently hold the cheapest stocks.

Of the top ten holdings in the MSCI Europe Value index, only four fall within the cheapest third of the European market as measured by the cyclically-adjusted price-to-earnings ratio. For the Enhanced Value index, the number rises only to five. "Close to half of investors' money," Lyddon notes, "is not invested in the cheapest third of the market." By contrast, Schroders' European value portfolios "typically have 90% exposure to the cheapest third of the European index."

The concentration problem does not stop at valuation. The MSCI Europe Value index currently allocates a "staggering 38%" to financials, a sector Lyddon describes as "one of the most homogenous sectors containing lots of similar companies vulnerable to similar risks." That exposure has driven results: financials contributed over half of the Value index's total return year-to-date through September 2026, and over a third of the Enhanced Value index return. That is not diversification. That is a sector bet dressed as an index.

Financials: No Longer the Core of the Opportunity

Lyddon does not dismiss the sector entirely, but he argues the index has overstayed its welcome. "Value indices tend to favour valuation metrics based on today's profits and dividends over cyclically adjusted metrics like CAPE," he explains. The result is that the index perceives financials as cheaper than the underlying fundamentals support. Banks that trade on modest price-to-earnings ratios do so not because they are bargains, but because "the market doubt[s] the sustainability of current bumper profitability and returns on equity."

The price-to-book multiples of European banks have risen substantially since their lows. Financials are no longer where the deep value lies.

Where Value Hides: Small and Mid-Caps

The richest seams of value, Lyddon argues, are further down the market cap spectrum. Within the cheapest third of the European market, companies with market caps below 5 billion euros carry an earnings yield approximately 200 basis points higher than those above 20 billion euros. That spread has widened materially since the end of 2024, sitting at the upper end of its historical range.

Small and mid-cap European equities are, as Lyddon puts it, "thoroughly unloved, ignored and under researched." That combination is precisely where active management earns its place.

Five Key Takeaways for Advisors and Investors

  1. European value has outperformed the S&P 500 over one, three, and five years and deserves a structural allocation, not a footnote.
  2. Passive European value products carry meaningful valuation risk, with nearly half of assets outside the cheapest third of the market by CAPE.
  3. Financials concentration in passive indices is a structural flaw, not a feature; the sector is no longer the cornerstone of the value opportunity it once was.
  4. Active management provides the flexibility to avoid index constraints, overweight genuinely cheap companies, and control sector concentration.
  5. European small and mid-cap value stocks offer the widest earnings yield premium relative to large-caps in recent memory, representing a compelling opportunity for investors willing to look past familiar names.

The Orwell quote Lyddon closes with is well chosen: "To see what is in front of one's nose needs a constant struggle." European value equities have delivered. The case for active management within that opportunity is structural, not tactical. The only remaining question is whether investors continue to walk past the Roman baths.

Footnote:

1 Lyddon, Andrew. "Familiarity Discount: The Case for Active European Value." Schroders, 12 Nov. 2026, www.schroders.com/en-gb/uk/institutional/insights/familiarity-discount-the-case-for-active-european-value/.

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