This article is a guest contribution by John P. Hussman, Ph.D., Hussman Funds.
Perhaps the best way to begin this week's comment is to note that in decades of market analysis, I can't remember a time that I've heard many analysts quoting some support or resistance level as being "critical" for the market. Some are eyeing the 1040 "neckline" on the S&P 500 "head-and-shoulders" formation. Others are eyeing the downward trendline that connects the April and June peaks for the index. Still others point to the "death cross" between the 50-day and the 200-day moving average, near the 1100 level, as being crucial. Even Richard Russell - who deserves more respect than most - has put the full weight of his analysis, over the near term anyway, on whether or not the Dow Transportation average remains above the closing level of 3792.89. The object of discussion has increasingly turned to the implications of this particular chart formation or that, as if some magic number or another absolves investors from having to think about the big picture.
All of this suggests that this is a "rent, not own" market being driven by technical traders who uniformly and somewhat predictably pile on to the sell side or the buy side when particular levels are hit. Last week, we observed the obligatory rally to prior support, closed a "gap" in the S&P 500 chart from a couple of weeks ago, and kissed the 20-day moving average. Based on this sort of "critical level" chatter, a move above the 1100 level could trigger a powerful but short-lived burst of short-covering on the relief of the "death cross", while a move below 1040, and particularly a break in the Transports below 3792.89, would most probably cause all hell to break loose. Simply put, over the very short term, market fluctuations are likely to be driven by masses of technical traders, nearly all acting on precisely the same signals.
The key issue here is the sustainability of these moves. To the extent that an upside breakout is accompanied by a substantial relief in near-term economic concerns (e.g. a move in the ECRI Weekly Leading Index growth rate back to positive territory, or three to four weeks of plunging new claims for unemployment), one might anticipate a positive follow-through over the intermediate term. In contrast, a downside breakout accompanied by further deterioration in reliable economic indicators or poor corporate guidance would prompt a more sustained period of deterioration. Lacking such confirmation from "real" indicators of economic and corporate activity, the immediate response of breakouts or breakdowns is likely to be confined to a short burst of concerted selling or short-covering.
On a valuation basis, the S&P 500 remains about 40% above historical norms on the basis of normalized earnings. The disparity between our valuation assessment and the putative undervaluation being touted by Wall Street analysts is so great that a few remarks are in order. First, virtually every assessment that "stocks are cheap" here is based on the ratio of the S&P 500 to year-ahead operating earnings estimates, and often comes with a comparison of the resulting "earnings yield" with the depressed 10-year Treasury yield. What's fascinating about this is that this is the same basis on which analysts deemed stocks to be about 40% undervalued just prior to the 2007 top, following which the market plunged by more than half. There's a great deal of analysis regarding forward operating earnings that I published in 2007, but probably the most comprehensive piece was Long Term Evidence on the Fed Model and Forward Operating P/E Ratios from August 20, 2007.
