Not Much Out of the G20 (Rosenberg)

This article is a guest contribution by David Rosenberg, Gluskin Sheff.

Much of the pledges made are standard fare. The key takeaway is the acknowledgment of fiscal restraint, which will be the dominant macro theme for at least the next three years. This confab was in stark contrast to the pro-growth stimulus theme of a year ago. No mention of currencies in the aftermath of the Chinese announcement to revalue; at least moderately.

All in, the stress on fiscal consolidation implies the need for policy rates to remain at ultra-low levels for a prolonged period of time. This in turn limits the chance of any sustained rise in government bond yields.

In terms of any goals established, there is an objective to shave fiscal deficits in half by 2013, and to stabilize debt-to-GDP ratios with a 2016 deadline. But specific timelines are at the discretion of each government. Ditto on the issue of bank taxes and global financial regulations.

“THE THIRD DEPRESSION”

That is the title of today’s spirited column by Paul Krugman in the NYT’s editorial section. His arguments can be debated as we are sure the entire Austrian school (along with Robert Barro) would take him to task on the efficacy of even more government intrusion at this point. However, Krugman’s view on what this cycle is all about is right on the mark: a deflationary depression. In our view, the best medicine from governments is to prevent credit bubbles from occurring in the first place – it’s not as if the U.S. didn’t have warning signs once Fannie and Freddie morphed into de facto hedge funds. In any event, here are some snippets from the Krugman piece that the perma-bulls should consider (especially with the consensus still north of $96 on 2011 EPS projections):

“Recessions are common; depressions are rare. As far as I can tell, there were only two eras in economic history that were widely described as “depressions” at the time: the years of deflation and instability that followed the Panic of 1873 and the years of mass unemployment that followed the financial crisis of 1929-31.”

“We are now, I fear, in the early stages of a third depression ... primarily by a failure of policy.”

“There is no evidence that short-run fiscal austerity in the face of a depressed economy reassures investors. On the contrary: Greece has agreed to harsh austerity, only to find its risk spreads growing ever wider; Ireland has imposed savage cuts in public spending, only to be treated by the markets as a worse risk than Spain, which has been far more reluctant to take the hard-liners’ medicine.”

“The Fed seems aware of the deflationary risks — but what it proposes to do about these risks is, well, nothing. The Obama administration understands the dangers of premature fiscal austerity — but because Republicans and conservative Democrats in Congress won’t authorize additional aid to state governments, that austerity is coming anyway, in the form of budget cuts at the state and local levels.”

“In the face of this grim picture, you might have expected policy makers to realize that they haven’t yet done enough to promote recovery. But no: over the last few months there has been a stunning resurgence of hard-money and balanced-budget orthodoxy.”

“... both the United States and Europe are well on their way toward Japan-style deflationary traps.”

As we said before, this is a powerful indictment against the current policy stance. But many other entities do not share Mr. Krugman’s view, or that more government intervention will do much good. The BIS (Bank for International Settlements) just published a report that came to different policy conclusions (cited in today’s FT):

“A programme of fiscal consolidation – cutting deficits by several percentage points of GDP over a number of years – would offer significant benefits of low and stable long-term interest rates, a less fragile financial system and, ultimately, better prospects for investment and long-term growth.

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