Borrowed Time: RenMac's Jeff deGraaf on Bonds, Bubbles, and the Return of the Balanced Portfolio

On a recent episode of The Meb Faber Show1, Jeff deGraaf, Chairman and Head of Technical Research at Renaissance Macro and Hall of Fame technical analyst, makes a methodical case that the investment regime of the past fifteen years has ended, and that most portfolios have not yet adjusted to the evidence.

John Bull Is Back

deGraaf anchors his thesis in 1873. Walter Bagehot, then editor of The Economist, quipped that "John Bull can stand many things, but John Bull can't stand 2%." Under a hard money system, any yield below that threshold pushed investors out on the risk curve in search of return, into Central and South American railroad bonds, most of which defaulted within five years.

The analogy is deliberate. For roughly fifteen years following the Global Financial Crisis, quantitative easing suppressed real rates to the point where TINA, There Is No Alternative to equities, was not a strategy so much as a structural constraint. Real yields turned negative at the cycle's nadir. Investors were force-marched into risk. SPACs were the modern equivalent of Honduran railroad bonds.

That regime is over. deGraaf places the current real yield at approximately 265 basis points. "Anything above 2%," he says, "starts to take you back to that John Bull can stand 2%, and real investors will look at bonds and say, hey, there's something to be had here." The direct portfolio implication is straightforward: "I don't need an 80/15 allocation to stocks versus bonds to get the same kind of 7% target return. I can have something that's more normalized, like a 65/35 portfolio with a 5% nominal and a 2.6% real yield, and get something that's close to that without the same volatility."

The transition will be gradual. "People's hopes, desires, and frankly, greed continue to persist until they start to take losses," deGraaf observes. "I don't think it ends up being a thunderclap. I think it ends up being kind of this gradual move as people show some frustration with equity returns."

The Bubble Signal and Shooting Them in the Back

The semiconductor sector provides deGraaf's sharpest case study. His bubble indicator is precise: a doubling of a diverse index from an all-time high within a two-year window. It fired on semiconductors in late April. It has fired previously on biotech, the Hang Seng, and Chinese equities in 2008.

The signal does not mean sell immediately. deGraaf is calibrated on the probabilistic sequence: "The next three months, buy it. Like, you own it for the next three months. It's unlikely it's going to fall out of bed right here." Six months brings rough parity. Beyond that, the return distribution deteriorates sharply, with one important characteristic: "After the bubble triggers, wherever it peaks, it's going to come all the way back down to that bubble signal."

This produces the firm's preferred tactical stance, which deGraaf calls "shooting them in the back." The objective is to ride the momentum as far as it goes, sell into the decline rather than attempting to pick the top, and prevent FOMO from forcing a re-entry near the peak. "Your terminal wealth is going to be better by shooting it in the back than believing that you can pick the top on the way up," he argues. As of the conversation, deGraaf estimates the semiconductor unwind is roughly midway through, with the resolution more likely a 2027 event than a 2026 one.

Faber draws the broader lesson: "Long-only managers, say you're Vanguard or say you're somebody who wants short exposure. This is a pretty cool idea...maybe instead of just letting these run, I don't have to outright sell them or short them, but maybe I'm going to stop rebalancing or stop reinvesting my dividends into these companies."

Credit Markets as the Real Signal

deGraaf identifies the credit complex as the most reliable early warning system for the broader cycle. BB spreads are approaching a 200 basis point trigger. CCC spreads sit near 1,200 basis points, though deGraaf notes the stress remains concentrated: roughly a third of that spread is driven by approximately 25% of issuers, with cable names and hyperscalers prominently featured. "A third of the hyperscalers are trading at their widest of the last two years," he notes.

Private credit carries its own opacity risk. Much of the book was struck when real rates were near zero, on floating-rate terms that have become progressively more burdensome. Gates limiting redemptions to 5% while investors sought 7 to 10% returns are, as deGraaf frames it, a liquidity problem masquerading as solvency: "I don't have a solvency problem. I have a liquidity problem. They're the same thing. If your liquidity problem goes on long enough, you have a solvency problem."

The current state is what deGraaf calls "stably deteriorating," a phrase Faber immediately flags as one he intends to borrow. The concern is not systemic today. The refinancing wall hits more forcefully in 2029. But the direction of travel is established.

The Market Cycle Clock and What Works Now

RenMac's proprietary market cycle clock maps inflation against growth across nine quadrants. The current reading places equities in a high-inflation, high-growth zone that historically produces the worst annualized returns of any quadrant, only marginally positive at approximately 40 basis points. Crucially, this is also the zone most consistent with higher real rates, tighter financial conditions, and sector rotation toward defensives.

Higher real yields favor health care, staples, and utilities over technology, discretionary, and industrials. Quality and value outperform growth and high-beta. The conditions and the technicals, in deGraaf's framing, are aligned: "The conditions are how much fuel's in the tank. And then the technicals are where's the spark come in."

5 Key Takeaways for Advisors and Investors

  1. Real yields above 2% restore the case for bonds. A 65/35 portfolio with a 2.6% real yield now competes credibly with an 80/20 equity-heavy allocation for the same return target, with meaningfully lower volatility. The TINA era is over.
  2. The bubble signal is a timing tool, not an immediate exit. When a diverse index doubles from an all-time high within two years, the next three months favor holding. The six-month window is roughly 50/50. Beyond that, the full retracement back to the signal level is the base case.
  3. Credit deterioration precedes equity deterioration. BB spreads near 200 basis points and CCC spreads widening in breadth are the signals to watch. Private credit opacity makes the public CCC complex the most accessible proxy for stress building in the system.
  4. Sector positioning should follow the real-yield regime. Defensives, specifically health care, staples, and utilities, outperform in high real-rate environments. Technology, discretionary, and industrials face structural headwinds in this regime.
  5. Position sizing matters as much as security selection. deGraaf employs the Kelly criterion and volatility normalization to ensure each position carries proportional risk across the book. The allocation decision, how much to bet, is as consequential as the directional call itself.

Reference

1 The Meb Faber Show. "How to Get Out of a Bubble Without Selling Too Early: Jeff deGraaf Explains." 13 Nov. 2026, www.youtube.com/watch?v=MIbb9NWnQdE.

Total
0
Shares
Previous Article

Royal Caribbean Outpaces Its Sector: The Breakout Levels to Watch

Next Article

The Monetary Muddle

Related Posts