by Daniel Gros, Center for European Policy Studies, via Project Syndicate
BRUSSELS â More than three years after the financial crisis that erupted in 2008, who is doing more to bring about economic recovery, Europe or the United States? The US Federal Reserve has completed two rounds of so-called âquantitative easing,â whereas the European Central Bank has fired two shots from its big gun, the so-called long-term refinancing operation (LTRO), providing more than âŹ1 trillion ($1.3 trillion) in low-cost financing to eurozone banks for three years. For some time, it was argued that the Fed had done more to stimulate the economy, because, using 2007 as the benchmark, it had expanded its balance sheet proportionally more than the ECB had done. But the ECB has now caught up. Its balance sheet amounts to roughly âŹ2.8 trillion, or close to 30% of eurozone GDP, compared to the Fedâs balance sheet of roughly 20% of US GDP.
But there is a qualitative difference between the two that is more important than balance-sheet size: the Fed buys almost exclusively risk-free assets (like US government bonds), whereas the ECB has bought (much smaller quantities of) risky assets, for which the market was drying up. Moreover, the Fed lends very little to banks, whereas the ECB has lent massive amounts to weak banks (which could not obtain funding from the market). In short, quantitative easing is not the same thing as credit easing. The theory behind quantitative easing is that the central bank can lower long-term interest rates if it buys large amounts of longer-term government bonds with the deposits that it receives from banks. By contrast, the ECBâs credit easing is motivated by a practical concern: banks from some parts of the eurozone â namely, from the distressed countries on its periphery â have been effectively cut off from the inter-bank market.
A simple way to evaluate the difference between the approaches of the worldâs two biggest central banks is to evaluate the risks that they are taking on. When the Fed buys US government bonds, it does not incur any credit risk, but it is assuming interest-rate risk. The Fed acts like a typical bank engaging in what is called âmaturity transformationâ: it uses short-term deposits to finance the acquisition of long-term securities. With short-term deposit rates close to zero and long-term rates at around 2% the Fed is earning a nice âcarry,â equal to about 2% per year on bond purchases totaling roughly $1.5 trillion over the course of its quantitative easing, or about $30 billion.
Copyright Š Project Syndicate
