What if the reason your portfolio fails you isn't the assets you picked — but the engine you never built?
In this episode of Insight Is Capital, host Pierre Daillie sits down with Rodrigo Gordillo, President and Portfolio Manager at ReSolve Asset Management, for a masterclass in what truly diversified, all-weather portfolio construction actually looks like — and why it's fundamentally different from anything most advisors and investors have ever been offered.
Rodrigo's story begins in Lima, Peru — where a government printing money into hyperinflation wiped out his family's savings overnight — and runs through the dot-com crash, the 2008 financial crisis, and the brutal 2022 simultaneous collapse of stocks and bonds. Those lived experiences didn't just shape his worldview; they became the architecture of a completely different way to build portfolios.
What emerges from this conversation is a framework that challenges nearly every assumption embedded in the standard 60/40 model — and explains why most "diversified" portfolios are actually running 85–90% equity risk under the hood. Rodrigo and Pierre explore how thoughtful, purposeful leverage can transform a low-octane diversified portfolio into something that competes with equities — without simply concentrating more risk in equities.
From regime-aware asset allocation across equities, bonds, gold, and systematic macro strategies, to the mechanics of return stacking and portable alpha, to the emerging institutional concept of "total portfolio" risk budgeting — this episode covers the intellectual terrain that separates sophisticated portfolio construction from the conventional wisdom most advisors were trained on.
Whether you're a seasoned allocator or just beginning to question the limits of traditional asset allocation, this is a conversation about what it truly means to prepare for an unknowable future — not predict it.
CHAPTERS
00:00 — Introduction: All-Terrain Investing & What It Takes to Build for Any Market Weather
01:25 — Rodrigo's Origin Story: Hyperinflation in Peru, Immigration to Canada & Early Financial Scars
05:14 — From Commerce & Statistics to Quant Finance: Why "Don't Lose Money" Became His North Star
07:01 — What Is the All Terrain Fund? The Problem It's Designed to Solve
10:22 — Equity-Like Returns With a Different Risk Profile: The Core Promise
13:04 — Prepare, Don't Predict: The Philosophy Behind Regime-Aware Portfolio Design
17:18 — The Four Pistons: Global Equities, Bonds, Gold & Systematic Macro — and Why Each Matters
20:16 — Inflation Regimes, Growth Regimes, and What Actually Works When
22:17 — The 60/40 Illusion: Why "Balanced" Portfolios Are Actually 85–90% Equity Risk
36:40 — The Nobel Prize–Winning Case for Defensive Leverage: What It Is and Isn't
38:30 — Risk Management Filters: Momentum, Trend, and Knowing When to Step Aside
41:32 — Adding the Fifth Piston: Systematic Macro, Managed Futures & Crisis Alpha
42:55 — Return Stacking & Portable Alpha: How to Add Diversifiers Without Selling Your Core
51:03 — Tail Protection and Long Volatility: The Final Layer of the Framework
01:03:09 — Backtests, Forward Expectations & The Simple Math Behind Stacking Risk Premia
01:08:52 — Rethinking the 100% Portfolio: How Institutions Actually Think About Risk Budgets
01:11:04 — The Total Portfolio Approach: A Brand New Institutional Concept That's 20 Years Old
01:14:02 — Wrap-Up, Where to Learn More & Resources
RESOURCES & LINKS
ReSolve Asset Management — All Terrain Strategy: investresolve.com/strategies
Return Stacked ETFs & Portfolio Explorer: returnstacked.com
#AllTerrainInvesting #ReturnStacking #RiskParity #PortfolioConstruction #ManagedFutures #SystematicMacro #AdaptiveAssetAllocation #LiquidAlternatives #PortableAlpha #WealthManagement #FinancialAdvisors #AdvisorEducation #AllWeatherPortfolio #ReSolveAssetManagement #InsightIsCapital #InvestmentStrategy #CapitalEfficiency #TrendFollowing #CrisisAlpha #MacroInvesting #Diversification #RiskBudgeting #GlobalMacro #ETFInvesting #AlternativeInvestments
]]>In a world where inflation, currency debasement, and geopolitical shocks threaten portfolios, what if you could keep your core equity exposure and add the asymmetric upside of Bitcoin and the timeless stability of gold—without triggering investor panic or selling winners?
In this episode, Pierre Daillie sits down with Mike Philbrick, CEO at ReSolve Asset Management, co-founders, along with Newfound Research, of the Return Stacked ETFs Suite, to unpack a strategy that’s been in the institutional playbook for decades but is now accessible to everyday investors: return stacking. Against today’s backdrop of persistent inflation, volatile markets, and shifting perceptions of alternative assets, Philbrick explains why gold and Bitcoin are moving from “fringe” to “foundational” in modern portfolios—and how the RSSX ETF offers a disciplined, behaviorally resilient way to integrate them without sacrificing the stocks and bonds investors know and trust.
From the behavioral traps that cause investors to abandon diversifiers at the worst moments, to the portfolio math that shows how modest allocations can improve returns and reduce risk, this conversation delivers both the “why” and the “how” of strategic diversification. Philbrick also addresses the shifting reputational risk for advisors—from owning Bitcoin to not owning it—and the growing regulatory clarity that’s further opening the floodgates for institutional adoption.
Whether you’re an advisor, allocator, or investor who wants to strengthen a core portfolio without selling winners, this episode offers a blueprint for adding crisis alpha before the next crisis hits.
4 Key Takeaways:
Timestamps:
00:00 – Why uncorrelated assets matter now
02:00 – Gold and Bitcoin as strategic, not just tactical, diversifiers
04:30 – Behavioral challenges of sticking with diversifiers
06:00 – Return stacking explained: adding without selling
08:00 – Volatility context: stocks, gold, Bitcoin
10:00 – Inside the RSSX ETF structure and allocation
12:00 – Implementation examples for advisors and investors
14:00 – Rebalancing mechanics and volatility adjustments
15:30 – Diversifying before the crisis, not after
17:00 – Small starts and building from a position of strength
19:00 – Institutional adoption trends and parallels
21:00 – Reducing tracking error and client friction
22:00 – The reputational risk shift for advisors
23:30 – Regulatory clarity and institutional green lights
24:30 – The mission: improve outcomes without sacrificing core equity engines
Learn more at: https://returnstacked.com
Read more at: https://investresolve.com
ETFs: RSSX (Stocks + Gold & Bitcoin)
#PortfolioDiversification #ReturnStacking #GoldInvestment #BitcoinStrategy #InflationHedge #AsymmetricUpside #ETFInvesting #BehavioralFinance #WealthManagement #InvestmentStrategies #MikePhilbrick #ReSolveAssetManagement #RSSXETF
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In this episode Adam Butler and Rodrigo Gordillo host ReSolve’s Head of Quantitative Research, Andrew Butler to discuss how ReSolve employs tools from the field of machine learning to produce meaningful and practical improvements in investment outcomes.
We start with Andrew’s background in applied mathematics and in particular his experience applying ML tools to solve complex real-world problems in the physical sciences. It was fascinating to hear Andrew recount how he came to understand that the tools that work well to model physical systems are much less useful in a financial context. This was a consistent theme throughout the discussion.
Our objective was to offer a high-level overview of the ML toolset so we started by defining what ML is and digging into three traditional classes of ML: unsupervised learning, supervised learning, and reinforcement learning. We make each method accessible with simple examples and discuss how ReSolve uses the respective techniques to improve outcomes at virtually every step in the investment process.
At many points the group paused to reflect on the myriad ways in which financial markets are distinct from other problem categories. We explore why it is critical to view financial markets through the prism of ML for any statistical inference, and discuss several tools that should be handy in the toolbox of every modern financial analyst.
Of critical importance, we reinforced the fact that the ML toolset is useless – if not downright dangerous – if deployed naively without the direction and support of experienced operators. Without a deep understanding of the unique properties and pitfalls of financial markets ML tools are likely to do much more harm than good to portfolios.
We also discussed why the most important step – by far – in data-driven research is the validation and online learning step – the sentinel – where trader intuition and experience can amplify results by orders of magnitude.
There was some debate about the role of machines and humans in finance and more broadly, and how those roles may evolve. Rodrigo held out hope for sustained human dominance in complex tasks while Adam argued that machines could be playing a much larger and positive role in society already if humans would just get out of the way!
There is a lot of marketing around the field of machine learning at the moment but very little nuanced, practical wisdom. We hope you take something of practical relevance from our conversation.
Copyright © Resolve Asset Management
Warning: This conversation may alter your perspective on investing and portfolio construction.
When your clients think about risk they most often recall or imagine losing money or enduring volatile markets. You, as an advisor, however, have to widen your perspective on risk to include your clients’ feelings about their investments, and the potential decisions they may make as a result.
Your clients’ greatest risk is the probability they won’t meet their financial goals – it rests upon you, their advisor, to minimize this risk. How do you do that? What actions, what decisions, what conversations are required in order for you, as an advisor, to minimize the possibility that your clients won’t achieve their objectives?
Here, in this podcast episode, we take a deep dive into this dilemma, which may change some of your perspectives about how to tackle market risks as well as the key risk facing your clients and by proxy you, and to shed some light on how to overcome and succeed.
Mike and Rodrigo like to ask, “When it comes to investing, would you rather be comfortable, or successful?”
]]>S&P 500 valuations are stretched. Exactly how stretched? And what should we infer about future returns?In this 6-minute video Adam Butler introduces a simple but novel innovation for modeling equity market valuations. There are reasons to believe average valuations should rise through time in response to changes in market structure. We discuss the conditions that might lead to higher valuations through time, and present a model to account for it. Viewers might be surprised at what we find when we analyze current valuations through the lens of this new model.
Benjamin Graham famously stated that “In the short run the market is a voting machine, but in the long run, it is a weighing machine.” It is critical to keep this in mind as we discuss market valuations. In the short term, prices are set largely via reflexive forces related to informational cascades, herding, and positive feedback dynamics – so-called “animal spirits”. Markets that have gone up recently are more likely to continue going higher, regardless of valuations, as investors are primarily motivated by the fear of missing out on gains, and lagging their peer group. These dynamics manifest in the so-called “momentum” phenomenon, which has been observed since the dawn of markets.
However, high valuations set up a condition of ‘criticality’, such that as valuations become more stretched, even small shocks to the system can trigger a change of state. Think of a pile of sand. When the pile is small, pouring more sand onto the pile simply creates a larger pile. At some point the pile grows tall and narrow. As more sand falls on the peak, it continues to grow, but eventually a large portion of the structure falls off, collapsing the pile. It can’t be known in advance when the structure will break. But we can observe that the structure is becoming more and more fragile.
Current valuations imply that the market is approaching a state of criticality. So long as there are no major shocks, the market can press higher, perhaps substantially so. But the higher stocks go in the short term, the more vulnerable they become to a major event. This event cannot – to our knowledge – be reliably predicted in advance. However, there are methods – that have nothing to do with valuation analysis – that may be useful in identifying a change of state shortly after the fact, and that may be used to limit losses. We cover such techniques elsewhere, as they are beyond the scope of this article.
To our mind, while valuation analysis is not an effective tool for market timing, it is still extremely useful, primarily for estimating future long-term market returns. When you smooth away all the market noise, the more you pay for a dollar of earnings or balance sheet today, the less you should earn on your investment in the future. Valuation analysis can help quantify this relationship, to help capital allocators make sense of all the available investment options.
Herbert Stein is credited with the tautology that “If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.” Other colloquialisms like “No tree can grow to the sky,” express a similar sentiment. The formal name of this effect is “reversion to the mean”, which is simply the principle that most systems have a reasonable average level, around which the system fluctuates with some random error. This is an extremely useful principle because it allows us to identify when a system has strayed too far from its normative value, and quantify a likely trajectory.
Most analysts take the long-term average valuation level for their equilibrium value. This method is parsimonious and defensible, but it makes the assumption that the variables that factor into valuations do not change through time. While this may indeed be the case, for several reasons, we have cause to question this assumption.
Notwithstanding myriad fundamental factors that influence equilibrium market valuations, the fact is that time itself should lead to a higher equilibrium. Consider that, as markets progress through time, they present investors with more data. Investors who take the time to study this data may become more confident about the market’s true character. Participants might feel they have a better grasp of the distribution of risk and expected payoffs, and therefore require a lower return to deploy capital, leading to higher average prices over time.
Other less nebulous factors may also exert an upward bias on valuations. Markets have become much more liquid, and investors will pay a premium for liquidity. They have also become much more transparent. Data is ubiquitous and immediate. The cost of trading has become negligible for larger participants. In addition, innovations like Futures and ETFs tracking diverse global asset classes offer investors many more instruments to trade, which means equities are less risky as a constituent in a diversified portfolio. For these and other reasons, investors require lower returns to compensate them for equity risk, which should drive valuations higher over time.
If equilibrium valuations expand through time, it makes less sense to use the long-term average valuation to measure whether stocks are expensive or cheap. Rather, the valuation model should account for a consistent expansion in valuations, and evaluate markets at each point in time relative to the current equilibrium. It is relatively straightforward to model this steady expansion in valuations by regressing valuations on the time variable. The slope of the resulting regression line will describe the rate at which valuations expand through time.
We performed our analysis using the Cyclically Adjusted Price-to-Earnings (CAPE) ratio as our valuation metric. This popular valuation ratio was first proposed by Dr. Bob Shiller, and is often called the Shiller CAPE. It is a compelling valuation ratio because it averages earnings over the horizon of a typical market cycle. As such, it reduces the noise in typical earnings measures that results from margin compression/expansion at different points in the business cycle, as well as the type of earnings write-downs that occur during major bear markets. The ratio also adjusts earnings for the impact of inflation.
Figure 1 illustrates this concept. The dark blue line is the CAPE ratio from 1881 through 2017, while the gold line tracks the long-term mean value of the ratio, at a value of 16.8. The light blue was created by regressing CAPE on the index of months, and tracks the expansion in CAPE over time. You can see that the equilibrium value has expanded from a low of 12 in the late 1800s to 21 today.
Figure 1. Cyclically Adjusted PE Ratio, with Long-Term Mean and Regression on Time
Source: ReSolve Asset Management. Data from Robert Shiller.
Now that we have equilibrium values for the CAPE ratio through time, we can examine whether the market is expensive or cheap by comparing the current observed CAPE to the current equilibrium CAPE. Given a current CAPE ratio as of April 2017 was 29.2, we note that U.S. stocks are trading about 72% above their long-term average valuation, and 38% above the rising trend.
Some investors may wonder whether current valuations are further explained by prevailing low interest rates. To answer this question, we examined the degree to which adding the current 10-year Treasury interest rate as a variable in our regression improved the explanatory power of our model. To our surprise, current interest rates were almost completely irrelevant in explaining equity market valuations. The explanatory power of our regression model barely budged, moving from 14.8% to 16.1%. Moreover, interest rates were not a statistically significant explanatory variable in the regression.
If it’s a relief to you that the S&P 500 is only 37% overvalued, remember that this approximates how extended the S&P 500 was in the Global Financial Crisis, the 1960s, and the 1937 Recession, and was only exceeded by valuations during the Tech Bubble, Great Depression and Bank Panic of 1893. But the story is actually even more troubling. That’s because the very same factors described above, which would cause equilibrium valuations to rise through time, would also cause the long-term equity risk premium to decline. In a follow-on article we will examine the decline in U.S. and global Equity Risk Premiums, and use our new equilibrium CAPE model to set expectations for future returns for U.S. stocks.
Now is the time for investors and advisors alike to start thinking about how to reposition portfolios for much lower domestic stock market returns from this point forward, and the potential for a critical event sometime in the next year or two. These headwinds should also motivate investors to start investigating global asset allocation strategies that are designed to row, rather than sail.
Copyright © Resolve Asset Management
]]>In this series, we’re going to take a relatively deep dive on the fundamental principles of Adaptive Asset Allocation. The goal is to investigate just how deep the roots of this investing approach go, and provide an intuitive baseline for Global Tactical Asset Allocation strategies in general.
Our process consists of a few basic steps. First, decide on a consistent universe of liquid assets for evaluation. Perhaps surprisingly, selecting the right asset universe for investigation is quite a nuanced proposition, and we plan to discuss it at length later in this series. For now, we provide a brief overview of considerations and define our testing universe.
Next, rank assets by some form of momentum, and hold the strongest assets. We’ll be looking at a wide range of nominal and risk-adjusted momentum metrics to see if any of them stand out. Finally, we must decide how to combine our strongest assets to achieve optimal performance, given specific goals and objectives.
It’s important to keep in mind that any one of these steps is, in and of itself, an entire field of study. Our goal is to find a useful balance between the breadth and depth of each topic, providing actionable intelligence to forward-thinking advisors.
Please note this series is a living thing and will evolve over time. For now, it is our plan to divide the series into five intuitive modules:
The universe of assets that is selected for investigation can have a large impact on results and conclusions. With such a dizzying array of instruments to choose from, investors may feel it is prudent to simply include all sufficiently liquid ETFs. However, this approach may produce large unintended biases, which would corrupt our investigation.
To ensure we structure our analysis to focus on the value of active asset allocation decisions with minimal bias, we need clear goal posts. First, our universe should be macro-consistent, which means it must cover the full spectrum of liquid global asset classes, from every major economic region. This ensures that, to the greatest extent possible, we are evaluating a ‘closed system’ of capital allocation, with minimal capital leakage. Perhaps more importantly, it minimizes our susceptibility to survivorship bias, which involves selecting only those assets that have done well enough through history to merit our attention.
Second, our universe should be diverse, and rooted in sound fundamental theory. Specifically, a well-specified universe should have sufficient breadth, including assets whose returns are designed to respond differently to various economic environments. Given that economic growth and inflation surprises are the main fundamental drivers of asset prices, it is essential to include assets that can thrive in any combination of growth and inflation regimes. Figure 1 organizes a representative universe of global asset classes based on how they would be expected to respond to inflation and growth.
Figure 1. The Fundamental Drivers of Asset Returns
Source: ReSolve Asset Management
Third, while it is critical that all assets and economic regions be represented in our investment universe, the universe must also be free from bias. This means minimizing the potential for overlapping bets. The importance of this step cannot be overstated, and is often overlooked by nascent system developers and major asset managers alike.
To understand why this step is so critical, consider a global tactical manager that, in an effort to broaden his investment universe, decides to include the 50 most liquid U.S. listed ETFs. This universe captures a wide variety of asset classes, including commodities, gold, and global equity and bond markets. However, 37 of these 50 securities (74%) are essentially bets on U.S. equities, differentiated by sectors, smart beta, industries, capitalization, issuer, etc.
Many GTAA strategies involve ranking assets and holding a top fraction, such as the top half of assets. In this case, even if every one of the 13 non-U.S. equity ETFs were to rank in the top half, the strategy would still hold 12 U.S. equity related assets. In other words, even when U.S. stocks are ranked at the bottom, fully 48% (12 of the 25 holdings) of the portfolio’s exposure would be toward U.S. equity beta. If the strategy involves holding the top 1/3 of assets, it would hold a minimum of 4/17 = 24% in U.S. equities. Only a concentrated strategy that holds the top ¼ of assets or less would have the possibility of holding a zero weighting in U.S. stocks. And this would only occur if U.S. equities were ranked at the absolute bottom of all available asset classes.
If it’s still unclear why this is problematic, consider: A poorly-designed investment universe can make it impossible to distinguish between a lucky asset class overweight and a thoughtfully-designed investment strategy. If U.S. stocks comprise most of the investment universe, and they are thriving, even a completely unskilled strategy will also thrive. Conversely, if U.S. stocks suffer, even a highly-skilled strategy will suffer. It is only when the investment universe is well-specified that we can separate the methodological wheat from the chaff.
The current period offers a perfect case study of this phenomenon, as the past decade has been particularly kind to U.S. equities relative to every other major global asset class. In fact, you can see that U.S. stocks have dominated every other asset class in terms of USD total returns over the past 3, 6 and 9 year periods ending February 2017. Obviously, GTAA mandates with investment universes that have been biased toward U.S. equities have had a substantial tailwind over this period. Investors would be forgiven for interpreting the outperformance of these strategies as evidence of skill, where in fact it is an artifact of dumb luck.
Figure 2. Compound Annual USD Total Returns, Periods Ending February 2017
Source: ReSolve Asset Management. Data from CSI.
To summarize, our universe must be representative of the total global investment opportunity set; contain diverse assets that are designed to thrive in different environments of inflation and growth, and finally; avoid multiple instruments that track essentially the same asset class. Now let’s put all three of these objectives into context to select our universe for investigation:
The universe above meets all of our criteria, and covers over 95% of global exchange traded assets.
Note that this universe is slightly different than the universe that we explored in whitepaper. Specifically, we broadened the universe to include international and emerging government bonds, and TIPs. This is more representative of the world’s major asset classes. We also merged U.S. and international REITs into a global REITs index to reflect the fact that REITs are already included in equity indexes, and that they represent a relatively small proportion of liquid global market cap. Finally, we expanded our Asian exposure rather than focusing only on Japan.
It is critical to emphasize that the key words in the label “Global Tactical Asset Allocation” are “asset allocation.” The single greatest explanatory factor of long-term returns is the move from cash into risk assets. That’s why, for our purposes, we want consistent exposure to a diverse basket of risky assets that we expect to deliver excess returns over the long term. That’s why well formulated GTAA strategies are long-only, and why they do not attempt to time assets relative to cash. Market timing ia an excruciatingly challenging exercise for mathematical reasons that we won’t get into here (and several large tactical managers who built a business on this premise learned this the hard way, as every investor must). But we want to emphasize that, done right, GTAA strategies will always be exposed to risky assets. GTAA is about emphasizing those risky assets that are producing their best returns, and de-emphasizing those risky assets that are struggling – in the short term – while maintaining broad exposure to diverse risky assets over the long-term.
While the specification of a coherent investment universe is an important first step, there are other dimensions of the problem that must be defined up front. These dimensions are sometimes called “degrees of freedom,” “free parameters,” or “independent variables,” because their specification affects the outcome of our experiments. When we started out on this journey almost 10 years ago, we spent a great deal of time determining which combination of parameters yielded the best historical results. Since then, we’ve realized that this approach is exactly backward. Rather than seeking the narrow set of parameters that offer the best fit of the historical data, we should identify a range of parameters that work well, and use them all. Moreover, by examining the performance over a range of specifications, we gain a more realistic perspective on the likely distribution of future outcomes from the methodology.
Aside from universe specification, we must define the following parameters:
There is a possibility that, over our full test horizon, one or two assets might completely dominate the results, by virtue of being especially “trendy” or producing an especially high long-term Sharpe ratio. As a result, we will perform tests on all 79 universe combinations of 10 and 11 assets, along with the full universe. Are you interested what an optimization would look like since 1990 if it didn’t invest in U.S. stocks or U.S. Long-term Treasuries? We’re going to find out. In fact, by the time we’re done, we will have performed 79 universe combinations x 4 number of holdings x 51 different holding periods = 16,116 tests per system.
Corresponding performance metrics will also be provided to illustrate the range of outcomes for each strategy. By performing our tests in this way we gain a much better sense of the true character of each strategy, as well as the class of strategies in general. Prudent system engineers will pay special attention to the lower end of the distribution, as these data points almost certainly provide the greatest clues about what to expect in production.
In our next article, we will begin the task of introducing price momentum as a measurement of strength. We will demonstrate that momentum is persistent and robust, and offer a variety of ways with which to deploy it.
Copyright © Resolve Asset Management
]]>From the perspective of a (free-range) turkey, life is pretty good. The farmer is there in his earliest memories. At first, the turkey is afraid of the farmer, but it quickly comes to like him. After all, from the time it is born, the farmer comes each day with corn and seed to eat. He lets the turkey out into the yard each morning and shepherds it back into the coop in the evening. He protects the turkey from predators.
Over the arc of the year, the turkey becomes fat and happy. He looks forward to the farmer’s visits. In fact, as each day passes, the turkey learns to trust the farmer more and more.
Then one day the farmer slaughters him and all his friends.
This story is paraphrased from a chapter in The Black Swan by Nassim Taleb. The lesson may be obvious, but Taleb really drives home the conclusion:
“Consider that the turkey’s experience may have, rather than no value, a negative value. It learned from observation, as we are all advised to do (hey, after all, this is what is believed to be the scientific method). Its confidence increased as the number of friendly feedings grew, and it felt increasingly safe even though the slaughter was more and more imminent. Consider that the feeling of safety reached its maximum when the risk was at the highest!”
So who are the turkeys in the current market? Consider that for the past 7 years, the world’s central banks have fed investors with a steady diet of nearly unlimited support for risky assets like global stocks, bonds, and real estate. Markets have been buffeted time and again by a series of potentially serious crises – the European debt crisis, a mid-cycle global growth shock, Chinese debt/currency crisis, Brexit, etc. – yet each time central banks have stepped in to guarantee rising prices.
And what have investors learned? They’ve learned exactly what central banks wanted them to learn: that it pays to take risk. The more risk the better. Why settle with razor-thin yields on safe government debt when you can purchase high yield bonds or dividend stocks and earn twice or three times the income? Don’t worry, if a risk appears that might produce losses on these investments (they aren’t explicitly guaranteed after all), a central bank will appear and make the problems disappear.
The Merriam-Webster dictionary describes “moral hazard” as “the likelihood of investors to take greater risks because of the knowledge that losses incurred as a result of those risks will be covered by another (as a government)”. Investors today have been lured into a sense of security by central banks, who by their actions over the past 7 years have encouraged an extreme case of moral hazard. In fact, investors are currently pricing many large global asset classes as though central banks have eliminated all risk.
While this is an inherently dangerous situation for investors, the fact is it could go on for quite a while longer without meaningful negative consequences. And just like the Thanksgiving turkey, investors become more and more confident each time central banks step in to bail them out. This confidence has real consequences, as investors continue to pay higher and higher prices for assets on the assumption that there will be no consequence for taking reckless amounts of risk.
At this point in the cycle, virtually every investor everywhere is grinding their teeth. After all, global equities haven’t made any upward progress in almost two years. Only income investors, steadily clipping their coupons and receiving their dividends have any cause to celebrate. As a result, the draw toward income bearing investments is almost inescapable. Not a week goes by that we don’t speak to an investor who desperately wants to buy more dividend stocks, bank stocks, or higher-yielding real estate or mortgage instruments.
But each time we hear this plea, we revisit the fact that these investments are risky. What do we mean by risky? We mean that, despite the farmer’s central banks’ seemingly infinite benevolence over the past five years, a day will come when these investments are left to their own devices. Someday companies will be forced to pay their bills on time without government support, and many will find that they can’t. And when that day happens many investors in high dividend stocks and high yielding bonds will discover that their investments aren’t worth nearly what they paid for them. In fact, they may discover that they are worth a lot less. Consider the figure below, which shows the performance of Canadian bank stocks, dividend stocks, RIETs, and high-yield bonds the last time monetary authorities lost control of the financial system in 2008.

Source: ReSolve Asset Management. Data from CSI.
“The Federal Reserve is not currently forecasting a recession.”
– United States Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke (January 10, 2008)
Note the date on the quote above (highlighted with a red vertical line on the chart). Just a few months later global markets entered the worst economic downturn in 80 years, and markets entered a truly epic crash. Canadian banks and REITs, and dividend stocks dropped over 50% from peak to trough in 2008. Even high-yield bonds – bonds! – dropped almost 30%. It just goes to show that even those who are charged with managing the financial system have no idea what’s about to happen just a few months down the road.

Now, it’s possible that central planners can manage to navigate these stormy waters without a compass or a map. But it’s also possible that they make a mistake, or simply lose control of the process. After all, risk is risk. It’s like energy – you can transform it, redirect it, even contain it for a time – but it cannot be destroyed. Rather, the longer central planners attempt to contain risk in the system, the more likely it is that they will lose all control when the next crisis inevitably hits. After all, if all it took to create lasting prosperity were endless central bank money-printing, why are we all working so hard?
The hard reality is that no one can predict how all of this will shake out. After all, who would have predicted, in the ashes of the technology wreck in 2003, that five years later housing prices would have tripled and oil would be trading at $100 a barrel? Who would have predicted after then Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan declared that market valuations were exhibiting “irrational exuberance” in late 1996, that the NASDAQ would go on to triple before peaking in 2000? Who knew in the depths of the European debt crisis in 2011 that five years later European government debt would be trading with negative yields, and U.S. stocks would have almost doubled?
The only certainty in markets – as in life – is change. That’s why we embrace investment methods based on the simple principles of observation and evolution. Did investors need a crystal ball to capitalize on the boom in oil, or the NASDAQ bubble, or the European debt crisis? Perhaps surprisingly, the answer is “NO”. Rather, it is enough to observe the behavior of markets and regularly adapt portfolios so that they consistently reflect markets’ best estimates of the future.
Well, it is usually enough. The trouble is that the last two years have been characterized by a generalized lack of conviction in either direction. The MSCI All-Cap World Equity Index is trading just 1% higher than it traded in September 2014. We interpret this sideways grind as a confession that nobody really understands how to deal with the multifaceted challenges represented by lower economic growth, record government debt, and market valuations that manage to look expensive (relative to history) and cheap (relative to bonds) at the same time.
Those investors who embrace traditional allocations to mostly domestic stocks and bonds are expressing unwavering faith in a centrally planned market. In contrast, ReSolve strategies express less faith in central planning, and greater faith that market forces will eventually prevail. In the meantime, we continue to employ methods that prioritize global diversification, with systematic exposure to rules that have rewarded investors for centuries.
At ReSolve, we like to focus on the most important investment math, which shows that long-term investment success is predicated on limiting losses to magnitudes from which investors can easily recover. For example, investors need a 100% return to recover from a 50% loss – a multiple of 2x – while a gain of just 11% is required to recover from a 10% loss – a multiple of 1.11x. As a result, our investment approaches are designed to maximize the probability of sidestepping major bear markets.
However, and as mentioned above, risk cannot be destroyed, just transferred. ReSolve strategies transform the risk of infrequent catastrophic drawdowns – on the order of 30-50% – into the risk of more frequent manageable drawdowns of 5-10% or less. Sometimes these smaller drawdowns can last for many months. We certainly understand that these periods can be quite uncomfortable. After all, we are investors right alongside you. So in addition to feeling a deep sense of urgency to deliver returns to our clients that will enable them to meet their financial goals, we also feel drawdowns and a sustained lack of progress in our own pocketbooks.
It’s natural to worry, during more difficult periods with lack of progress, about whether the approach we’ve chosen is the right one. We are here to tell you, without guile or hubris, that our resolve is not shaken. But that’s because we have spent thousands of hours getting our hands dirty in the guts of the machine. We’ve lived millions of lifetimes in simulation examining the true fundamental distribution of possibilities in the future. We’ve examined the strengths and vulnerabilities of our methods alongside every conceivable alternative, across two hundred years of economic change, and found the alternatives wanting. We know what you need to achieve financial success, and we are confident that the methods we employ provide the best chance of achieving it.
Copyright © Resolve Asset Management
]]>by Adam Butler, GestaltU
Benjamin Graham famously said that “In the short run, the market is a voting machine but in the long run, it is a weighing machine.” But this is not quite correct. Rather, in the short term, the market is a machine where investors “vote” about what the market will “weigh” in the future. Of course, when Benjamin Graham referred to “weighing,” he was actually referring to how investors “value” an asset.
The goal of this article is to summarize the complex dynamics that drive asset returns. You’ll discover that asset returns are impacted by four sources of risk. Two of these risks affect all assets in the same way, and therefore are undiversifiable. The other two risks impact different kinds of assets in different ways. Since some assets respond positively to changes in these risks while others react negatively, these latter two risks can be diversified away. In other words, investors who take an informed view of diversification can almost eliminate fully half of the sources of risk in their portfolio.
Before investigating the four sources of risk, it’s important to understand that markets are constantly adjusting prices to reflect investor expectations about the future. As a result, meaningful changes in prices will only occur if investors receive new information that is inconsistent with current expectations. When this happens, investors experience a shock, which causes them to adjust the price of assets higher or lower to reflect this new reality.
To make this concept more concrete, imagine that investors are currently expecting a poor environment for a certain asset. To reflect these pessimistic expectations, investors will have acted accordingly to lower the price of the asset. If the future environment is unfavorable for the asset, the price of the asset should not change. That’s because investors have already priced the asset appropriately for an unfavorable future. The price of the asset will only be reset higher or lower if investors receive new information that causes a meaningful change in expectations.
To summarize this critical point, asset prices do not change in response to favorable or unfavorable environments. Rather, asset prices reflect investors’ current expectations about a favorable or unfavorable environment. Prices will only experience meaningful change if investors receive new information that represents a shock to their current expectations.
Asset classes refer to the broadest categories of financial assets. Few investors think about investing from this perspective, but in fact most of the important things that happen in markets are driven by what happens at the asset class level.
When we refer to asset classes, we are talking about global stocks, bonds, currencies, commodities, inflation protected securities, and traded real-estate. These asset class categories have very different underlying mechanics, which cause them to react in different directions to certain types of shocks. In other words, a given shock may cause stocks to be repriced in one direction while bonds are repriced in the opposite direction.
In some cases, stocks and bonds in different regions of the world will also react to shocks in different directions for intuitive fundamental reasons. For example, some regions are primarily exporters while others are primarily importers. Some regions produce a surplus of commodities, while other economies produce few commodities. As a result, it is sometimes useful to divide global stocks and bonds into regional baskets to capture this diversity. Figure 1. below describes the major asset classes that matter to this discussion.
Figure 1. Asset class behavior in different inflation and growth environments
Source: ReSolve Asset Management
There are other ways to segment stock and bond markets, such as by industry sector or credit rating. While these categories are useful for certain investment activities, they are not meaningful distinctions in the context we will discuss here. At root, stocks of all industries within a given regional economy will react in the same direction to the same fundamental shocks. For this reason, thinking about asset classes in terms of sectors adds little incremental value in terms of diversity.
All things equal, investors prefer to hold cash because it is available for immediate consumption. Most investors don’t hold cash on hand directly, but rather hold their savings in bank accounts. Larger investors hold cash in Treasury bills. As a result, cash actually earns a small return. As Treasury bills mature, they are rolled over at different rates. Savers have a good sense of what cash will earn at each point in the future by observing the yield curve, which signals investors’ expectations about future cash rates.
Why would an investor abandon a safe cash investment, which can be used for guaranteed consumption at any time, for a risky investment which may produce an uncertain amount of consumption in the future? The answer is that in return for accepting the risk of uncertain future consumption, including the possibility of loss in the short term, investors expect to produce higher returns to fund a larger amount of consumption in the long-term. But how do investors decide how much cash they should pay today for the opportunity for higher future consumption?
Perhaps the most fundamental principle in finance is that the value of an asset today is the sum of all the future cash flows that we expect the asset to produce in the future. For most assets, these cash flows are distributed in two forms: dividends or interest payments, which are made at regular intervals, and; the cash we expect to receive on the sale (or maturity) of the asset.
In order to entice an investor out of cash and into an investment, the investor must believe its future cash-flows will be larger than what he would otherwise earn on cash invested in Treasury bills. Each future cash flow on the investment is compared against the expected return on cash, which is forecast by the yield curve. So as a useful simplification, investors actually price an investment as the sum of its future cash-flows in excess of what they would otherwise earn on cash.
For practical purposes, the asset classes in Figure 1. can be divided into three fundamental groups. Stock-like assets, which include all global equity markets and real estate, have highly variable cash-flows. Bond-like assets, including inflation protected securities, have guaranteed cash-flows. The third category consists of assets with no cash-flows, such as commodities and gold. The nature of an asset’s cash-flows will dictate how it should react to different types of shocks.
With these simple concepts in mind, let’s turn our attention to how the four risks described above impact the price of investments by shocking investors’ expectations about future cash flows from investments versus future returns on cash itself. Importantly, the framework below ignores complex feedback dynamics that cause some types of risk to impact other types of risk. For simplicity, we also discuss risks as primarily affecting certain asset classes. While the forces we describe below are important drivers of asset returns, it is easier to understand the four types of risks in isolation. We spend some time at the end of this article describing their interactions.
The prices of stock-like investments are primarily influenced by investors’ expectations about the size and timing of future cash-flows. Cash-flows from stocks are produced from corporate earnings. All things equal, when sales growth is strong, earnings growth is strong. In aggregate, corporate revenues are ultimately driven by economic growth. When economic growth exceeds expectations, revenues also exceed expectations, and this results in better-than-expected corporate cash-flows. When economic growth is weak, this dynamic flows in reverse, resulting in lower than expected cash-flows.
Stock prices are thus very sensitive to expectations about future economic growth. If a series of new data points leads investors to increase expectations about future economic growth, investors are likely to increase their expectations about future cash-flows. This should result in higher stock prices. On the other hand, where investors observe a series of underwhelming economic data, they will reduce their expectations about future cash flows, and price stocks lower.
The prices of bond-like investments, and hard assets like commodities and gold, are primarily impacted by changes in inflation expectations. Inflation impacts the cost of future consumption. If inflation is expected to be high, investors expect that they will have to pay much more in the future for important goods and services. That is, the price of consumption is expected to rise. If inflation is expected to be low, investors expect that the price of consumption is expected to remain relatively stable. Sometimes, investors expect negative inflation – deflation – in which case they expect prices in the future to fall.
Inflation affects the rate that investors require to hold cash rather than consume. If investors believe that prices will be much higher in the future, they have high incentives to consume today. As a result, they require a higher return on cash to offset their rational desire for immediate consumption. This higher return on cash will be reflected at each future point on the yield curve. In other words, all things equal high inflation means high interest rates. The opposite is also true: low inflation expectations typically result in low interest rates.
Recall however that asset prices do not change because of investor expectations. Prices at all times are consistent with investor expectations. Rather, asset prices change because of unexpected shifts in investor expectations that occur as a result of new information.
Bonds and hard assets would be expected to react in opposite ways to changes in inflation expectations. When a bond is issued, its interest payments are fixed at the rates that prevailed at the time. The size of these interest payments are known in advance, and do not change over the life of the bond. The price of a bond is simply the sum of its future interest payments, in excess of what an investor would expect to earn on cash over the same period.
When fixed interest payments on a bond are exactly in line with what an investor would expect to earn on cash over the same investment period, the bond trades at ‘par’. (We will, for now, ignore the fact that bond investors also require a premium return because they must either lock-up their savings for several years, or accept the possibility of having to sell the bond before it matures at a lower price). Now imagine that there is an upside inflation shock, such that investors become more concerned about higher costs of consumption in the future. Investors feel pressure to consume now rather than later, so holding onto cash becomes less attractive. As a result, higher yields on cash are required at each point in the future to entice savers to remain in cash.
Now the fixed interest payments on the bond are below what an investor could expect to earn on their cash over the same horizon. An investor would no longer be willing to price the bond at par. Rather, investors would only be willing to purchase the bond at a lower price, so that their expected return on the bond (relative to the price they pay) is once again attractive relative to the choice of holding cash.
In this way, the price of bonds is directly impacted by inflation shocks in either direction. Upside inflation shocks cause interest rates to rise, which makes the fixed interest payments on existing bonds less attractive, causing bond prices to fall. Downside inflation shocks cause future interest rates to fall, which makes the fixed interest payments on bonds relatively more attractive, pushing bond prices higher.
Bonds react positively to negative inflation shocks, but fall on rough times in periods of unexpectedly high inflation. Which prompts the question, what assets should offer protection against upside inflation shocks?
By their fundamental nature, inflation protected bonds, commodities and gold should produce strong returns during periods of unexpectedly high inflation. For this reason, they perform an important duty in portfolios, acting as ballast to falling bond prices in the event of upside inflation shocks. To understand why, and when each of these asset classes might be expected to flourish, we need to understand the three fundamental causes of inflation.
Inflation can be caused by a demand shock, a supply shock, or a monetary shock. A demand shock results when consumption growth is stronger than expected, and producers can’t keep up with demand, which causes the prices of goods and services to increase. This type of inflation is often broad-based, and directly impacts people’s daily consumption basket. This is picked up using measures of price increases such as the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Inflation protected bonds, such as Treasury Inflation Protected Securities are designed so that their interest payments are adjusted regularly to reflect changes in the CPI. As a result, this special type of bond becomes valuable during demand led inflation shocks, as investors seek ways to preserve their purchasing power.
A supply-led inflation shock occurs when a fundamental input to the economy – for example oil or iron ore – experiences an unexpected change in supply. For example, in the 1970s two Middle-Eastern conflicts – the Yom Kippur War in 1973, and the Iranian Revolution in 1979 – triggered interruptions in oil exports, causing major oil shortages in major industrial countries and triggering large increases in energy costs. On the other hand, rapid unexpected on-stream supply of unconventional petroleum in the United States as a result of ‘fracking’ technology may have contributed to the large drop in oil prices observed in 2014-2015. It’s clear that commodities do well during supply led inflation shocks.
Lastly, monetary inflation shocks occur because central banks of the world enact policies that have the goal of altering currency exchange rates. When a country’s currency exchange rate declines relative to other currencies, it costs that country more to import goods and services, while its exported goods and services get cheaper. When a country’s central bank acts to set exchange rates far below what might be warranted on the basis of economic competitiveness, investors may seek to preserve their global purchasing power by purchasing assets that are outside the reach of central banks. For several thousand years, gold has been a primary recipient of these capital flows. As a result, gold often does quite well during monetary led inflation shocks.
So far we have presented a framework where asset prices are impacted by unexpected shifts in expectations about either growth or inflation in isolation. We positioned stocks as being particularly sensitive to economic growth, while bonds and commodities are sensitive to inflation expectations. But in economics, few things happen in isolation.
The fact is, changes in expectations about growth are typically coincident with changes in expectations about inflation. Consider a situation where a confluence of unexpectedly negative economic data causes investors to reduce their expectations about future economic growth. Clearly this will impact expectations about corporate earnings, with predictable effects on stocks.
But lower growth rarely happens in isolation. Slower than expected growth means that there will not be as much demand for goods and services as companies were expecting. Companies may end up with a surplus of inventory, and have to lower prices to entice greater consumption. Lower than expected prices means a negative inflation shock. Lower than expected inflation means a downward revision to interest rates, which benefits bond prices.
On the other hand, lower growth may be the result of a large potential supply shock emanating from a primary economic input, such as a large spike in the prices of basic necessities like oil or food. The cost of basic necessities competes with discretionary consumption, so if consumers end up spending more at the gas station or the supermarket, they have less money left in their pocketbook for discretionary consumption. In this case, commodity prices (oil and food) will have been steadily rising as investors were adjusting stocks lower in anticipation of slower than expected economic growth.
You can see that changes in asset prices are driven by interactions between the forces of inflation and growth. Investors are constantly adjusting their expectations about these dynamics, and repricing asset prices accordingly. Moreover, each asset class responds in a predictable way to different combinations of shocks. But as we will now see, investors who are mindful of these relationships between asset pricing and economic shocks have the ability to diversify away the risks of potentially adverse economic outcomes.
Figure 1. above provides a theoretical framework for how a wide variety of assets should react to different types of economic shocks. You’ll note that stocks and bonds only really do well in certain economic environments. Specifically, portfolios of stocks and bonds thrive when growth is stronger than expected, and changes in inflation expectations are benign or decelerating.
Unfortunately, most investors’ portfolios are composed almost entirely of these two asset classes. Since the global economy can spend decades experiencing negative growth shocks and large inflation shocks in either direction, these traditional portfolios can struggle for long stretches of time during unfavorable regimes.
The following chart and table describe how a typical U.S. “balanced” portfolio (dark blue in the chart) consisting of 60% stocks and 40% intermediate Treasury bonds would have fared during major economic environments over the past half century. Pay special attention to the 1970s, where both stocks and bonds struggled under a stagflationary regime. Also note the extended periods of 20-30% losses, in some cases lasting several years, during the brutal bear markets of 1974, 1987, 2000 and 2008. These episodes are symptomatic of inadequate portfolio diversification.
Figure 2. Cumulative growth of U.S. 60/40 portfolio vs. Global Risk Parity portfolio across economic regimes.
Source: ReSolve Asset Management. Data from Global Financial Data. Simulated and hypothetical results. Please see disclaimer.
Sadly, investors in traditional portfolios of stocks and bonds endure unnecessary financial risk because they think too narrowly about diversification. Worse, this extra risk is not rewarded with excess returns, because it can be diversified away.
A truly diversified portfolio would hold assets that are designed to thrive in a wide variety of economic environments, such as the entire universe described in Figure 1. Of course, among these assets there are some that are quite volatile, and others that are much more stable. In order to maximize the diversification properties of all the assets, they must all contribute an equal amount of risk to the portfolio. This maximally diversified portfolio has a name: Global Risk Parity. Notice in Figure 2. how this diversified approach produces steady returns in virtually all market environments, with lower volatility, and relatively minor peak-to-trough losses (drawdowns).
It’s clear that shifts in inflation and growth expectations pose a meaningful risk to investors in any major asset class. Fortunately, it is possible to assemble a portfolio that neutralizes exposure to these risks. By expanding into assets that respond in predictably diverse ways to positive or negative shocks to growth and inflation expectations, and equalizing risk exposures, it is possible to manage economic uncertainty through diversification. In fact, this very concept is the primary feature of Global Risk Parity portfolios.
It is sometimes rational for investors to reprice assets even if there is no change in expectations about economic variables. In other words, assets can be repriced even if there is no change to investor expectations about growth or inflation.
Consider that a rational investor will only be enticed out of a safe cash position to invest in a risky asset, such as a stock or bond, if he expects to earn a higher return on that asset than he could earn from cash. Investors will pay a high premium for an asset when its expected return is substantially higher than that of cash over the term of the investment.
As a simplification, central banks are largely responsible for setting the return on cash. And through their communications, they not only set the expected returns on cash at the current moment, but they also can communicate their intentions about cash rates in the future. Sometimes – for example, when central bankers are concerned about the prospects of overheated inflation – they communicate that their intent is for cash rates to rise over the next few years. At other times, and for other reasons, they signal their intent for cash rates to go lower.
Consider a stock market index that is trading at $1000. Assume that at this price, the market is expected to produce a compound return of 7% over the next few years. Meanwhile, central banks have been communicating their intent for cash rates to remain below 5% for the foreseeable future. In this case, the current market price of $1000 is reflecting that, at equilibrium, investors are prepared to accept stock-market risk in return for at least a 2% premium return over cash.
Now imagine that the central bank signals that they are going to move their target for cash rates from 5% to 7% over the next few years. Critically, this move was not anticipated by the market. This may be because the possibility of a shift in policy was not well communicated by the central bank in previous announcements. Or perhaps the move is inconsistent with how the central bank has traditionally behaved in response to the type of economic conditions that currently prevail.
Whatever the reason, stock market investors are now faced with a very different economic equation. They can invest in risky stocks and expect to earn 7%, but with a chance of extreme losses in the short and intermediate term. Alternatively, they can invest in safe cash and expect to earn 7% with essentially no risk of loss.
Investors had previously signaled that they were willing to accept a 2% premium for investing in stocks over cash. Now they are faced with earning a 0% premium. The natural consequence is for investors to reprice the market lower so that, if investors were to purchase the market at the new lower price, they would expect to earn the same 2% excess return that they required before the rate shock. This might require that the market should be priced to $800, or $500.
This example highlights that unanticipated changes to expected future cash rates represents a very significant driver of asset class returns. Importantly, the market in the example above could be any market – stocks, bonds, REITs, etc., as all assets respond in the same way to this type of shock. This fact has profoundly important consequences. That’s because, since all risky assets respond in the same way to the same shock, this type of risk cannot be diversified away. In other words, all portfolios everywhere – no matter how diversified – will be impacted by this risk, and there is no costless way to hedge the risk away.
It is critical to understand that markets are nothing more than the collective expression of all investors’ fears and hopes at any particular time. Sometimes investors are optimistic and hopeful in aggregate, while at other times they are pessimistic and fearful. An investor who is fearful about economic uncertainty will require a larger potential return to entice them out of safe cash and into a risky investment. Greedy investors, on the other hand, will be willing to accept a high degree of risk for the chance to earn a small excess return.
This dynamic is complicated by the fact that investors’ feelings of hope and fear are to a very large extent informed by the market’s behavior itself. When the market rises, investors perceive that other investors are feeling more optimistic about the future, and this prompts feelings of optimism, greed and envy. Optimistic investors who are greedy for returns are more likely to move capital from cash into risky assets for the promise of greater returns. This in turn causes markets to rise further, bolstering aggregate confidence. When markets fall investors perceive that risks were larger than they thought, and this provokes feelings of pessimism and fear. Fearful investors are less likely to deploy cash assets into the market, and are more likely to move capital out of markets and into safe cash. This causes prices to fall, invoking more fear and commensurate selling.
A meaningful portion of changes in investor risk appetite stems from changes in expectations about growth and inflation. As a result, it is challenging to observe this type of risk in isolation. Moreover, when changes in risk appetite do manifest independent of genuine fundamental shifts in investor expectations about economic conditions, markets tend to normalize quickly. As a result, while this risk is real, and can’t effectively be diversified away, the practical effects of this risk are likely to be relatively small.
It is useful to decompose expected returns on risky assets into the returns that investors are guaranteed to receive on cash plus a premium that investors expect to receive for bearing market volatility. As we’ve seen, this volatility is derived from three fundamental sources, as illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Decomposition of Risk
Source: ReSolve Asset Management with reference to Balanced Asset Allocation by Alex Shahidi (Wiley, 2014)
What does this all mean for investors? First, investors in diversified portfolios should expect to be compensated for accepting the risk of unanticipated shifts in expectations about future cash rates. That’s because this risk affects all assets in the same direction, so it cannot be diversified away. Indeed, all investors everywhere are susceptible to this one source of risk.
Second, investors should not expect to be compensated for taking risks that can be easily neutralized through better diversification. For a humble investor with neutral views on the future, a diversified portfolio like Global Risk Parity almost always has a higher expected risk-adjusted return, with less exposure to major economic risks, than any other more concentrated portfolio.
Special thanks to Alex Shahidi whose book Balanced Asset Allocation does a superb job of articulating the concepts above. We would highly recommend the book to any investor seeking a better understanding of portfolio balance and risk parity.
Copyright © GestaltU
Over the last several months, in particular, the number of articles discussing the shift from “active management” to “passive indexing” have surged.
I get it. The market seems to be immune to decline.
It is effectively the final evolution of “bull market psychology” as investors capitulate to the “if you can’t beat’em, join’em” mentality.
But it is just that. The final evolution of investor psychology that always leads the “sheep to the slaughter.”
Let me just clarify the record – “There is no such thing as passive investing.”
While you may be invested in an “index,” when the next bear market correction begins, and the pain of loss becomes large enough, “passive indexing” will turn into “active panic.”
Sure, you can hang on. But there will be a point where your conviction will eventually be broken. It is just a function of how much loss it takes to get there.
Over the last four years, as the Central Bank fueled surge in asset prices has climbed relentlessly higher, the psychological shift from active to passive management has gained ground. Unfortunately, this is a result of a psychological bias where recent performance is extrapolated indefinitely into the future. This is known as “recency or anchoring bias,” and is one of the primary factors that has the greatest effect on investor returns over time. As stated previously:
“However, in order to judge today’s market level, it is desirable, perhaps essential, to have a clear picture of its past behavior. Speculators often prosper through ignorance; it is a cliché that in a roaring bull market knowledge is superfluous and experience a handicap. But the typical experience of the speculator is one of temporary profit and ultimate loss.”
Yes. “YOU are a speculator.”
You have none, zero, nada, no control over the direction of an individual company, the index or the fund manager. You are simply SPECULATING on the price you paid for an asset that you HOPE to sell at a higher price to someone else in the future. That is, in its most basic form, a speculation.
The importance of that statement is that most individuals extrapolate past performance indefinitely into the future and become extremely complacent in managing for risk. This tendency is what leads investors to “buy high and sell low.” This psychology is displayed in the following chart.
The question that must be answered is whether this is just a bull market, or some sort of “new market” that will defy all previous experiences?
If this is just a bull market, then the term itself suggests that it is just the first half of a full-market cycle and eventually a bear market will follow. The chart below shows the history of full market cycles going back to 1900.
Historically, full market cycles have finished when prices complete a “mean reverting” process by falling well below the long-term mean. Since the beginning of the secular bull market in the 1980’s the full “mean reverting” process has not yet been completed due to the artificial interventions by Central Banks to prop up asset prices.
There is an argument to be made that this is could indeed be a “new market” given the continued interventions by global Central Banks in a direct effort to support asset prices. However, despite the coordinated efforts of Central Banks globally to keep asset prices inflated to support consumer confidence, there is plenty of historic evidence that suggests such attempts to manipulate markets are only temporary in nature.
This can also be seen by looking at the rate of change in the S&P 500 index over a 72-month period. The chart below shows the rate of change the real, inflation-adjusted, return of the S&P 500 index from 1900 to present. I have also overlaid that with the actual real S&P 500 index (log-2 basis). This more clearly shows that from current peaks of the long-term rate of change in the index, forward market returns have become less desirable.
The conclusion is quite simple. The current rate of change is in extreme territory and is exceeded only by five other market up-moves: the roaring bull market of the twenties leading into the Great Depression, the bull market of the fifties and the technology boom. Further, the trajectory of the up-move is similar to that of the market leading into the highs of 1929 and the highs in 1983. The spike in the ROC coming off the secular bear market lows of 1974, ended with the crash of 1987.
Such extreme movements in prices over a relatively short period, regardless of underlying circumstances, have all had similar outcomes. Consequently, investors should expect a similar outcome in the future. However, in the short-term psychology tends to overtake more logical thought processes as the “need for greed” keeps investors at the table long after the “cards have turned cold.”
Valuations also provide similar evidence that the current market is most likely no different than previous bull market cycles. The forward price/earnings (PE) ratio — the price of the S&P 500 divided by the expected earnings of those S&P 500 companies — is probably the most popular way to measure value in the stock market.
In theory, it tells us if the market is cheap or expensive relative to some long-term average. Unfortunately, since P/E’s are terrible at predicting short-term outcomes for the market, investors tend to quickly dismiss them as “being wrong this time.” Such attitudes have historically not worked out well for individuals.
The series of charts below show what valuations tell you about what should be expected as investors with respect to their longer-term investment goals. The charts below are the total dividend reinvested returns of the inflation adjusted S&P 500 index.
Not surprisingly, the expected total inflation-adjusted returns from currently high levels of valuation have historically been disappointing relative to what investors had witnessed previously.
Importantly, the charts above DO NOT mean that EVERY year will be a low return. What history suggests is that forward returns will be much more volatile with periods of significant drawdowns which will comprise a total long-term return at lower levels. Unfortunately, most investors will not survive to see that outcome.
The problem with the “passive indexing” argument is that it is primarily based on flawed assumptions of “average” returns over a period of time. However, the validity and dependability of this rosy view cannot be conclusive, because NO prediction, whether of a repetition of past patterns or of a complete break with past patterns, can be proved in advance to be right.
Nevertheless, past experience does have some things to say that are at least relevant to our problem. Optimism and confidence have always accompanied bull markets. This must be so otherwise the bull market could not have existed. Irrational exuberance, willful blindness, and overconfidence are the fuel which propels “bull markets” to their dizzying heights.
Unfortunately, exuberance and complacency are replaced by distrust and pessimism when bull markets eventually collapse.
As the evidence suggests, the current bull market is likely not a “new market” but just the first half of a full market cycle. Eventually, the cycle will complete itself as price goes through a mean reverting event. This is not a BEARISH prognostication but a simple reality. Nothing more. Nothing less.
As Adam Butler, Mike Philbrick and Rodrigo Gordillo penned back in 2013:
“Portfolio growth is governed by the mathematics of compounding, which means that, for example, a 100% gain is erased by a 50% loss, and a 50% loss requires a 100% gain to get back to even. Applying the same principles to where we are in the current bull/bear cycle is illuminating.
If we assume that the next bear market will deliver losses in-line with what we have experienced from bear markets through history, then at the bottom of the next bear market investors will have lost 38% of their portfolio value. The question is, how much must current investors expect stocks to gain before peaking to justify owning them here instead of waiting to purchase them in the next bear market?
The most unbiased estimate of the magnitude of the next bear market is the historical median of 38%. Using the math of compounding, we can determine that a 38% loss requires a 61% gain to break-even [1 / (1 – 38%)]. Logically then, and by extension, investors who choose to hold stocks today must expect gains of at least 61% in order to rationalize their investment; otherwise they would eliminate the anxiety of riding the equity roller-coaster and simply invest in cash, waiting to pounce on stocks at equivalent or lower value at some point during the next bear market.”
In the near term, over the next several months or even couple of years, markets could very likely continue their bullish trend as long as nothing upsets the balance of investor confidence and market liquidity. However, of that, there is no guarantee.
As Ben Graham stated back in 1959:
“‘The more it changes, the more it’s the same thing.’ I have always thought this motto applied to the stock market better than anywhere else. Now the really important part of the proverb is the phrase, ‘the more it changes.’
The economic world has changed radically and will change even more. Most people think now that the essential nature of the stock market has been undergoing a corresponding change. But if my cliché is sound, then the stock market will continue to be essentially what it always was in the past, a place where a big bull market is inevitably followed by a big bear market.
In other words, a place where today’s free lunches are paid for doubly tomorrow. In the light of recent experience, I think the present level of the stock market is an extremely dangerous one.”
He is right, of course, things are little different now than they were then.
What is important to remember is that for every “bull market” there MUST be a “bear market.” While “passive indexing” sounds like a winning approach to “pace” the markets during the late stages of an advance, it is worth remembering it will also “pace” just as well during the subsequent decline.
Oh…so you say you’re going to “sell” those “passive ETF’s” before that happens?
Well, then you are not so “passive” after all.
Lance Roberts
Lance Roberts is a Chief Portfolio Strategist/Economist for Clarity Financial. He is also the host of “The Lance Roberts Show” and Chief Editor of the “Real Investment Advice” website and author of “Real Investment Daily” blog and “Real Investment Report“. Follow Lance on Facebook, Twitter and Linked-In
Copyright © Clarity Financial
]]>“The greatest trick the Devil ever pulled was convincing the world he didn’t exist.”
– Verbal Kint, The Usual Suspects
The investment industry has investors convinced that the only path to better performance is through stock selection. As a result, most investors approach the challenge of portfolio construction exactly backward, and miss out on the most important opportunities to produce differentiated performance. The purpose of this series is to challenge the conventions that lead to misguided asset allocation priorities, and offer compelling reasons for practitioners to reverse their thinking, with the goal of delivering better outcomes for investors.
To review, Part I of this series introduced Grinold’s Fundamental Law of Active Management. Grinold proved that an investor’s opportunity to generate performance depends largely on the number of diverse investments that are available to construct portfolios. All else equal, an investor with more diverse investment choices should outperform an investor with fewer choices.
In Part II, we explained how to determine the number of truly independent sources of return in a portfolio. We used a technique called principal component analysis, and demonstrated how to isolate equity ‘beta’ from the returns of the 30 Dow stocks. We also illustrated why, according to a simple interpretation, the Dow 30 stocks are explained by just 3 independent sources of return.
In Part III, we reviewed seminal analyses on the relative importance of asset allocation and security selection from Grinold and Kahn, as well as Ibbotson and Kaplan. As these original analyses were descriptive studies of institutional returns, they really isolated the way institutions have chosen to apply active management. As such, they are less helpful in quantifying the true size of the opportunity.
Assoe et al. attempted to bridge this gap by performing a simulation study where they varied the allocation across asset classes, and independently across stocks, to determine the range of outcomes. Their analysis led the authors to conclude that individual security decisions and asset allocation decisions provide equal opportunities for differentiated performance. However, they anchored asset allocations to traditional endowment practices, i.e. 60% stocks and 40% bonds, and stock allocations to market capitalizations. As such, their analysis still did not capture the full opportunity set.
Here, in Part IV, we use the framework described in part II, along with some assumptions about the relationships between global asset classes, to illustrate the relative importance of asset allocation relative to security selection for an unconstrained strategy, such as Global Tactical Asset Allocation. We approach the problem from a theoretical perspective in order to capture the full opportunity set that is available to investors who focus in each domain. In addition, we quantify the proportion of global portfolio breadth that is available to active asset allocators versus stock-pickers given a range of correlation assumptions.
Before we begin, we want to ensure that readers have a working grasp of our primary analytical tool, principal component analysis (PCA). Recall that PCA is simply a method to determine the number of independent forces that explain the dynamics of a system. It is used in voice and facial recognition, big data applications, physics, psychology, and almost any other domain you can think of where investigators want to tease out exactly what is happening in a complex process.
A metaphor may help illustrate the concept. Imagine that a man steals five dogs. Each dog is on its own leash, and has a GPS chip embedded in its collar so that it is possible to track its exact movements. As the man walks down the street the dogs move around in a seemingly random pattern, and trace out individual movements in space.
An analyst who works with the company who issues the GPS chips wishes to determine the direction that the man is walking so that the authorities can intercept him. To do so, he finds the positions of each dog, and how their positions vary from one another, at each point in time. He then performs PCA on their co-movements. The PCA reveals that, while the dogs are moving in a random pattern, there is one direction that is common to all dog movement: the movement in the direction that the thief is walking.
It’s easy to see how this concept relates to finding the dominant forces at work in a portfolio. Consider stocks: while each stock in the portfolio is reacting to a multitude of forces at any point in time, the force that dominates the movement of all securities is the direction that the market is moving in aggregate. PCA teases out this dynamic from the covariances or correlations observed between the individual stocks. Of course, the same analysis can be performed on any portfolio, including multi-asset portfolios, to determine the major forces at play.
Now that we understand how PCA works, let’s put this powerful tool to work in determining the relative impact of stocks versus asset allocation in a diversified portfolio.
The analysis below is based on a framework first described by Staub and Singer (2011) in an article called “Asset allocation vs. security selection: Their relative importance.” The authors set out to see what proportion of total global breadth, across stock and bond indexes and individual stocks and bonds, is attributable to asset allocation relative to security selection. Note that the decision to invest in risky assets versus cash invokes a decision about what mix of asset classes to hold (in this case, proportion of stocks vs. bonds). Once the stock/bond proportion is chosen, the investor must choose which geographic markets to own, and once that decision is made what individual stocks and/or bonds to hold in those markets. In this way, each incremental layer of portfolio decision has a cascading impact on more granular sets of assets down the chain.
Staub and Singer provide a convincing argument for the use of an estimated correlation matrix as the measure of portfolio risk, in place of the more commonly used covariance matrix. They argue that the magnitude of risk – that is, an asset’s volatility – can largely be managed by scaling exposure to the asset up or down. However, the direction of risk, which is captured in the correlation matrix, is completely out of a manager’s control. As such, it is the purest source of portfolio risk, and contains the only important information about what is driving asset prices.
For their analysis, Staub and Singer created a large correlation matrix to capture the correlation structure among the following levels of grouping:
In addition they assume that:
Each level of grouping contains correlation information about the levels above and below. For example, owning stocks anywhere in the world means you are correlated with the general risk of owning risky assets; more highly correlated yet with the risk of global equities, and; most highly correlated with the geographic equity market the stock is listed on. As such, the authors assume the following:
In a general sense, this decision tree describes a significant portion of the opportunity set for most large institutions, and exceeds the scope of decisions for many private investors.
With these assumptions in place, the authors construct a correlation matrix with 4000 rows × 4000 columns (100 stocks × 20 stock indexes + 100 bonds × 20 bond indexes). Each cell in the matrix holds the correlation between one security and another, which depends on the type of security (stock or bond), and the market. They then apply Principal Component Analysis to this structured correlation matrix to identify the proportion of independent portfolio breadth attributable to each level of grouping.
While in practice it is difficult to confidently link latent factors from PCA to real-world factors, Staub and Singer’s creative approach lends itself more concretely to traditional groupings. For example, in their analysis of multiple groupings of assets and stocks, the second factor loads with opposite signs on equities and bonds, and thus by logical extension can be viewed as the asset class (equity versus bonds) decision factor. Given this engineered structure, the authors have confidence in labeling the factor portfolios by the traditional groupings described above. Thus the forces driving all stocks and bonds in our simulation can be identified and quantified for interpretation.
According to their analysis Factor 1 explains 37% of standardized variance, and captures the broadest decision to invest in capital markets in general. This is inferred because all securities – stocks and bonds – load on Factor 1 in the same direction. Factor 2 explains a further 14%, and since stocks and bonds load in different directions, it captures the stock/bond decision. As such, a total of 51% of total standardized variance is explained by these two asset-allocation decisions alone.
Adding the 40 factors related to geographic market allocation adds another 14% of explained variance and completes the ‘asset allocation’ dimension, bringing the total proportion of explained variance to 65%. The remaining dynamics in the system – 35% of explained variance – can thus be attributed to security selection, as described in Figure 4.
Figure 1. Proportion of standardized variance (implied breadth) available from opportunities in asset allocation versus security selection.
Source: Staub and Singer (2011)
How might one interpret this analysis? The broadest interpretation is that when you choose a stock for investment you are actually making several choices at once. You are choosing:
These are all choices related to asset allocation. Moreover, the three implied decisions above are likely to have a much larger impact on portfolio outcomes than your choice of specific stock. In fact, they explain about 65% of what happens to your stock under normal conditions. As such, it doesn’t really matter if you choose a good stock if it is a poor time to invest in capital markets in general (i.e. during extremely volatile crisis periods); if it is a poor time to invest in stocks vs. bonds, or; if it is a poor time to invest in the stock’s country or region.
If asset allocation choices have a more meaningful impact on portfolio results than one’s choice of individual securities, where should an investor spend his time to produce better results? Obviously, investors would be better off focusing on asset allocation.
The Staub and Singer analysis made reasonable assumptions about the correlations between stocks and bonds of different markets under typical market conditions. But ‘typical’ conditions can change materially over time as markets move through different economic regimes and states. Figure 2. illustrates how correlations between individual stocks, and between stocks and bonds, have evolved over the past two decades.
Figure 2. Average Pairwise 252 Day Rolling Correlations for S&P500 Stocks and for S&P500 vs. U.S. Treasuries.
Source: ReSolve Asset Management. Data from CSI and Global Financial Data.
Under normal conditions, Staub and Singer demonstrated that the asset allocation related decisions dominate portfolio outcomes. But if correlations change through time, are there periods where this relationship is reversed? To answer this question, we performed the same analysis as Staub and Singer, but varied the correlation assumptions. Specifically, we varied the stock/bond correlation between -1 and 1, and pairwise correlations between individual stocks between 0 and 1. Figure 3. presents the results of this analysis. Specifically, it quantifies the proportional influence of asset allocation decisions on portfolio outcomes under each set of correlation assumptions.
Figure 3. Proportional influence of asset allocation decisions on portfolio outcomes.
Source: ReSolve Asset Management
Some examples might help tease out the salient information from Figure 3. First off, the black border around the vertical column at -0.1 highlights the average correlation between the S&P 500 and U.S. Intermediate Treasuries over the past 20+ year period from Figure 2. The horizontal black borders at 0.35 on the y-axis highlight the average value for pairwise U.S. individual stock correlations over the same period. Where they intersect at a value of 0.63, we can infer that asset allocation dominates 63% of portfolio decisions under this specific set of correlation assumptions. Note then that the amount available from security selection is simply 1-0.63, or 37%. So under average conditions, most of the available opportunity for active management is derived from asset allocation decisions, not security selection decisions.
A few other values are highlighted because they are of particular interest. First, the red bordered value of 0.65 corresponds to the assumptions used by Staub and Singer of correlations of 0.5 between domestic stocks, and 0.3 between domestic stock indexes and domestic bond indexes. Note that our analysis confirms their conclusions.
In addition, the blue bordered value of 0.57 represents the intersection of the 95th percentile stock/bond correlation (when stocks and bonds are highly correlated) and the 5th percentile average pairwise stock correlation (when individual stocks are not highly correlated), which identifies the most favourable times for stock pickers. Incredibly, even at peak times for stock pickers they still have at their disposal less than half of the opportunity set that would be available to them if they expanded their scope into active asset allocation.
Lastly, we highlight the proportional breadth during periods of market stress like 2008, when pair- wise stock correlations have historically converged towards 1, and stock-bond correlations have often been highly negative. As such, the green bordered value represents the intersection of 95th percentile average pairwise stock correlation with the 5th percentile stock / bond correlation, a period which clearly favours asset allocation decisions. You can see that at such times of market stress the active asset allocation opportunity may dominate security selection by almost a factor of 4 to 1.
In The Usual Suspects Verbal Kint made the case that global criminal mastermind Keyser Söze had pulled a great trick by convincing the world that he didn’t exist. It seems the asset management industry has pulled a great trick of their own: they’ve convinced millions of investors for many decades to focus on the domain of investing with the least impact on long-term results. That is, investors have been overwhelmingly convinced to focus on stock selection for active returns and ignore the more meaningful opportunities in active asset allocation.
Investors can, perhaps, be forgiven for falling for this trick in years past because there were few options available to express asset allocation decisions directly. But this excuse is no longer valid. Investors now have over 4000 Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) representing every conceivable asset class, geography, sector, or risk factor imaginable. Of course, just because all the pieces are present doesn’t mean you know how to put the puzzle together. That’s where we come in.
Download the Adaptive Asset Allocation whitepaper here.
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]]>Summary
Many studies have documented the fact that market participants in many regions, including Canada, invest more in the companies from their home country than would be warranted by their country’s share of global markets. Three of Canada’s largest and most sophisticated pension funds have cut Canadian exposure in their equity allocations. Yet private Canadian market participants have so far failed to follow suit. Private market participants’ Canadian equity holdings represent almost 18 times Canada’s share of world markets.
Large, Sophisticated Managers Are Reducing Canadian Equity Exposure.
Canada has several world-class pension plan managers. The Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, and the Caisse de depot et de placements du Quebec collectively manage CAD 700 billion. Each has over 1,000 employees with offices in financial centers around the globe.
It’s worth exploring the holdings of these large, sophisticated fund managers to compare and contrast with your other portfolios. Of particular note, all three pension managers have materially cut their portfolio allocations to publicly traded Canadian equities in the past three years. The Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan has lead the way, reducing its Canadian equity exposure to 1.6% in fiscal 2015 from 9.0% in 2012. The Canada Pension Plan cut its Canadian equity holdings to 5.4% from 8.4%, and the Caisse de Depot’s allocation fell from 12.6% to 9.0%.

Private Canadian Investors Heavily Overweight Canada
In contrast to Canadian institutions, Canadian private market participants tend to heavily overweight the local market. A 2016 Vanguard study calculated that Canadians held 59% of their equity investments in Canada.
These figures are about 18 times more than Canada’s share of the world equity markets. For example, according to the S&P Global 1200, as of June 30, 2016, Canadian stocks accounted for 3.3% of global equity market capitalization.
“Home country” bias is a common theme in behavioral economics literature about investing, but a multiple of 18 seems excessive. It means that most market participants are making an active “bet” that the commodity-driven Canadian market will outperform all other global markets and asset classes by a substantial margin. This view appears to stand in contrast to the views expressed by some of Canada’s most respected institutions.
Conclusion: Time to Think Globally
Canada’s most sophisticated institutions have moved to take advantage of global opportunities in their equity allocations. Individual Canadian market participants might benefit from a similar line of thinking.
[1] Canada Pension Plan annual reports for March 2016 and 2013. [2] Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan annual reports for December 2015 and 2012. Calculation of percentages by ReSolve Asset Management. [3] Caisse de depot et placement du Quebec 2015 annual reports for December 2015 and 2012.This article is a publication of S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC. © S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC 2016. S&P® is a registered trademark of S&P Financial Services LLC. Dow Jones® is a registered trademark of Dow Jones Trademark Holdings LLC. S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC is not an investment advisor. This publication is not a recommendation by S&P Dow Jones Indices to buy, sell, or hold a security, nor is it considered to be investment advice.
Copyright © S&P Dow Jones Indices
]]>Bank of America Merrill Lynch recently released a research note suggesting that Risk Parity investment strategies currently represent a substantial source of systematic risk in global markets. The note was picked up breathlessly by several media outlets and posted under sensationalist headlines employing eye-catching terms like “spectre,” and “mayhem.” The introduction to the actual report says:
Last week’s sharp sell-off in JGBs renewed concerns of forced selling by risk parity funds. While the drawdowns in US Treasuries, US equities, and ultimately risk parity portfolios were small and short-lived, the latent risk remains worth monitoring, as (i) leverage is still near max levels across a variety of risk parity parametrizations, (ii) bond allocations are historically elevated, and (iii) markets continue to be skeptical of a 2016 Fed hike.
The same day, Business Insider reported on the BAML note, adding:
Now, this isn’t as straightforward as watching volatility in one asset class, as risk parity funds focus on “the relative dynamics between component volatilities and correlation.” With that in mind, the note includes a scenario tool to help investors assess what moves in the S&P 500 and 10-year US Treasury futures could trigger “significant deleveraging by rules-based, vol-controlled risk parity funds.”
In plain English, they’re trying to help clients figure out what might trigger widespread forced selling.
The grey bar is the zone in which the risk parity funds aren’t forced to sell. So, for example, if there was a -2% drop in US Treasury futures and a 5% jump in the S&P 500, risk parity funds wouldn’t react.
The orange zone includes the events that would presage a dramatic deleveraging. Their model suggests that, for example, a -1% drop in US Treasury futures and a -4% drop in the S&P 500 would trigger forced selling.

Source: Bank of America Merrill Lynch
Unfortunately, this characterization of how Risk Parity works is misguided for a number of reasons. Let’s examine how Risk Parity actually works, and address the most important misapprehensions from the article in turn.
What is Risk Parity?
Risk parity is characterized by three primary features. First of all, Risk Parity implementations almost always invest in a diverse basket of asset classes which react in different ways to various economic environments. That means they are more than just traditional portfolios of stocks and bonds. Rather, they include assets like commodities and gold, inflation protected securities, assets denominated in a wide variety of currencies, and more obscure assets like emerging market bonds. So it is incorrect to state that Risk Parity implementations will react exclusively to changes in risk and correlations in stocks and bonds.
Second, Risk Parity is about balancing risk. To balance risk, high risk assets like equities must necessarily receive a smaller allocation in portfolios than lower risk assets like bonds. For this reason, Risk Parity portfolios allow assets with diverse risk profiles to contribute equally to the portfolio. This means the portfolio doesn’t rely on just one or two sources of returns, but rather accrues returns from many sources, which as stated above, produce their best returns in different economic environments.
While all Risk Parity implementations apply the concepts described above, they can implement them in more than one way. For example, the progenitor of Risk Parity products is Bridgewater’s All Weather Portfolio. Bridgewater analyses the fundamental relationships between assets and different economic regimes to construct a strategic Risk Parity allocation. In other words, the All Weather fund has a relatively static asset allocation, and rebalances back to this allocation on a regular basis. As such, it acts counter-cyclically by buying assets that have gone down the most and selling assets that have gone up the most. This implementation actually moderates the behavior of markets, in direct contravention to the claims made by the BAML note.
Other Risk Parity methodologies are more dynamic. Portfolios are altered regularly in response to changes in observed correlations and risks across global asset classes. All things equal, if an asset class starts to exhibit higher risk, and/or higher correlations with other assets in the portfolio, these dynamic approaches will reduce exposure to this asset class in favor of other assets in the portfolio. As always, the ultimate goal is to maintain maximum diversification.
The third distinguishing feature of Risk Parity strategies is that they are usually managed to a target volatility, so that to the greatest degree possible investors receive the experience they signed up for, even during the most hostile market conditions.
Of course, while investors are concerned with the volatility of their investment experience in the short-term, in the long-term they are ultimately concerned with wealth generation. For this reason, many Risk Parity managers target higher levels of risk in order to achieve higher returns consistent with investor requirements to sustain portfolio income needs. The only way to achieve higher risk/return targets with a maximally diversified portfolio is to use leverage. But the leveraging/deleveraging process isn’t nearly as sensitive as what is implied in the report. And many large Risk Parity implementations don’t react at all to short-term changes in market risk.
Some risk parity implementations – like All Weather for example – employ leverage in a strategic sense, based on long-term estimates of asset class risks and co-movement relationships. As such, these strategies do not react to short-term changes in risk or correlation, and do not deleverage or re-leverage as market risk ebbs and flows. Other strategies respond dynamically to current market conditions, and scale exposure up or down to deliver a more stable experience in all market environments. Only those strategies that dynamically manage portfolio volatility based on local risk and correlation have the potential to materially alter total exposure over time.
As you can see, there is nothing inherently nefarious about Risk Parity. It is simply a way to avoid concentrating risks in assets – like equities – which are designed to thrive in just a narrow spectrum of possible economic states. Now that we’ve highlighted the salient features of Risk Parity, and how these strategies are typically implemented, let’s dispel some of the misapprehensions that were proposed in the report under discussion. You will see that the market in general has little to fear from Risk Parity, and in fact it is a compelling solution for many investors to consider as an alternative to the UNbalanced 60/40 portfolio.
Reality #1: Risk parity is reactive, not proactive.
The report in question asserted that Risk Parity may be at the ‘epicenter’ of the next market crisis. But this is fundamentally impossible, as it confuses cause and effect. That’s because dynamic Risk Parity strategies will only act to reduce risk if risk is already increasing. In other words, there must be a fundamental or structural issue in markets that has sparked an expansion in risk (and a convergence in correlations) before Risk Parity funds would take action.
We acknowledge that, once risk really starts to accelerate higher in markets, dynamic Risk Parity strategies may exacerbate the issue at the margin by reducing overall portfolio exposure to maintain risk targets. But they will never ‘trigger’ a market crisis on their own.
Reality #2: Risk Parity doesn’t have sufficient assets – especially in risky asset classes – to create a disproportionately large market impact.
In order to amplify a major market event, Risk Parity assets must necessarily represent a meaningful share of global markets. However, according to recent estimates, there is only about $600B deployed in Risk Parity strategies globally. While this might seem like a large sum, it is actually rather small relative to the size of the liquid global markets in which these strategies invest.
A 2014 paper by Doeswijk, Lam and Swinkels estimates the investable global market portfolio at $90.6 trillion as of 2012, while other estimates put the figure at over twice that amount. So Risk Parity strategies represent less than 1% of global liquid market capitalization.
Figure 1. Risk parity assets as a proportion of global liquid market capitalization.
Source: ReSolve Asset Management.
Now, as mentioned above Risk Parity strategies are often levered up to achieve higher risk/return targets, so it’s fair to say these strategies probably represent $1-1.5 trillion in total exposure. However, the assets that really require leverage are very low-risk shorter-term government bonds. The market for shorter-term bonds is arguably the deepest and most liquid market in the world. So it is unlikely that deleveraging of these assets would cause a material dislocation.
In addition, due to the risk-balanced approach, more volatile and highly correlated risky assets like equity markets generally represent only about one third of allocations in Risk Parity portfolios. For example, Figure 2 shows the actual weights in our ReSolve Risk Parity strategy scaled to 12% volatility as of July month-end. Note that the strategy has 197% exposure, so it is levered by 1.97x. Notwithstanding this leverage, the equity-like assets in the portfolio add up to just 35% of total portfolio assets, while intermediate term Treasury bonds represent the largest allocation by far.
Figure 2. Asset allocation of ReSolve Risk Parity (USD 12% Volatility) Mandate as of July 31, 2016
Source: ReSolve Asset Management.
Reality #3: Pro-cyclical Risk Parity effects are mostly offset by counter-cyclical effects.
The BAML report in question makes the assertion that Risk Parity strategies all react to an expansion in market volatility and correlations by reducing exposure. But this is not true at all. As mentioned above, Risk Parity strategies come in two distinct forms. Indeed, one implementation of Risk Parity does monitor intermediate market risks and correlations. When these strategies observe that market risks and correlations have changed so that portfolio risk is above the strategy’s target risk, they will lower overall exposure to realign with their target risk. These are pro-cyclical actions that may exacerbate market crises at the margin.
However, the other form of risk parity is engineered based on the fundamental drivers of returns in each market environment. This approach is strategic in nature, and does not respond pro-cyclically to intermediate shifts in risks and correlations. Rather, this approach targets long-term strategic asset weights, and acts counter-cyclically in response to market dislocations, by buying assets that have dropped significantly and selling assets that have risen.
The question is, what portion of Risk Parity implementations are dynamic vs. strategic. The largest Risk Parity fund, Bridgewater’s All-Weather strategy, is a strategic implementation. This fund represents about $70 billion, not including leverage. We would also speculate that large pension plans that have adopted a Risk Parity approach in-house are more likely to employ a strategic version of the strategy. After all, many institutions require a strategic asset allocation to be vetted by actuaries to justify long-term return and risk assumptions.
On the other hand, the largest dynamic Risk Parity fund to our knowledge is Standard Life’s Global Absolute Return strategy with $33.5 billion as of June, 2016 (Source: Standard Life). The second largest fund, Invesco’s Balanced Risk fund (ABRIX) has about $5.5 billion, while Columbia Threadneedle’s fund (CRAAX) has about $1 billion, and AQR’s fund (AQRIX) has half a billion dollars invested (Source: Morningstar). In total, this adds up to just over $40 billion in major dynamic Risk Parity implementations, just over half of what is invested in All Weather’s strategic
approach. So it is far from clear that pro-cyclical risk parity strategies will overwhelm counter-cyclical implementations in order to exacerbate market crises.
Reality #4 Bank derivative books are orders of magnitude larger than global markets, and are likely a much larger contributor to pro-cyclical systemic risk.
It’s curious that a major global money-center bank would choose to target risk parity as a source of systemic risk when global banks themselves are likely a much more destabilizing presence in markets. That’s because banks act as counterparties to the vast majority of global derivatives contracts. According to the Bank for International Settlements the most conservative estimates of the size of the global derivatives market exceeds $630 trillion after netting effects. In other words, derivative contracts held at global banks represent over 1000x the notional value of all global Risk Parity strategies.
This is important because banks manage their derivatives exposure using precisely the same mechanism that dynamic Risk Parity strategies use to manage their total portfolio exposure. Specifically, banks are constantly monitoring the risks and correlations across their derivative books in order to manage total bank risk exposure. Obviously actions taken by banks to maintain risk exposures in the $630 Trillion derivatives market completely overwhelm the relatively infinitesimal exposure management by dynamic Risk Parity funds.
Figure 3. Relative size of risk parity investments, global investable market capitalization and notional value of global derivatives
Source: ReSolve Asset Management; Financial Times (2016); Doeswijk, Lam and Swinkels (2014), Bank for International Settlements (2015)
Reality #5: Risk Parity strategies typically do not execute major shifts in exposure in response to large short-term events.
It’s important to understand that the application of leverage in a Risk Parity fund is not an on or off decision. Rather, when a Risk Parity fund de-levers in order to maintain its volatility target, the deleveraging occurs in incremental amounts, typically 5-10% of portfolio assets. This is obviously much less dramatic than the potential 50% deleveraging scenarios implied by the BAML report.
The fact is, Risk Parity funds make relatively small incremental adjustments in response to changes in market risk, in order to maintain risk balance. The emphasis is on small changes over time in response to observed shifts in the risks and correlations between all global asset classes. Even a fairly material shift in risk and correlation in just a couple of assets is unlikely to trigger a major deleveraging event.
Reality #6: Institutional investors exert a much larger pro-cyclical effect than Risk Parity funds could possibly conjure.
Even if we acknowledge the possibility that Risk Parity’s net contribution to asset classes is mildly pro-cyclical, assigning proportional market impact is virtually impossible. That’s because there is such a wide variety of amplifying and moderating effects at work in markets.
One very large pro-cyclical effect is institutional return chasing. An IMF paper released in February 2016 presents strong evidence of pro-cyclical investment behavior across Central Banks, public and private pensions, life insurance companies and endowments. These entities combined represent more than $24 Trillion in assets.
The paper shows that almost all major institutional categories are guilty of chasing into asset classes that have been rising over the recent past, and selling out of asset classes that have been declining. The Figure below taken from the paper quantifies how well past returns explain changes in institutional asset allocation for periods from 1 year through 10 years. As you can see, the most influential factor explaining changes in institutional asset allocation is returns over the past year.
Figure 4. T-Statistics from Regressions of Asset Allocation Changes on Returns and Yields
Source: International Monetary Fund, Jones (2016)
Conclusion
Risk parity is about balance. Moreover, because there is a mix of pro-cyclical and counter-cyclical Risk Parity implementations, and; because assets in Risk Parity strategies are small relative to global markets, these strategies probably contribute very little to overall systemic risk.
To the contrary, Risk Parity provides an effective way for investors to take maximum advantage of all opportunities available in global markets, in the most diversified way possible. In these uncertain times it’s critical to develop portfolios that are robust and ready for whatever happens next.
Want more? Download our Risk Parity Solution Brief now.
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]]>by Adam Butler, Michael Philbrick, Rodrigo Gordillo, ReSolve Asset Management, via GestaltU.com
If you read the paper, watch the news, and listen to investment experts you are doing it all wrong. There are no market wizards; the emperors have no clothes; most people are ‘swimming naked’. The following paragraphs offer abundant and incontrovertible evidence condemning expert judgment for the great sham it really is. We also offer some practical ways to cope with the terrifying reality that no one is in control.
Turn on any media conduit nowadays and you’re likely to find an expert offering some kind of opinion on the future. The problem is that the experts you are most likely to see are least likely to know what they’re talking about. They may know a great deal about their subject matter, but this domain expertise will not translate into better forecasts of future events. You see, no matter how much knowledge or experience these experts have at their disposal, their crystal ball is just as foggy as yours.
Now, the fact that no one can predict the future may seem obvious. You don’t really believe in crystal balls, fortune telling, astronomy, or phrenology, right? But odds are you will tune-in to your favorite media source to hear what their experts have to say. Admit it – when an expert recognized by a respected media source brings to bear a mosaic of knowledge, insight and logic to offer an opinion about what will happen in the future, you pay attention. After all, if they don’t know what will happen in their domain of expertise, who does?
That’s right, no one knows. And no amount of knowledge, logic, or insight will change this fact. But don’t take our word for it – take the word of Dr. Philip Tetlock.
In 1985, disillusioned by his experience taking notes at political intelligence committees in the early 1980s, Philip Tetlock set out to discover whether experts could predict future events. Over a span of almost 20 years, he interviewed 284 experts about their level of confidence that a certain outcome would come to pass. Forecasts were solicited across a wide variety of domains, including economics, politics, climate, military strategy, financial markets, legal opinions, and other complex fields with uncertain outcomes. In all, Tetlock accumulated an astounding 28,000 forecasts.
Tetlock was interested specifically in measuring forecast calibration; that is, how experts’ confidence in a particular forecast calibrated with the actual percentage of times that their forecasts came to pass. If experts were well calibrated, when they assigned a 60% probability to forecasts, those forecasts should prove correct about 60% of the time. Unfortunately, when Tetlock measured the actual realized calibration of expert forecasts, individually and in aggregate, he discovered that experts’ confidence in forecast outcomes exhibited virtually no relationship with actual results.
In fact, his results represent an unequivocal condemnation of the global forecasting business:
In summary, Tetlock discovered that the primary mechanism that most people rely on to make decisions every day – expert judgment – is irrevocably flawed. This has profound implications for decision-making in every dimension of life, but it implies a complete overhaul in how people think about their investments.
If you work in the financial industry your livelihood probably depends on ignoring Tetlock’s conclusions, and most analysts, fund managers, strategists etc. will do just that. This is natural – few people can operate for long with such a high level of cognitive dissonance. But as advisors, we have a rare opportunity to look truth in the eye, and deal with it. And the truth is pretty grim.
Consider these sobering facts. CXO Advisory has been tracking and publishing gurus’ forecasts of market direction since 1998. Recently, CXO published a review of all 6,459 forecasts from all of the market ‘gurus’ that they tracked from 1998 – 2012. Specifically, the gurus were graded on their ability to call the direction of the market, but were not penalized for missing the magnitude of the move.
Over 14 years, CXO concluded that the average guru’s accuracy in calling the direction of the market has been about 47%, or slightly worse than a coin toss. The following chart shows how the accuracy of forecasts has stabilized over time around the 47% mark as the sample size expanded over time. In other words, the experts were less reliable than flipping coins.
Chart 1. Cumulative Accuracy of S&P 500 Market Timers
Source: CXO Advisory
The evidence doesn’t end there. The following charts build a formidable case against expert forecasts in every facet of the global investment business. From earnings to interest rates to market outcomes, financial experts universally fail to provide useful guidance about the future.
Chart 2. Consensus forecasts for 10-year Treasury yields versus realized yields, 2000 – 2017.
Source: Bank of America, Thompson Reuters, Datastream, Consensus Economics
Chart 3. Consensus S&P500 aggregate forecast earnings vs. realized earnings, 1985 – 2005
Source: Montier, J. Behavioural Investing (Wiley, 2007)
Do any experts get it right? What about the experts at the Federal Reserve who are in charge of setting interest rates? Can they predict the magnitude or direction of interest rates just six months hence?
A working paper entitled “History of the Forecasters: An Assessment of the Semi-Annual U.S. Treasury Bond Yield Forecast Survey” (Brooks & Gray, 2003) studied the Federal Reserve economists from 1982 – 2002, including Alan Greenspan, to discover whether the group of experts that sets interest rates is able to effectively forecast their trajectory through time.
Chart 4. Mean rate prediction and subsequent realization.
Source: (Brooks & Gray, 2003)
Again we see a strong talent for extrapolating what has just happened, but no talent whatsoever for predicting what will happen next. But it’s difficult to see from Chart 4. just how magnificently wrong these forecasts actually were. When forecast returns are plotted against actual returns 6-months in the future, it’s clear that Fed economists didn’t just miss the magnitude of the change in rates, they also consistently missed the direction of the move.
Chart 5. Actual percentage change in yield compared with forecast percentage change.
Source: (Brooks & Gray, 2003)
Tetlock demonstrated that experts can’t forecast the future across a wide variety of domains. The charts above make the same case against financial experts. That is, financial experts systematically produce forecasts of market direction, bond yields, earnings, and short-term interest rates that are worse than what might be expected from random guesses. Why would anyone pay attention to these experts? Moreover, why would any investor use their forecasts to inform their investment portfolio?
“That’s what diversification is for. It’s an explicit recognition of ignorance.” – Peter Bernstein
In our business, we embrace uncertainty head-on by adopting systematic strategies founded on the principle that we can’t know the future. That means focusing on diversification. Strategies like the Global Market Portfolio, global risk parity, and diversified risk premia strategies are all rational ways to maximize diversification against an uncertain future.
Investors in the Global Market Portfolio (GMP) hold all liquid global assets in proportion to market capitalization. As such, they express the belief that the optimal asset allocation reflects the average bets of all market participants. On the other hand, investors who allocate to a global risk parity (GRP) strategy express the reasonable belief that assets should produce long-term returns in proportion to their risks. And this is not just good theory; long-term asset returns validate this relationship between risk and return, as shown in Chart 6. Importantly, investors in the GMP and GRP eschew forecasts of future asset class returns altogether.
Chart 6. Long-term asset class returns and risks.
Source: Bridgewater, JP Morgan
Alternative risk premia strategies like Adaptive Asset Allocation capitalize on the market’s ‘willing losers’. A large portion of investors sacrifice wealth to express alternative preferences, such as benchmarking, home bias, or return chasing. These investors leave residual returns on the table for wealth-maximizing investors to harvest through systematic factors like momentum, value and low beta. Again, these approaches require no forecasts about how markets will evolve. Rather, they express the belief that investors will continue to act on non-wealth-maximizing preferences as they have since the dawn of markets.
In contrast to the forecast-free approaches above, most investor portfolios reflect strong forecasts about expected economic outcomes and capital market assumptions. Importantly, these forecasts are mathematically implied in every portfolio whether they were made explicitly or not. For example, if U.S. stocks and bonds mirror their historical risk and correlation in the future, and bonds can be expected to yield 2% over the next 10 years, a 60/40 balanced portfolio implies stock returns of 13.5%[1]. If forecasts at the beginning of the investment process are even mildly off the mark, these portfolios are incredibly inefficient. In other words, they are likely to produce results that deviate profoundly from their original objectives, and underperform less biased portfolios by a substantial margin.
A thoughtful approach to markets starts with deep introspection about how we believe markets work. For advisors, consultants, and CIOs, these beliefs should inform all of our choices about how to allocate our clients’ hard-earned savings. Tetlock’s study involved over 28,000 observations. The results are astonishingly statistically significant and incontrovertible.
Voltaire said that “Doubt is not a pleasant condition, but certainty is absurd.” While it is natural to seek comfort by putting faith in expert judgment, the fact is there is no wizard behind the curtain. As a result, the cornerstone of any successful long-term investment plan is learning how to deal with ambiguity. This means embracing real global diversification in ways you probably haven’t contemplated before, and perhaps introducing alternative sources of return that don’t rely on forecasts. To learn more about the Global Market Portfolio, Global Risk Parity, and Adaptive Asset Allocation, please visit investresolve.com.
[1] Assumes 60/40 is maximum Sharpe ratio portfolio with cash at 0% current yield, and historical covariance between stocks and Treasury bonds.
by Adam Butler, ReSolve Asset Management, via GestaltU
If you’ve been a regular reader of our blog, you already know that we recently published our first book Adaptive Asset Allocation: Dynamic Portfolios to Profit in Good Times – and Bad. As of this writing, it still stands as the #1 new release in Amazon’s Business Finance category. We’re pretty psyched about that.
In our book, we spent a great deal of time summarizing the research posted to GestaltU over the years. We did this in order to distill the most salient points, and also to tie seemingly disparate topics together into a cohesive narrative. Our book covers topics ranging from psychology to cognitive biases to asset valuations to retirement income planning to (of course) investment strategies. The book was meant to stand as a single source for what ought to matter to modern investors. As one ad for our book reads:
We hope we succeeded in doing that, but like any greatest hits album, we also included some fresh, now “tracks” in our book! And we thought we’d share one of them with you today. So without further ado, here’s Chapter 37, on The Usefulness and Uselessness of Backtests.
Chapter 37: The Usefulness and Uselessness of Backtests
There is a Grand Canyon-sized gap between the best and worst that backtesting has to offer. And since this book’s findings on the value of Adaptive Asset Allocation are largely based on modeled investment results, it’s only proper to include an essay on the various sources of performance decay.
The greatest fear in empirical finance is that the out of sample results for a strategy under investigation will be materially weaker than the results derived from testing. We know this from experience. When we first discovered systematic investing, our instincts were to find as many ways to measure and filter time series as could fit on an Excel worksheet. Imagine a boy who had tasted an inspired bouillabaisse for the first time, and just had to try to replicate it personally. But rather than explore the endless nuance of French cuisine, the boy just threw every conceivable French herb into the pot at once.
To wit, one of our early designs had no less than 37 inputs, including filters related to regressions, moving averages, raw momentum, technical indicators like RSI and stochastics, as well as fancier trend and mean reversion filters like TSI, DVI, DVO, and a host of other three and four letter acronyms. Each indicator was finely tuned to optimal values in order to maximize historical returns, and these values changed as we optimized against different securities. At one point we designed a system to trade the iShares Russell 2000 ETF (IWM) with a historical return above 50% and a Sharpe ratio over 4.
These are the kinds of systems that perform incredibly well in hindsight and then blow up in production, and that’s exactly what happened. We applied the IWM system to time US stocks for a few weeks with a small pool of personal money, and lost 25%.
Degrees of Freedom
The problem with complicated systems is that they require you to find the exact perfect point of optimization in many different dimensions – in our case, 37. To understand what we mean by that, imagine trying to create a tasty dish with 37 different ingredients. How could you ever find the perfect combination? A little more salt may bring out the flavor of the rosemary, but might overpower the truffle oil. What to do? Add more salt and more truffle oil? But more truffle oil may not complement the earthiness of the chanterelles.
It isn’t enough to simply find the local optimum for each input individually, any more than you can decide on the optimal amount of any ingredient in a dish without considering its impact on the other ingredients. That’s because, in most cases the signal from one input interacts with other inputs in non-linear ways. For example, if you operate with two filters in combination – say a moving average cross and an oscillator – you are no longer concerned about the optimal length of the moving average(s) or the lookback periods for the oscillator independently. Rather, you must examine the results of the oscillator during periods where the price is above the moving average, and again when the price is below the moving average. You may find that the oscillator behaves quite differently when the moving average filter is in one state than it does in another state. Further, you may discover that the effects are quite different at shorter moving average horizons than longer horizons.
To give you an idea of the scope of this challenge, consider a gross simplification where each filter has just 2 possible settings. With 37 filters we would be faced with 137 billion possible filter settings. While this permutations may not seem like a simplification, consider that many of the inputs in our 37 dimension IWM system had two or three parameters of their own (short lookback, long lookback, z score, p value, etc.), and each of those parameters was also optimized.
Never mind finding a needle in a haystack, this is like finding one particular grain of sand amongst every grain of sand on earth.
As a rule, the more degrees of freedom your model has, the greater the sample size that is required to prove statistical significance. The converse is also true: given a fixed observation horizon (sample size), a model with fewer degrees of freedom is likely to have higher statistical significance. In the investing world, if you are looking at back-tested results of two investment models with similar performance, you should generally have more confidence in the model with fewer degrees of freedom. At the very least, we can say that the results from that model would have greater statistical significance, and a higher likelihood of delivering results in production that are consistent with those observed in simulation.
Sample Size
There is another problem as well: each time you divide the system into two or more states you definitionally reduce the number of observations in each state. To illustrate, consider our 2 state example with 137 billion combinations. Recall that statistical significance depends on the number of observations, so reducing the number of observations per state of the system reduces the statistical significance. For example, take a daily rebalanced system with 20 years of testing history. If you divide a 20 year (~5000 day) period into 137 billion possible states, each state will have on average only 5000/137 billion=0.00000004 observations! Clearly 20 years of history isn’t enough to have any confidence in this system; one would need a testing period of more than 3 million years to derive statistical significance.
Degrees of freedom and sample size are two sides of the same coin. The greater the former, so too must be the latter to achieve statistical significance. Unfortunately, many models suffer from a great disconnect: insufficient sample size given the degrees of freedom. In these cases the error term dominates the outcomes and weird things happen more often than your intuition would lead you to believe. But such is the way of the world when you suffer from small sample sizes.
The problem becomes, then, how to tell a good strategy from a bad one. Most investors would seek some confidence from observing historical returns. However, investment outcomes are mostly dominated by luck over periods that most investors use for evaluation. Consider two investment teams where one – Alpha Manager – has genuine skill while the other – Beta Manager – is a closet indexer with no skill. After fees Alpha Manager expects to deliver a mean return of 10% per year with 16% volatility, while Beta Manager expects to deliver 8% with 18% volatility. Both managers are diversified equity managers, so the correlation of monthly returns is 0.95.
With some simple math (well it’s simple if you know it!), and assuming a risk free rate of 1.5%, we can determine that Alpha Manager expects to deliver about 3% per year in alpha relative to Beta Manager. This alpha is the investment measure of “raw talent.”
The question is, how long would we need to observe the performance of these managers in order to confidently (in a statistical sense) identify Alpha Manager’s skill relative to Beta Manager? Without going too far down the rabbit hole with complicated statistics, Figure 37-1 charts the probability that Alpha Manager will have delivered higher compound performance than Beta Manager at time horizons from 1 year through 20 years.
Figure 37-1. Probability Alpha Manager Outperforms Beta manager over 1-20 Years
You can see from the chart that there is a 61% chance that Alpha Manager will outperform Beta Manager in year 1 of our observation period. However, over any random 5-year period Beta Manager will outperform Alpha Manager about a quarter of the time, and over 10 years Beta will outperform Alpha almost 15% of the time. Only after 20 years can we finally reject the probability that Alpha Manager has no skill at the traditional level of statistical significance (5%).
Figure 37-2 demonstrates the same concept but in a different way. The middle line represents the expected cumulative log excess returns to Alpha Manager relative to Beta Manager; note how it shows a nice steady accumulation of alpha as Alpha Manager outperforms Beta Manager each and every year. But this line is a unicorn. In reality, 90% of the time (assuming a normal distribution, which admittedly is naive) Alpha’s performance relative to Beta will fall between the top line at the high end (if Alpha Manager gets really lucky AND Beta Manager is very unlucky) and the bottom line at the low end (if Alpha Manager is really unlucky AND Beta Manger is really lucky). Note how in 5% of possible scenarios Alpha Manager is still under performing Beta Manager after 17 years of observation!
Figure 37-2. 90% range of log cumulative relative returns between Manager A and Manager B at various horizons
These results should blow your mind. They should also prompt a material overhaul of your manager selection process. But we’re not done yet, because the results above make very simplistic assumptions about the distribution of annual returns. Specifically, they assume that returns are independent and identically distributed, which they decidedly are not. In addition, certain equity factors go in and out of style, persisting very strongly for 5 to 7 years and then vanishing for similarly long periods. Dividend stocks are this cycle’s darlings, but previous cycles saw investors fall in love with emerging markets (mid-aughts), large cap growth stocks (late 1990s), large cap “nifty fifty” stocks (60s and 70s), and so on.
Basically, investment managers sometimes don’t fade with a whimper, but rather go out with a bang. So what’s an investor to do if meaningful decisions cannot be made on the basis of track records? The answer is simple: Focus on process. The most important information that is meaningful to investment allocation decisions is the process that a manager follows in order to harness one or more factors that have delivered persistent performance for many years.
The best factors have demonstrable efficacy back for many decades, and perhaps even centuries. For example, the momentum factor was recently shown to have existed for 212 years in stocks, and over 100 years for other asset classes. Now that’s something you can count on. And that’s why we spend so much time on process – because we know that in the end, that’s the only thing that an investor can truly base a decision on.
For the same reason, we are never impressed solely by the stated performance of any backtest – even our own. Rather, we are much more impressed by the ability of a model to stand up under intense statistical scrutiny: many variations of investment universes tested in multiple currencies under several regimes, along with a wide range of strong parameters with few degrees of freedom.
Often, we see advertisements of excellent medium-term results built on flimsy statistical grounds. Without understanding their process in great detail, these results are absolutely meaningless. Less commonly, we see impressive shorter-term simulations, but that are clearly based on robust, statistically-significant foundations. In those cases, we sit up and take note because thoughtful, statistically-significant, stable, results are much rarer and much more important than most investors imagine.
The investment results portrayed in marketing pieces are often nothing more than mirages. Small sample sizes, undisclosed factor exposures, and high levels of covariance between many investment strategies make it almost impossible to distinguish talent from luck over most investors’ investment horizons. In contrast, by gaining a deep understanding of the process that gives a manager an edge, with credible statistical substantiation, an investor can have measurable confidence in the prospects of a strategy.
Of course, once a strategy is widely recognized as being successful, it is likely to start attracting more capital. As a result, a meaningful portion of observed out-of-sample performance decay is the result of arbitrage; that is, others discovering and concurrently exploiting the same anomaly.
Multiple Discovery
One of the more interesting marvels observed over the centuries in science is “multiple discovery.” This phenomenon, so named by noted sociologist Robert K. Merton in 1963 (not to be confused with Robert C. Merton, who won the Nobel Prize in Economics for co-publishing the Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing model), occurs when two or more researchers stumble on the same discovery at nearly the same time, but without any prior collaboration or contact. Historically, these discoveries happened almost concurrently in completely different parts of the world, despite little shared scientific literature, and significant language barriers.
For example Newton, Fermat and Leibniz each independently discovered calculus within about 20 years of each other in the late 17th century. Within 15 years of each other in the 16th century, Ferro and Tartaglia independently discovered a method for solving cubic equations. Robert Boyle and Edme Mariotte independently discovered the fundamental basis for the Ideal Gas Law within 14 years of each other in the late 17th century. Carl Wilhelm Scheele discovered Oxygen in Uppsala, Sweden in 1773, just 1 year before Joseph Priestley discovered it in southern England. Both Laplace and Michell proposed the concept of “black holes” just prior to the turn of the 18th century.
The 19th and 20th centuries also saw a wide variety of multiple discoveries, from electromagnetic induction (Faraday and Henry), the telegraph (Wheatstone and Morse in the same year!), evolution (Darwin and Wallace), and the periodic table of the elements (Mendeleev and Meyer). Alan Turing and Emil Post both proposed the “universal computing machine” in 1936. Jonas Salk, Albert Sabin and Hilary Koprowski independently formulated a vaccine for polio between 1950 and 1963. Elisha Gray and Alexander Graham Bell filed independent patents for the telephone on the same day in 1876!
Though not at all a complete list, Wikipedia has catalogued well over 100 instances of multiple discovery in just the past two centuries. If the frequency of multiple discovery is related to both the speed of communication and the number of linked nodes in a research community (a hypothesis for which we have no proof, but that is logically appealing), then the concept of multiple discovery has important implications for current investors in the age of the Internet.
For us, there is a clear analog in quantitative finance: researchers operating independently, but sourcing ideas from a common reservoir will almost certainly stumble on similar discoveries at approximately the same time. This dynamic will almost certainly lead to some performance decay once these strategies are put to work out of sample, and with real money, as all of these investors will be attempting to draw from the same well of alpha. Indeed, in a recent paper Jing-Zhi Huang and Zhijian (James) Huang demonstrate that published anomalies exhibit meaningful performance decay after publication, though the best anomalies, such as value and momentum, do preserve much of their pre-publishing luster out of sample.
Structural Impediments to Asset Class Arbitrage
It’s important to note that the anomalies explored by Huang and Huang relate specifically to equity selection. We believe active approaches to global asset allocation have several advantages, in terms of sustainability, over strategies aimed at selecting securities within a specific asset class. As a result, we expect them to be less vulnerable to decay.
For example, most investors have a strong home bias and are not open to approaches that stray too far from stocks and bonds of their country of residence. Strategies that propose to be agnostic to home bias, and spend substantial periods invested in unfamiliar assets are unlikely to gain mass adoption.
More importantly, major asset classes represent enormous pockets of capital, on the order of hundreds of billions, or even trillions, of dollars. Markets this deep require equally deep sources of capital to arbitrage. Yet the current large sources of capital in global markets – pensions, endowments, and other institutions – are constrained in their ability to take advantage of the opportunity in this space in three important ways:
For these and other reasons, we feel global multi-asset active allocation strategies have many strong years ahead of them, in contrast to many other strategies, which may live and die very quickly because they do not possess the above characteristics.
On the Robustness of Adaptive Asset Allocation
There is a common misconception – that even our younger selves once held – that the primary goal of investment modeling is to maximize backtest results. But the catastrophic failure of our 37-dimensional system, along with countless smaller but no less important lessons over the past six years, have helped us to see the light. No, as we’ve now mostly internalized, the primary goal of investment modeling is to develop systems where the distribution of in-sample returns maximally reflects the distribution of real-world returns. This is the definition of robustness.
As we’ve discussed, there are ways to maximize robustness: minimize degrees of freedom, maximize sample size and invest in ways that structurally limit arbitrage. Our formulation of Adaptive Asset Allocation has all of these characteristics. By using a global asset class-based approach with minimal degrees of freedom tested over multiple economic regimes, we maximize the odds that future outcomes will resemble the past.
We don’t know what’s going to happen tomorrow. Nobody does. But in the end, we are confident that the Adaptive Asset Allocation approach will continue to deliver in-line with our expectations.
And in the world of investing, what more could you ask for?
Copyright © GestaltU
]]>by Adam Butler, GestaltU.com
Note: This series expands on the concepts discussed in our whitepaper, Tactical Alpha: A Quantitative Case for Active Asset Allocation. If you would like to skip ahead by reading the original paper, you can download it here.
By far the greatest source of personal consternation as a professional in markets is investors’ obsession with finding the best stocks, or the best stock pickers. The fact that investors pursue this objective at all undermines all meaningful arguments about efficient markets. After all, why on earth would the well informed, rational actors that constitute efficient markets spend all their time on the component of the investment process that is likely to make the least amount of difference to their long-term wealth?
You see, the ability to pick the best securities (for example, individual stocks and bonds) in a chosen market is almost irrelevant compared to one’s choice of market itself. Does it matter how well one can choose stocks from a market if that market is dramatically underperforming?
Consider the example of emerging market equities, which have underperformed U.S. equities by more than 55% over the past 5 years. And one need not go so far afield as emerging markets to find other examples with similarly large dispersion. Developed international markets also lagged U.S. stocks by a substantial margin. The Vanguard FTSE Developed Markets (ex-US) ETF (VEA) generated just 20% total return, or 3.7% per year, lagging US stocks by 8.4% annualized. Now, consider that the Vanguard US Total Stock Market ETF produced over 14% per year over the past 5 years. What is the likelihood that an investor – even a great investor – who chose stocks from non-US markets over the past five years was able to outperform even a poorly skilled manager selecting from U.S. stocks?
Figure 1.
To get a sense for the impact of stock picking in the individual markets, let’s examine the range of mutual fund outcomes for funds focused on each region. According to Reuters’ fund screener, the 95th percentile U.S. equity fund delivered 15.5% annualized over the past five years, while a 5th percentile fund produced about 8.8%. Meanwhile, active international equity mutual funds’ performance ranged from 5.7% to -1.7%. Incredibly, a 95th percentile manager in the emerging markets equity space delivered just 1.7% annualized over the past 5 years, while a 5th percentile fund lost over 7% per year.
Table 1.
Which means that even the worst stock pickers in US markets outperformed the best stock pickers in international developed markets, and the worst stock pickers in international developed markets performed as well as the best stock pickers in emerging markets.
In other words, portfolio outcomes are much less influenced by which funds you choose within a given market, than by which market you choose to invest in. Virtually any investor choosing to focus on U.S. stocks would have crushed any other investor who chose to diversify farther afield. And keep in mind that we have just focused on equity investments; investors who broadened their horizons to include government bonds, international bonds, credit, commodities, REITs, infrastructure, and other assets would have seen even greater dispersion.
The point is, while most investors and advisors spend all their time trying to pick the best stocks, or the best stock-pickers, these decisions mean almost nothing compared to decisions about asset allocation. At the best of times for stock-pickers asset allocation and stock-picking have about the same influence on portfolio outcomes; at the worst of times, asset allocation almost completely determines success or failure. And yet, most investors embrace policy portfolios which explicitly limit deviations from strategic, long-term asset allocation targets. These same institutions then turn around and take large and regular active bets within each asset allocation sleeve by trading stocks, bonds, and managers. To our eye, these investors approach the problem exactly backwards.
It has long been considered prudent investment policy to separate the asset allocation decision from the active investments in portfolios. Typically, asset allocation is expressed as a semi-permanent policy or reference portfolio guided by an advisor, a board, and/or an investment committee. In many cases, this policy allocation is loosely based on intermediate or long-term estimates of risk premia and covariances across the eligible asset universe. Once the policy portfolio weights are struck, the investment staff set about selecting managers within each of the asset class silos with the goal of harvesting alpha from security selection.
This process is motivated by the perception that the opportunity to generate incremental excess returns is much higher in the security selection space than the asset allocation space. After all, Grinold showed how investment fortune favours market breadth, and there are vastly more securities (i.e. stocks and bonds) than there are asset classes (i.e. stock and bond market indexes, commodities, REITs, etc.) to choose from. This (mis)perception informs the relative priority placed on the pursuit of alpha from active security selection relative to active shifts in asset allocation.
Market inefficiencies exist for a variety of reasons, such as asymmetric information, tax frictions, and emotional biases. Perhaps the most economically significant inefficiencies stem from structural constraints imposed on a large segment of investors. We view the structural bias in favour of security selection versus tactical asset allocation among institutional and private investors as an important example of this type of inefficiency. As such, so long as tactical asset allocation is largely ignored by most investors, active asset allocation represents one of the most economically important sources of excess returns available to investors in public markets.
Most previous studies on the impact of asset allocation relative to security selection have been performed on pension funds and mutual funds, and explore the degree to which total portfolio variance is explained by deviations from institutions’ long-term policy portfolios. The studies are structured as attribution analyses, where portfolio returns are disaggregated into returns due to the policy portfolio and active returns, which in most studies are defined as the residual not accounted for by the policy portfolio.
Brinson et al. (1986, 1991) regressed monthly portfolio total returns for pension funds against the monthly returns to each fund’s policy portfolio, and determined that the policy portfolio explains approximately 90% of the monthly variance in total returns. Many citations of Brinson’s original publications in this field falsely suggest that their analysis makes conclusions about return attribution. However, Brinson’s study mainly proved that once an institution sets a strategic asset allocation, it tends to stick to it wtih minimal deviation through time.
Ibbotson & Kaplan (2000) recognized the omnipresence of misperception around Brinson’s analyses and set out to correct this in their paper, “Does Asset Allocation Policy Explain 40, 90, or 100% of Performance?” Aside from validating Brinson’s original analysis, they answered two related questions: to what degree does asset allocation explain the variability of performance between different investors, and; to what degree does asset allocation explain the level of long-term performance?
To determine how well asset allocation explained the dispersion in returns across funds, the authors performed a cross sectional regression of returns from funds and institutions against respective policy benchmarks. They determined that 40% of the difference in returns across funds is explained by differences in asset allocation policy, with the balance determined by some combination of tactical shifts, sector bets, security selection, and fees. Notably, their analysis did not yield attributions among the remaining variables, so one is left to guess at their relative importance.
Lastly, Ibbotson and Kaplan performed an attribution analysis to determine the percent of long-term absolute performance explained by a fund’s asset allocation. They calculated the long-term performance of each fund’s policy portfolio and compared it against actual long-term fund returns. The results of this analysis are described in Table 2.
Table 2.
Ibbotson and Kaplan stated that, on average, asset allocation explained 99% and 104% of long-term returns. How might we interpret this finding? Recall that the total return to portfolios were decomposed into the total return to the fund’s policy portfolio using asset class benchmarks, plus the active return, minus trading frictions. So the results of this study demonstrate that, over the periods studied in the analyses, the average institution lost 4% of total return to fees, ineffective active management, or poor manager selection.
Combined with the original analysis by Brinson, which makes the strong case that institutions make very few material deviations from policy weights over time, one is left to conclude that the vast majority of the dispersion and performance decay observed by Ibbotson and Kaplan was due to fees and poor active security selection. This is a troubling condemnation of traditional forms of active management in general.
Since institutions apparently do not make meaningful active bets in asset allocation, we are left to ponder how much opportunity was squandered by ignoring this segment of the decision tree. In other words, to what degree can active asset allocation move the needle on portfolio outcomes relative to active security selection?
Fortunately, Assoe et al. [ALP] performed an analysis, modeled after Kritzman and Page (2003), which applied a creative approach to answer this question. ALP used a normative framework, in which the potential returns in each quarterly period from 1985 – 2005 were explored for a large set of constrained, randomly generated portfolios constructed from either asset class indexes, or individual securities.
In the analysis by ALP, benchmark weights were assigned for a theoretical fund that included cash (5%), bonds (30%), stocks (40%), real estate (10%), private equity (10%), and commodities (5%). This broadly reflects the composition of a typical U.S. endowment, or family office policy portfolio, though ALP focused on U.S. asset classes only, which substantially limits the breadth of the asset class portfolio. You will see why this is important later in this series, but for now the ALP analysis is one step forward.
At the start of each annual period, 100 draws were made from the asset pool, where the probability of drawing an asset class at each draw is in proportion to the neutral policy weights above. Each draw represented 1% of the final portfolio for that year, so 100 draws comprised a fully invested portfolio of varying composition. The returns to these random portfolios were then computed for each quarter of the subsequent year, after which a new random portfolio was constructed in the same way. This process was repeated 10,000 times each year for the 20 year period from 1985 through 2005.
The purpose of this procedure was to generate a large sample of random portfolios produced exclusively from marginal changes to asset allocation around prescribed weights. To this end, the dispersion of portfolio returns is due exclusively to changes in asset allocation, as opposed to the other variables cited by Ibbotson and Kaplan.
A similar procedure was then used to generate stock portfolios from a long-term S&P 500 stock dataset. In this case stock portfolios were created at the start of each year by randomly selecting 100 stocks. The probability of inclusion at each random draw for any given stock was equal to the stock’s current weight in the index, so that over many trials the average weight for each stock would converge to the stocks’ market cap weighting, though each single random portfolio would deviate normally around these value. This procedure was also repeated 10,000 times over the entire 20-year investment period, with each repetition representing one sample portfolio.
Figure 2.

Source: Assoé, L’Ehr and Plant (2006)
ALP were concerned with measuring the dispersion in returns between top performing random portfolios and worst performing random portfolios over time. This dispersion would serve as a proxy for the breadth of opportunity available for a manager to out- or under-perform. They measured dispersion by calculating the performance difference between the 5th and 95th percentile portfolios in each quarter for both the asset allocation portfolios, and the stock selection portfolios. The authors asserted that this dispersion (see Figure 2.) proxied the true empirical breadth of bets available within each asset universe at each period. They documented three important conclusions:
We would add a few other observations. First, the paper deliberately constrains the deviations in allocations to the six asset classes by setting average weights in the asset pool according to a typical institutional weighting scheme. While this assumption is consistent with the current decision-making latitude of many institutions, it substantially understates the true breadth of independent bets that might be available from an unconstrained asset allocation decision. Second, while the the authors do note that the relative breadth available from asset allocation and security selection varies profoundly through time (Figure 2), they offer little in the way of discussion about how or why this time variation is observed. Third, as noted above ALP constrained the study to U.S. asset classes and stocks, which substantially attenuates the available breadth across the liquid asset class universe. We will address each of these points later in this article series.
Most investors miss the forest for the trees by focusing on security selection rather than asset allocation to produce better portfolio outcomes. As a case study, we showed how the best stock pickers in international stock markets could not hope to compete with even the worst stock pickers in domestic U.S. markets over the past five years. Rather, outcomes in equity portfolios were almost completely dominated by geographic effects; individual securities played a much smaller role.
Brinson, and later Ibbotson and Kaplan, demonstrated that for a large universe of institutional investors, asset allocation explained over 90% of quarterly portfolio returns. This research mostly served to prove that the aggregate of active asset class bets and active security bets had very little impact on portfolio outcomes. However, there are several possible reasons why this might be the case. Perhaps institutions rarely deviate from policy asset class weights. Alternatively, perhaps active security bets across managers mostly cancel each other out, resulting in only minor active security risk. In any event, these seminal authors left the work of sorting out asset class vs. security selection effects to future researchers.
Assoé, L’Ehr and Plant rose to the challenge with a creative random portfolio simulation modelled on a typical endowment portfolio’s asset allocation. Under rather severe constraints, they observed that asset allocation and security selection play equally important roles in long-term portfolio outcomes. They also noted that the impact of asset allocation and security bets on portfolio outcomes varies profoundly over time. However, they did not elaborate on why this might be the case.
In our next article, we will provide a compelling theoretical argument for why asset allocation decisions should dominate long-term portfolio outcomes. We will combine concepts from each of our prior articles to make our case, and show how relative contributions from asset allocation and security selection are sensitive to various correlation assumptions. In the end you will see that, even during the most favourable periods for security selection, asset allocation explains over half of total universe breadth. In less favourable stock-picking environments, asset allocation almost completely determines the success or failure of a portfolio.
Note: This series expands on the concepts discussed in our whitepaper, Tactical Alpha: A Quantitative Case for Active Asset Allocation. If you would like to skip ahead by reading the original paper, you can download it here.
See also:
Tactical Alpha in Theory and Practice Part I
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