Nouriel Roubini: The Phantom Economic Recovery

Tuesday, August 18th, 2009

The following article is a guest contribution from RGE Monitor, and Nouriel Roubini’s Project Syndicate, August 16, 2009.*

Where is the US and global economy headed? Last year, there were two sides to the debate. One camp argued that the recession in the US would be V-shaped—short and shallow. It would last only eight months, like the two previous recessions of 1990-1991 and 2001, and the world would decouple from the US contraction.

Others, including me, argued that given the excesses of private sector leverage (in households, financial institutions and corporate firms), this would be a U-shaped recession—long and deep. It would last about 24 months, and the world would not decouple from the US contraction.

Today, 20 months into the US recession—a recession that became global in the summer of 2008 with a massive recoupling—the V-shaped decoupling view is out the window. This is the worst US and global recession in 60 years. If the US recession were—as is most likely—to be over at the end of the year, it will have been three times as long and about fives times as deep—in terms of the cumulative decline in output—as the previous two.

Today’s consensus among economists is that the recession is already over, that the US and global economy will rapidly return to growth and that there is no risk of a relapse. Unfortunately, this new consensus could be as wrong now as the defenders of the V-shaped scenario were for the past three years.

Data from the US—rising unemployment, falling household consumption, still declining industrial production and a weak housing market—suggests that the US recession is not over yet. A similar analysis of many other advanced economies suggests that, as in the US, the bottom is quite close, but it has not yet been reached. Most emerging economies may be returning to growth, but they are performing well below their potential.

Moreover, for a number of reasons, growth in the advanced economies is likely to remain anaemic and well below trend for at least a couple of years.

The first reason is likely to create a long-term drag on growth: Households need to deleverage and save more, which will constrain consumption for years.

Second, the financial system— both banks and non-bank institutions—is severely damaged. Lack of robust credit growth will hamper private consumption and investment spending.

Third, the corporate sector faces a glut of capacity, and a weak recovery of profitability is likely if growth is anaemic and deflationary pressures still persist. As a result, businesses are not likely to increase capital spending.

Fourth, the releveraging of the public sector through large fiscal deficits and debt accumulation risks crowding out a recovery in private sector spending. The effects of the policy stimulus, moreover, will fizzle out by early next year, requiring greater private demand to support continued growth.

Domestic private demand, especially consumption, is now weak or falling in over-spending countries (the US, UK, Spain, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand, etc.), while not increasing fast enough in over-saving countries (China, other Asian countries, Germany and Japan, etc.) to compensate for the reduction in these countries’ net exports. Thus, there is a global slackening of aggregate demand relative to the glut of supply capacity, which will impede a robust global economic recovery.

There are also now two reasons to fear a double-dip recession. First, the exit strategy from monetary and fiscal easing could be botched, because policymakers are damned if they do and damned if they don’t. If they take their fiscal deficits (and a potential monetization of these deficits) seriously and raise taxes, reduce spending and mop up excess liquidity, they could undermine the already weak recovery.

But if they maintain large budget deficits and continue to monetize them, at some point—after the current deflationary forces become more subdued—bond markets will revolt. At this point, inflationary expectations will increase, long-term government bond yields will rise and recovery will be crowded out.

A second reason to fear a double-dip recession concerns the fact that oil, energy and food prices may be rising faster than economic fundamentals warrant, and could be driven higher by the wall of liquidity chasing assets, as well as by speculative demand. Last year, oil at $145 a barrel was a tipping point for the global economy, as it created a major income shock for the US, Europe, Japan, China, India and other oil-importing economies. The global economy, barely rising from its knees, could not withstand the contractionary shock if similar speculative forces were to drive oil rapidly towards $100 a barrel.

So, the end of this severe global recession will be closer at the end of this year than it is now, the recovery will be anaemic rather than robust in advanced economies, and there is a rising risk of a double-dip recession. The recent market rallies in stocks, commodities and credit may have gotten ahead of the improvement in the real economy. If so, a correction cannot be too far behind.

©2009 / PROJECT SYNDICATE

Nouriel Roubini is chairman of Roubini Global Economics and a professor at the Stern School of Business, New York University.

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The Road to Depression

Monday, December 1st, 2008

Brad DeLong says two big mistakes made the crisis worse:

James Bradford DeLong (b. June 24, 1960, Boston) commonly known as Brad DeLong, is a professor of economics at the University of California, Berkeley and a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of the United States Department of the Treasury in the Clinton Administration. He is also a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research, and is a visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.

The Road to Depression, by Brad DeLong, Project Syndicate: For 15 months, the United States Federal Reserve, assisted by the financial regulators of the US Treasury, have been trying…,

above all, to avoid a deep depression.

They have also had three subsidiary objectives:

• Keep as much economic activity as possible under private-sector control, in order to ensure that what is produced is what consumers really want.
• Prevent the princes of Wall Street … from profiting from the systemic risk that they created.
• Ensure that homeowners and small investors do not absorb too much loss, for their only “crime” was to accept bad risks, which they would not have done in a world of properly diversified portfolios.

Now it is clear that the Fed and the Treasury have lost the game. If a depression is to be avoided, it will have to be the work of other arms of the government, with other tools and powers.

The failure to contain the crisis will ultimately be traced, I think, to excessive concern with the first two subsidiary objectives: reining in Wall Street princes and keeping economic decision-making private. Had the Fed and the Treasury given those two objectives their proper - subsidiary - weight, I suspect that we would not now be in this mess…

The desire to prevent the princes of Wall Street from profiting from the crisis was reflected in the Fed-Treasury decision to let Lehman Brothers collapse… The logic behind that decision was that, previously in the crisis, equity shareholders had been severely punished…

But this was not true of bondholders and counterparties, who were paid in full. The Fed and Treasury feared that the lesson being taught in the last half of 2007 and the first half of 2008 was that the US government guaranteed all the debt and transactions of every bank and bank-like entity that was regarded as too big to fail. That, the Fed and the Treasury believed, could not be healthy.

Lenders to very large overleveraged institutions had to have some incentive to calculate the risks. But that required, at some point, allowing some bank to fail…

In retrospect, this was a major mistake. … With that guarantee broken by Lehman Brothers’ collapse, every financial institution immediately sought to acquire a much greater capital cushion…,

but found it impossible to do so.

The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy created an extraordinary and immediate demand for additional bank capital, which the private sector could not supply.

It was at this point that the Treasury made the second mistake. Because it tried to keep the private sector private, it sought to avoid partial or full nationalization of the components of the banking system deemed too big to fail. In retrospect, the Treasury should have identified all such entities and started buying common stock in them - whether they liked it or not - until the crisis passed.

Yes, this is what might be called “lemon socialism,” creating grave dangers for corporate control, posing a threat of large-scale corruption, and establishing a precedent for intervention that could be very dangerous down the road.

But would that have been worse than what we face now? The failure to sacrifice the subsidiary objective of keeping the private sector private meant that the Fed and the Treasury lost their opportunity to attain the principal objective of avoiding depression.

Of course, hindsight is always easy. But if depression is to be avoided, it will be through old-fashioned Keynesian fiscal policy: the government must take a direct hand in boosting spending and deciding what goods and services will be in demand.

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