Michael Belkin’s Model Points Up for Stocks

Tuesday, February 2nd, 2010

Kate Welling of welling@weedon has just conducted another of her top-class interviews with Michael Belkin. Belkin is the author of The Belkin Report that I used to read regularly, but have had difficulty in obtaining over the past two years or so. He has a huge reputation among institutional investors and got his calls right more often than not when I still had access to his material.

Friend Barry Ritholtz (The Big Picture) provides some insight into Belkin’s latest thinking with the following excerpts from Welling’s report:

“Where my views are probably different to what some of the higher profile names are currently saying is that I’m not pointing to the equity market now as the source of a bubble or of malinvestment, in Austrian terms.

“If not the stock market, where are you pointing?

“At the bond market. Specifically, since the March 20, 2009 turning point in the equities market, if you look at the AMG weekly data on inflows into ETFs and mutual funds, bond fund flows have been positive every week and have averaged $4 billion a week. There hasn’t been a single down-week. But meanwhile, for equity funds, there’s been a completely different pattern. They’ve been down two weeks, up one week, then down, up four weeks, down five weeks - and the average inflow is only $500 million a week.

“Just barely positive?

“Yes, at last count only $24 billion had gone into all kinds of equity funds over this entire recovery rally, versus $178 billion into bond funds. I’ve been looking at this for quite a while and sort of scratching my head and wondering what was going on. But finally it just occurred to me. They’re buying bonds. It’s rather obvious. I think what has happened is that the public in previous cycles bought emerging-market funds or internet stocks or whatever, when the Fed would lower interest rates to an artificially low level, thereby penalizing people on their savings. So right now, for instance, I have friends who inherited a lot of money and I’m an informal advisor to them, not a paid advisor. They keep asking me, what do I do now? They were investing in CDs, which were parceled out to a lot of different banks on which they were making 2, 3, 4%. But now they’re maturing and the banks are offering, like, nothing. So they are asking, what do we do, what do we do? They need the yield; they need income; they don’t want to lose the nominal principal. What to do? What to do?”

“Belkin’s time series regression analysis is not only data driven, but he is also aware of historical predecessors. I find his argument that bonds are at greater risk than stocks to be very counter-intuitive, contrary - and compelling,” added Ritholtz.

Source: Barry Ritholz, The Big Picture, February 1, 2010.

Tags: Barry Ritholtz The Big Picture, Bond Fund, Bond Funds, Bond Market, Class Interviews, Emerging Market Funds, Equity Funds, ETF, Friend Barry, Fund Flows, Funds Bond, Inflow, Institutional Investors, Internet Stocks, Michael Belkin, Model Points, Mutual Funds, Profile Names, Stock Market, Turning Point, Weedon
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WealthTrack: Cliff Asness - Betting on Quants

Monday, December 7th, 2009

This week Consuelo Mack is joined on WealthTrack by Cliff Asness, an outspoken and thought-provoking hedge fund manager. He explains AQR Capital Management’s value-oriented, quantitative computer-driven strategies and why he is making them available in mutual funds.

Note: The transcript of this interview is not available yet, but will be posted here as soon as it arrives.

Source: Wealthtrack, December 4, 2009.

Tags: Advertisement, Aqr Capital Management, Betting, Cliff Asness, Driven Strategies, Hedge Fund Manager, Mack, Mutual Funds, Wealthtrack
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WealthTrack’s Great Investors: A Conversation with Mark Headley

Tuesday, August 18th, 2009

This week in WealthTrack’s series on Great Investors, Consuelo Mack features Mark Headley, chairman of the board of Matthews International Capital Management, which runs a family of Asia-focused mutual funds.

Headley discusses the impact of the financial crisis in Asia as well as potential opportunities in the region. (If there is no sound, click on “unmute” by scrolling over the bottom of the image.)

Note: The transcript of this interview is not available yet, but will be posted here as soon as it arrives.

Source: WealthTrack, August 14, 2009.

Tags: Cape Town, Capital Management, Chairman Of The Board, Ffffff, Financial Crisis In Asia, Image Note, International Management, Investment, Investors, Mack, Matthews International, Mutual Funds, Postcards, Sound Click, Target, Wealthtrack
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Technical Talk: Rally continues …

Wednesday, March 18th, 2009

The comments below were provided by Kevin Lane of Fusion IQ.

On March 10 we said: “Market internals (i.e. the number of advancers to decliners and up volume to down volume) on today’s advance were the most bullish internal readings seen since the move off the 2002 lows … ”

We also said: “When the skew of advancers to decliners and up to down volume is this strong it suggests almost a buying panic on the part of institutions to get back into the market. Additionally these strong internals also suggest that there are a confidence and conviction on the part of institutional buyers.”

And last but not least, we said: “That said we believe today’s rally is the start of a good move higher (again it may not be the ultimate low - only hindsight will tell us that); however, the surge of momentum suggests this rally will be worth participating in.”

So here we are not many days later and up considerably from where we published those comments and now what?

We still believe the combination of the market getting really oversold, attractive valuations, excessive negative sentiment, portfolio managers having a lot of cash on hand and the quarter end for many mutual funds coming up (i.e. window-dressing time. After all if returns looked poor again more redemptions would follow) (and the last thing they want to show is down another 20+%) has led to a lot of capital redeployment. With the market moving higher quickly, even more managers felt they would lag behind their peers and subsequently benchmarks, thus even more money (i.e. managers chasing the move) came into the market.

In addition it was not unrealistic for many to think the stimulus package (no matter what your thoughts on its long-term ability to be effective or not) will goose the economy to some degree at some point in the not too distant future. So that said we continue to view this current rally as having legs with maybe another 10 to 15% up from present levels. (So buying on dips with appropriate stop losses would make sense for the time being.) We also continue to view this as an opportunity to make money on the long side for a narrow window of time (1 to 3 months).

However, ultimately we think this rally will fade and we will get a retest of the recent lows (check the history books, we almost always get a retest). How the market handles that retest will tell us a lot with regard to the longer-term picture. We believe tech and growth (since they have the best bases and most constructive chart patterns and corrected much less than the broader market during the down draft) will still outperform with regard to sector and style bias respectively during this rally/bounce.

In Barron’s this weekend, one portfolio manager, Felix Zulauf, made an articulate case that this will be a violent rally (900 on the S&P 500) followed by a move to new lows (450 on the S&P 500) with the ultimate bottom coming in 2011. This certainly is plausible, and would anyone doubt it after what we saw in the last 12 months especially if this is a multi-year secular bear? However, we believe the best one can get from this market is to try to dissect it and plan for shorter horizons such as 1 to 3 months until more macro-economic data allow for longer-term forecasting comfort. This is a market where traders will continue to dominate and thrive (provided you try to capture return both on rallies as well as declines). For the foreseeable future buy-and-hold strategies should be kept on the shelf if one wishes to make a return.

As always don’t BUY BLIND!! Have an exit strategy before you trade/invest (and stick to it)!!!

Source: Kevin Lane, Fusion IQ, March 18, 2009.

Tags: Attractive Valuations, Benchmarks, Conviction, Decliners, Dips, Distant Future, Down Volume, Hindsight, Institutional Buyers, Iq, Lows, Market Internals, Mutual Funds, Negative Sentiment, Portfolio Managers, Redemptions, Redeployment, Skew, Stimulus Package, Window Dressing
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Bill Ackman: Pershing Square Q3 2008 Letter

Thursday, November 27th, 2008

Pershing Square Q3 2008 Investor Letter
by Bill Ackman, November 15, 2008 at 11:44 pm

These are extraordinary times particularly for active participants in the capital markets. While I do not normally choose to write about macro and regulatory events, I thought it would be useful for you to understand how we think about recent events and their impact on our portfolio.

We are currently witnessing the greatest deleveraging event in history. What began as a credit bubble bursting has now spread to the equity markets as banks, investment banks, hedge funds, structured products, mutual funds, pension funds, endowments and other leveraged and unleveraged market participants have been forced to liquidate assets by their counterparties, leverage providers, redeeming clients, and as a result of downgrades, other debts or other commitments that need to be funded.

These actions have led to forced and indiscriminate selling in security markets around the world, which in turn has caused other investors to panic or simply to sell, to get out of the way of other forced sellers.

As a fund which is generally substantially more long than short, we have also suffered large mark-to-market declines in our long investments. Year to date, however, our performance has substantially exceeded that of the broader equity markets, which at this writing have seen a more than 34% decline. Our outperformance is largely due to large gains on our investments in Longs Drugs and Wachovia Corporation as well as profits on our credit default swap and other short exposures. Our market losses have been further mitigated because we operate unleveraged and have substantial cash balances. Currently, we have cash and near-cash (Longs Drugs and Wachovia/Wells Fargo long/short) equal to approximately 39% of our capital.

When, you might ask, will the selling end? While I don’t proclaim to be a market prognosticator, I will make a few observations. Unlike the deleveraging that takes place when banks and other financial institutions sell assets to meet regulatory requirements, which is typically a longer term process, the forced deleveraging that is now taking place in the equity markets is being implemented largely by the prime brokerage firms and margin account managers at broker dealers around the world. Prime brokers are not known to be laggardly in their approach to liquidating an account that no longer meets margin requirements. This is likely to be even more true in the current environment. As such, it may be reasonable to conclude that the forced liquidation that is now taking place may not be a prolonged process.

Security prices around the world have come down tremendously. In the larger capitalization U.S. markets, which are the focus of our strategy, the reductions have been substantial. As of the market close on October 31st, the S&P 500 is down 34.0%, year to date, and down by 37.5% from its high on October 31, 2007; and this is after last week’s rally in which the S&P 500 rose more than 12% from the lows. Unlike the bear market of 1973 and 1974, in which stocks declined by 45% from the highs, this bear market was not preceded by the “Nifty 50″ bubble in which large capitalization growth stocks traded at extraordinary valuations. While valuations were not cheap one year ago, in a long-term historical context, the market as a whole (particularly if one were to exclude financials) was not particularly expensive either.

As such, in today’s market, we are finding extraordinary bargains, the kinds of opportunities that are normally associated with market bottoms. While there are still weak and poorly capitalized businesses that are likely still overvalued, the high quality, well-capitalized, larger capitalization businesses which are the focus of our strategy look very cheap to us.

While this means that now is likely to be a much better time to be a buyer rather than a seller, it does not mean that the market will not continue to decline, even substantially, from current levels, particularly in the short term. In fact, because of tax-loss selling over the next 60 or so days, there will likely be additional selling pressure. At some point, however, the forced selling will come to an end. Large amounts of cash are sitting on the sidelines waiting to be deployed when investors feel the coast is clear. In the event the market were to start to rise again, it would not be a surprise to see institutional, retail, and hedge fund investors rapidly deploy capital so as not to miss a, perhaps, explosive market rally.

What does this all mean for Pershing Square? Despite the fact that we occasionally have an opinion, we spend little time trying to outguess market prognosticators about the short-term future of the markets or the economy for the purpose of deciding whether or not to invest. Since we believe that short-term market and economic prognostication is largely a fool’s errand, we invest according to a strategy that makes the need to rely on short-term market or economic assessments largely irrelevant.

Our strategy is to seek to identify businesses and occasionally collections of assets which trade in the public markets for which we can predict with a high degree of confidence their future cash flows - not precisely, but within a reasonable band of outcomes. We seek to identify companies which offer a high degree of predictability in their businesses and are relatively immune to extrinsic factors like fluctuations in commodity prices, interest rates, and the economic cycle. Often, we are not capable of predicting a business’ earnings power over an extended period of time. These investments typically end up in the “Don’t Know” pile.

Because we cannot predict the economic cycles with precision, we look for businesses which are capitalized to withstand difficult economic times or even the normal ups and downs of any business. If we can find such a business and it trades at a deep discount to our estimate of fair value, we have found a potential investment for the portfolio. Next we look for the factors that have led to the business’ undervaluation, and judge - based on our assessment of the company’s governance structure, management team, ownership, and other factors - whether we can effectuate change in order to unlock value. When the price is right, the business is high quality, the management is excellent, and there are no changes to be made, we are willing to make a passive investment.

Our assessment of the short-term supply and demand for securities plays almost no role in our determining whether to invest capital, long or short. If we believed that it was possible to accurately predict short-term market or individual stock price movements and we had the capability to do so ourselves, we might have a different approach. Below I quote Warren Buffett in his 1994 Letter to shareholders where he perhaps says it best:

We will continue to ignore political and economic forecasts, which are an expensive distraction for many investors and businessmen. Thirty years ago, no one could have foreseen the huge expansion of the Vietnam War, wage and price controls, two oil shocks, the resignation of a president, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a one-day drop in the Dow of 508 points, or treasury bill yields fluctuating between 2.8% and 17.4%.

But, surprise - none of these blockbuster events made the slightest dent in Ben Graham’s investment principles. Nor did they render unsound the negotiated purchases of fine businesses at sensible prices. Imagine the cost to us, then, if we had let a fear of unknowns cause us to defer or alter the deployment of capital. Indeed, we have usually made our best purchases when apprehensions about some macro event were at a peak. Fear is the foe of the faddist, but the friend of the fundamentalist.

A different set of major shocks is sure to occur in the next 30 years. We will neither try to predict these nor to profit from them. If we can identify businesses similar to those we have purchased in the past, external surprises will have little effect on our long-term results…

Stock prices will continue to fluctuate - sometimes sharply - and the economy will have its ups and down. Over time, however, we believe it is highly probable that the sort of businesses we own will continue to increase in value at a satisfactory rate.

I believe we will look at the current U.S. stock market valuations for high quality mid and large capitalization businesses as presenting perhaps the best investment opportunities of our lifetimes.

Portfolio Update

The last quarter and, in particular, the last few weeks have been an extraordinarily busy and productive time for Pershing Square. During this time, we have made considerably more buy and sell decisions than usual, taking advantage of the liquidity of our holdings, the enormous volatility of the market, and new opportunities that have presented themselves in recent weeks.

In the third quarter, we disposed of our investments Cadbury PLC, Canadian Tire, and Austrian Post at prices generally higher than current levels. We also disposed of the substantial majority of our investment in Sears Holdings. We hold a residual interest in Sears (which represents approximately 1.5% of fund capital) as its price declined to a level at which it made no sense to continue to sell. We redeployed the capital from these sales into Wachovia Corporation, which I will discuss further below, as well as a new investment in which we are in the process of accumulating a position.

We sold these positions not because we thought they would be poor investments, but rather because we believed that we could redeploy the capital in investments that offered a more attractive risk-reward profile. As we have often stated, we are always willing to sell an existing holding at a profit or a loss, if we can find a better use for the funds. For our taxable investors, sales at a loss have the additional benefit of offsetting taxable gains.

Our sales were also motivated by the fact that three of the above companies - Sears, Canadian Tire, and Austrian Post - each have a controlling shareholder. Because we believe that one of our important competitive advantages is our ability to effectuate change at companies in our portfolio, other than in special circumstances, we do not expect to make investments in controlled companies in the future.

As a result of recent changes in the portfolio and strategic developments with respect to Longs Drugs and Wachovia Corporation, our long portfolio is now comprised of higher quality, more economically resilient businesses, companies for which we can be a catalyst to create value, and a large amount of cash and soon-to-be cash that we can redeploy in new opportunities.

On the short side of the portfolio, we have been opportunistic in unwinding single-name credit default swaps in cases where spreads have increased significantly, and have covered certain short positions where stocks have declined substantially as a result of company-specific as well as market-related events. We recently repurchased CDS on the investment grade credit index as certain technical factors have made this investment/hedge attractive once again.

Longs Drugs

In last quarter’s letter, I alluded to a new position on which we expected to file a Schedule 13D shortly. That position was Longs Drugs, a West Coast based drugstore retailer. While Longs’ was valued in the market as an underperforming drug store retailer, we valued the business based on its component parts which included: (1) owned and long-term, below-market, leasehold real estate, (2) RxAmerica, a rapidly growing pharmacy benefit manager (”PBM”) which generated more than 20% of the company’s trailing operating income, and (3) an underperforming, low-margin drugstore retailer. At our cost, we believed that Longs real estate value alone more than covered our purchase price and we were getting the PBM and the retailer for less than free. We estimated the fair market value of the company to be $85 to $95 per share assuming each of the company’s assets was sold to the buyer who could pay the highest price.

Unlike many of our previous active investments, we concluded that Longs had reached the end of its strategic life and should be sold to one of its larger competitors, namely CVS or Walgreens. While it has been rare for us to buy a stake in the company with a view that a strategic sale was the right exit opportunity, we have done so in the past. For example, our original investment in Sears Roebuck & Company was predicated on a strategic outcome at the company which was ultimately achieved when it was acquired by Kmart.

In the current weak (to use a euphemism) credit environment, we are particularly wary of investments which are predicated on a sale. However, in this case, we were comforted by the fact that Longs Drugs would be a must-have acquisition for CVS and Walgreens and that both companies, which are many times the size of Longs, could easily finance the acquisition. Even in the event a sale did not go through, we had purchased Longs at an attractive price which offered a substantial margin of safety against a permanent loss of capital.

Within one week of our 13D filing, Longs announced that it had entered into a transaction to be sold to CVS for $71.50 per share in a cash tender offer, an approximately 44% premium to our average cost. While we were happy with the deal, we were somewhat unhappy with the purchase price, particularly when we learned that the company had not run a competitive auction. Thereafter, we hired the Blackstone Group with whom we have worked successfully in past transactions in an attempt to achieve a better outcome for all shareholders.

We and Blackstone were successful in attracting a bid of $75 per share from Walgreens; however, the greater regulatory risk and potential time delay in a transaction with Walgreens led Longs’ board to reject the transaction in favor of the CVS offer. Walgreens subsequently withdrew its offer citing market conditions, and a day later, the CEO of Walgreens stepped down. We anticipate that we will be fully cashed out of our investment in Longs’ by the close of trading today.

Wachovia Corporation

Wachovia is a good example of the types of opportunities that have emerged in the current highly volatile environment. On Monday morning September 29th, Wachovia Corporation announced that it had entered into an agreement in principle to sell its banking subsidiaries to Citigroup. The transaction was structured in an unusual manner. In the deal, Citi was paying $2.1 billion of its own stock to Wachovia Corporation (the publicly traded holding company for the Wachovia banking subsidiaries) and assuming $53 billion of senior and subordinate holding company debt in addition to the debt and other liabilities of the Wachovia banking subsidiaries. The description of the transaction was limited to a several paragraph press release and a conference call presentation by Citigroup that morning. Wachovia stock opened later Monday afternoon at approximately $1.80 per share, down 82% from Friday’s close.

The market’s reaction to the Citi transaction was severe, particularly as the transaction was announced only four days after Washington Mutual’s subsidiary banks were seized by regulators and sold to J.P. Morgan. In that transaction, WaMu’s holding company filed for bankruptcy, wiping out shareholders and materially impairing holding company creditors.

The Wachovia transaction, however, was structured in a materially different manner from the WaMu seizure. It appears that the government, in order to protect bank holding company bondholders from losing their investment and perhaps to avoid triggering a CDS credit event, structured this deal so that Citi would assume the holding company debts. Interestingly, as part of the Citi transaction the government provided an excess-of-loss guarantee on Wachovia mortgages to protect Citi, which the government could likely have avoided if it had not required Citi to assume $53 billion of holding company debt. It appears that the government had concluded that additional bank holding company debt defaults would create systemic risk or reduce the ability for bank holding companies to access this important source of capital, and therefore chose to protect the Wachovia banking subsidiary and the holding company bondholders.

The unusual structure of the transaction created an interesting investment opportunity. By removing the holding company debts, Wachovia Corporation, now orphaned from its bank subsidiaries was left with some very attractive assets. Based on our reading of the public filings, conference call transcripts, and internet research over the course of Monday morning and afternoon, we estimated that Wachovia was left with the following assets: approximately $2 billion or more of cash, $2.1 billion of Citigroup Stock, the Wachovia Securities wealth management operation, A.G. Edwards (which had been purchased one year ago for approximately $7 billion), Evergreen Asset Management (a mutual fund manager with $245 billion in assets under management), Wachovia Insurance Services, and other ancillary assets.

In light of the Citi debt assumption, the only material liability of Wachovia Corporation was $9.8 billion of non-cumulative, perpetual preferred stock. Because this preferred is both non-cumulative and perpetual, Wachovia has no obligation to ever pay a dividend on these securities making these liabilities effectively a free form of equity financing. These types of preferred securities are typically structured to qualify as an attractive form of bank holding company equity which gets favorable regulatory and rating agency treatment. Now that they were orphaned by the transaction, at best these liabilities were worth less than 50 cents on the dollar.

We also determined that the structure of the transaction would create a large tax asset for the holding company. By selling the bank subsidiaries for less than their net tangible asset value, we estimated that a $26 billion tax loss would be created. This tax loss could by carried back two years enabling the holding company to recover approximately $7.5 billion of cash taxes that had previously been paid.

Our conservative estimate of value of New Wachovia was in excess of $8 per share even assuming that the preferred stock was redeemed or valued at par. We began buying the stock shortly after it opened on Monday afternoon. My instructions to our traders Ramy Saad and Erika Kreyssig were to buy every share we possibly could, including pre- and post-market trading. They did a superb job.

Between Monday afternoon and late Thursday we acquired 178 million shares, or approximately 8.3% of the company, at an average price of $3.15. On Friday morning before the open, Wells Fargo announced a definitive agreement to acquire Wachovia for 0.1991 shares of Wells common stock, or more than $7.00 per share based on Friday’s trading price. We began selling our Wachovia stock on Friday. We could not, however, hedge the Wells Fargo stock price because the short selling ban was still in effect.

Citi, which thought it had an exclusive to complete the transaction with Wachovia, brought litigation later that Friday to enjoin the Wells Fargo deal. By late the following week, Citi, likely as a result of pressure from the government, had agreed to allow the Wells transaction to go forward while retaining their lawsuit for damages against Wells Fargo.

As of this date, we have hedged 100% of our exposure to Wells Fargo shares, and have been opportunistic in unwinding a substantial portion of the position. Assuming we waited until transaction closure and taking into consideration Wachovia shares already sold, we have locked in a 67% profit on this $560 million investment.

The government and all of the parties appear to be doing everything they can to consummate the transaction promptly. The transaction received HSR approval in one day and the Treasury and banking authority approvals over the following weekend. Wells has been issued 39% of the voting stock of Wachovia and transaction closure is anticipated by year end. The transaction requires the recently filed form S-4 to be approved by the SEC and the completion of the mechanics of the shareholder meeting in order to be consummated. It is an excellent deal for Wells Fargo and for Pershing Square.

A Mistake

While most of our long investments are comprised of great businesses or assets at fair prices with a catalyst to create value, we occasionally are willing to invest a small amount of fund capital in situations which offer the potential for a many-fold profit at the risk of a large or near-total loss of capital invested. I typically call these investments mispriced options. Our CDS investments fit this profile. While not all mispriced options will be profitable for the funds, I expect our collective experience in these commitments to be quite favorable over time.

We purchased stock in American International Group, Inc. (AIG) after the announcement of the government bailout. In summary, we did so because at the price paid, we purchased AIG at a substantial discount to book value, and we believed that book value was a conservative estimation of the value of AIG’s underlying businesses net of derivative losses. We also believed that there was the potential for a renegotiation of the government’s extremely harsh financing commitment to AIG which provided for 80% dilution, enormous commitment fees, and a high interest rate.

In particular, we believed that if AIG could pay back the government promptly through a combination of asset sales, termination of certain CDS contracts at potentially less than fair market value, and equity investments from existing and potentially other investors, that there was a chance to renegotiate the 80% zero-strike warrant package to the government. If the warrant dilution could be mitigated, it would be possible for AIG shareholders to make a many-fold return on investment. Initially, we believed that the potential for return outweighed the risk of loss. Because of the inherent leverage of AIG, the risk of a permanent loss of capital on this investment was material. As such, we limited the size of our investment to 2.5% of fund capital.

After acquiring our position, we met with other large holders, policymakers and contacted Berkshire Hathaway and other potential investors about a proposed recapitalization of AIG. Unfortunately, the collection of shareholders that were attempting to restructure the government deal was exceedingly disorganized and some large holders were conflicted by a desire to buy certain assets from the company.

We ultimately concluded that the return on invested brain damage from this investment exceeded the probability-weighted opportunity for profit, and we decided to fold the tent. We sold our stock and incurred a modest loss to the funds.

Our Business Model

In order to achieve long-term success, Pershing Square must make good investments and operate with a robust business model. With much media attention focused on hedge fund failures, I thought it would be worthwhile reviewing the characteristics of our business model and explaining why we will withstand industry-specific and overall environmental threats to the investment and hedge fund businesses. The principle factors which contribute to the robustness of our business model are as follows:

* Our portfolio management approach is inherently low risk (where risk is defined as the probability of a permanent loss of capital), particularly when compared with other hedge fund business models. An important distinguishing factor about Pershing Square compared to most other hedge funds is that we do not generally use margin leverage in our investment strategy. The lawyers prefer that I put in the word “generally” to give us the flexibility to use margin to manage short-term capital flows, but, to-date, we have not used any but an immaterial amount of margin, and only for a brief period of time, and we have no intention of changing this approach,
* We generally invest in higher quality businesses with dominant and defensive market positions that generate predictable free cash flow streams and that have modestly or negatively leveraged (cash in excess of debt) balance sheets. We buy these businesses at deep discounts to our estimate of intrinsic value giving us a margin of safety against a permanent impairment of capital. I say “generally” again here because we do make exceptions in certain limited circumstances; that is, we may buy a more leveraged or lower quality business if we believe the price paid sufficiently discounts the risk.
* We often seek investments where we can effectuate positive change to catalyze the realization of value. This serves to accelerate the recognition of value, helps us avoid “dead money” situations, and protects us somewhat from managerial actions which can destroy value.
* We are diversified to an adequate but not excessive extent. This has further benefits for risk and operational management which I will discuss below.
* There is an inherent balance to our long/short investment approach. Historically, when equity or credit markets weaken, our shorts become more valuable, and occasionally materially more valuable, offsetting somewhat the mark-to-market declines in our long portfolio. If we choose to unwind these short positions during market downturns, we can generate capital to invest in a now less expensive market. These short investments generally stand on their own in that they do not typically require a stock market or credit market decline to be successful. That said, they have served as a useful hedging tool during periods of dramatic market declines.
* We have been paranoid about counterparty risk since the inception of the firm. First, we trade with counterparties which we believe to be creditworthy. Second, we have negotiated ISDA agreements which provide us with daily mark-to-market cash and U.S. Treasurys equal to the previous day’s market value of our derivative contracts. In cases where we are required to post initial margin and therefore have some exposure beyond the market value of our derivative contracts, we have typically purchased CDS on our counterparties to further mitigate counterparty risk. While our approach to counterparty risk has protected us from any counterparty losses to date, please be forewarned there is no perfect approach to avoiding counterparty risk.

Our simple approach to investing also allows us to avoid complicated approaches to risk management. Our investment strategy does not require us to open offices all over the globe. As such, we don’t need traders working around the clock. We can go to sleep at night and sleep. Our weekends are largely our own (Ok. I admit it. I am writing this letter in the office on Sunday.) Our risk management approach is to: (1) put our eggs in a few very sturdy baskets, (2) store those baskets in very safe places where they cannot be taken away from us and sold at precisely the wrong time due to margin calls, and (3) to know and track those baskets and their contents very carefully. We call this approach the sleep-at-night approach to risk management. If I can’t, we won’t.

I am extremely skeptical of more automated, algorithmic, Value at Risk, and other business school sanctioned approaches to risk management. None of these approaches saved Lehman, Bear Stearns, Fannie, Freddie, AIG, WaMu, Wachovia or any of the other institutions that used these and other ostensibly more sophisticated risk management strategies.

Our investment strategy and approach to counterparty risk serves to limit the risks inherent in our individual investment selections, our counterparty risk, and the portfolio as a whole. There are, however, other important risks to our business, principally operational, reputational, and regulatory risk.

Operational Risk

Our investment approach is largely straightforward and relatively simple. This, coupled with the concentrated nature of the portfolio, allows us to run our business with a limited number of personnel. We have five senior investment professionals including myself. Shane Dinneen, still officially a junior investment professional, is fast earning his stripes as an eventual senior member of the team.

We could manage our portfolio with less human talent than we have. For members of the investment team reading this letter, don’t be concerned because I have no intention of shrinking the team, but I make the point nonetheless. Simplicity in our investment approach allows for a simpler back office and a smaller overall staff. We have 31 people total at Pershing Square. It could be fewer, but one of Tim Barefield’s (our COO) important risk management principles provides for back-up talent for every role in the firm.

Our Noah’s Ark approach to personnel duplication makes for a good analogy for the ship we have designed. We have worked hard to build a business that can withstand the Great Deluge, and this goes beyond counterparty risk. For example, it is not yet clear this year whether there will be any incentive allocation to be shared at the firm. That said, whether or not the funds’ finish the year in the black, it will be extremely unlikely that a member of our team leaves by choice, and I have no intentions of letting anyone go. This is due to several factors:

* Pershing Square’s large amount of assets under management per investment principal and per overall employee are important ratios to consider when evaluating the sustainability of Pershing Square or any hedge fund for that matter. The economics of a high Asset per Employee ratio attract and allow for the retention of top talent. Our team can be compensated appropriately even in times of short-term underperformance. Hedge funds which barely (or don’t even) cover their costs with management fees are inherently unstable enterprises because in an unprofitable year they cannot pay their people and are likely to lose their most talented professionals to other firms.
* Pershing Square is a nice place to work. While this sounds like an obvious approach to retaining talent, many and perhaps most hedge funds don’t fit this description. We are big believers in taking care of our team not just financially and with attractive benefits, and we have those in spades. We consider every employee at the firm a member of our extended family, and we treat and care for them appropriately. We do this not for business reasons, but it has important long-term business benefits.
* Pershing Square is an extremely exciting place to work. We believe our work creates value beyond the profits we historically have generated for our investors. Our approach to value creation at businesses has created enormous value for investors who happened to own companies to which we contributed to the creation of value. Similarly, investors and counterparties who listened to our views on the bond insurers, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, etc. saved themselves from large losses or perhaps profited by short sales. The fact that our work creates value for the markets as a whole provides additional motivation to the team.

Bottom line, we are built to last, and we will continue to work hard to deserve your continued support.

Reputational and Regulatory Risk

Reputational risk is one of the key risk factors for a business that is subject to a high degree of regulatory scrutiny in an industry that seems to generate considerable public scorn. Our approach to assessing reputational risk is to apply the New York Times test. We ask ourselves whether we would be comfortable having our family and friends read a front page New York Times story about actions taken by Pershing Square written by a knowledgeable and intelligent reporter who has access to all of the facts. If we are comfortable with such an article being read by our close friends, our families, and the public at large, our action passes the test. If not, we reconsider our potential action.

More recently, I have decided to participate in the public dialogue about hedge funds, agreeing to occasional appearances on television or otherwise talking to the press, speaking at industry events, meeting with Congressman, Senators, and other officials. I do so not for any desire for public recognition, but rather because I believe that it is important for the hedge fund industry to come out of the shadows and defend the importance of our work. If we and others (that includes hedge fund investors in addition to the managers) don’t do so, the industry, in my view, is at even greater risk of further regulatory, tax, and other legal changes that will materially harm our business models and industry.

One does not need to look further than the recent short selling ban which was an extremely ill-advised regulatory change that contributed to market turmoil and the recent market decline. By imposing a ban on an investment approach that has been legal for generations with no warning or opportunity for public debate, the SEC caused a short squeeze and subsequent market disarray that wiped out large amounts of hedge fund capital, caused forced selling as long/short, market neutral, quantitative, and other managers had to sell long positions to rebalance their books. More significantly, it cost the U.S. capital markets its highly respected position as an exemplar free marketplace where the rule of law prevailed. It also contributed to hedge fund underperformance, thereby leading to investor redemptions, further reducing industry capital.

I believe the short selling ban also contributed to continued market declines since the ban was put into place. In that hedge funds are among the most opportunistic investors in the world, destroying large amounts of hedge fund capital likely contributed to market declines because of a dearth of opportunistic hedge fund buyers who would normally step in and purchase the compelling values created by falling markets.

Even though the restriction on short selling has been eliminated, the longer-term consequences of populist regulatory actions will continue to be felt by the markets and its participants until such time as our securities regulator makes clear that the U.S. will never again change the rules of the game mid play.

Specifically, the short selling ban was harmful to Pershing Square because we lost the opportunity to lock in even greater gains on our Wachovia investment by not initially being able to hedge our Wells Fargo exposure. I estimate this loss at approximately 3% to 4% of fund performance. This loss was somewhat offset by our ability to sell certain investments into the short squeeze at higher than anticipated prices. We were otherwise not materially affected because short selling equities has not been a material part of our investment program, although we did cover one large equity short at a loss which is now trading at a more than 40% lower price, another 4% to 5% potential loss of profit assuming we had not covered at higher prices.

Hedge fund investors - the pension funds, state plans, charitable, healthcare and other institutions and the individuals who invest in hedge funds - are a much more appealing constituency to defend the industry than the managers themselves. I encourage you to consider becoming part of the public debate on the industry. We collectively need one another’s support.

Investor Risk

The stability of a hedge fund’s capital base is critical to its long-term success. We have endeavored to attract high quality investors who have a deep understanding of our investment approach. We do our best to continually inform you of the progress of our holdings and business, and remind you of the inherently volatile nature of our concentrated strategy. Our investment strategy is also transparent. The nature of our approach requires most of our holdings to eventually be disclosed publicly. As such, it is easier for you to understand how we have made and lost money over the years, and to assess our ability to replicate our historic strategy and performance.

Over the last nearly five years, we have delivered very little of the volatility that investors are concerned about, that is, downward volatility. As such and with strong historical performance, we have not “tested” our investor base. We hope never to “test” our investor base.

While we have considered a longer-term lock-up structure, we chose not to modify our existing liquidity terms because we did not want our terms to be overly burdensome to investors and to present a hurdle to the reinvestment of capital, particularly during a period of temporary underperformance. Year to date, we have had minimal redemptions. New commitments have exceeded our redemption requests by approximately 3 to 1. We have a pipeline of new prospects that are in the process of completing their due diligence. That said, the continuity of our investor base is a long-term success factor for the funds and for this we are relying on you.

Is Now a Good Time to Invest in Pershing Square?

I have never before suggested that one time or another would be a better time to invest in Pershing Square. I am going to take the risk of doing so now. At the risk of sounding promotional, I believe that now is perhaps the best time in our history to increase your investment in Pershing Square. A few thoughts to consider:

When one invests in Pershing Square today, with respect to our current portfolio and potential opportunities in the market, the spread between price and value is the widest it has been since the inception of Pershing Square and likely over the last 30 or more years in our opinion. Investments like Target Corporation which we purchased initially in the mid to high $50s per share now sell at approximately $40 per share and there has been no meaningful diminution in the per-share value of Target since our initial purchase 18 months ago. In fact, the probability of Target and other Pershing Square holdings implementing a value-creating transaction are higher today than before because of management and shareholder frustration with current share price levels. Consider that Target management options are nearly all out of the money, and a meaningful number of vested options will soon likely expire worthless if there is no change in the status quo.

An additional investment in Pershing Square today also purchases a pro rata interest in our cash and near-cash investments. While purchasing cash indirectly is not an inherently attractive proposition, we are currently analyzing a number of long and short investments that appear extremely interesting, and subject to completion of our due diligence, may become large new commitments. While for the first nearly five years of our business, we found only a limited number of interesting opportunities, albeit a sufficient number to generate attractive returns, we are now presented with tens of intriguing situations that are worthy of careful review. One could reasonably conclude that the greater spread between price and value and a wider selection of attractively priced opportunities will lead to higher rates of return on these commitments than during previous periods of greater market efficiency which characterized the first four years of the funds’ existence.

While many have portrayed the current environment as a highly risky time to invest, these individuals are likely confusing risk with volatility. We believe risk should be determined based on the probability that an investor will incur a permanent loss of capital. As market values have declined substantially, this risk has actually diminished rather than increased. Risk is high now for the leveraged short-term investor, but actually much lower for the unleveraged, long-term investor in high quality, mid and large capitalization, modestly leveraged businesses.

Unlike levered hedge funds whose risk increases as NAV declines, Pershing Square’s risk has declined with the recent decline in the value of our portfolio. Why? This is due to the fact that a leveraged manager’s probability of being sold out by its prime broker increases as its portfolio’s equity declines. Many hedge fund strategies are confidence and credit sensitive because they require continued access to low-cost financing. Recent declines may also require leveraged hedge funds to post additional collateral on trades which did not require an initial down payment. Because our investment strategy does not require leverage to operate, recent increases in financing costs and reductions in leverage afforded to hedge funds have no impact on our current or future prospects. In our case, the margin of safety of our investments actually increases, the greater the decline in our holdings’ share prices. We, of course, also have no margin leverage creating the risk of a forced sale. So yes, I believe now is a good time.

Pershing Square Advisory Board Addition

Matt Paull joined the Pershing Square Advisory Board on September 1st. For some of you, Matt’s name may be familiar for he was formerly the CFO of McDonald’s Corporation before his retirement earlier this year. I have known Matt for about 10 years, and interacted with him intensively in mid to late 2005 and in early 2006 when Pershing was advocating for change at McDonald’s.

As CFO of McDonald’s, Matt was one of the most highly regarded public company CFOs in the country. Shareholders were the beneficiaries of superb capital allocation and strong share price appreciation during his tenure as CFO. I consider it one of Pershing Square’s greatest accomplishments that we were able to garner Matt’s respect and friendship even though there were occasionally contentious moments during our engagement with McDonald’s.

Matt has already proved enormously helpful in our interactions with Target Corporation. As a former CFO, particularly one that has been on the other side of one of Pershing Square’s most significant engagements, Matt brings a uniquely valuable perspective to the firm and to the management teams of our portfolio companies.

In addition to his Pershing Square advisory role, Matt is currently serving on the business school faculty of University of San Diego.

Organizational Update

We completed our move to the 42nd floor of 888 Seventh Avenue in August. The second time round, we really got it right. The space is beautiful, promotes communication, and is extraordinarily well organized and efficient.

After the move, we made several additions to the team. Courtney Leonardo and David Robinson joined the IR team in administrative roles, roles which had previously been filled by temporary employees. Alex Song joined us from Goldman Sachs as the newest junior member of the investment team. Amy Stern joined the Finance and Accounting team from Tiger Global, and will focus her efforts on management company accounting. Amy is also attending the NYU Stern School of Business where she is working on a business school degree. Jill Skousen replaced Whitney Stodtmeister as the administrative assistant for the investment team after Whitney moved to Santa Barbara. Helena Tunner joined us to work with Dianna Baitinger at front desk reception.

On other news, Alex Kaufmann of our IR team will be attending Columbia University’s Executive MBA program on Fridays and weekends. We are big believers in continuing education for our personnel.

As always, we are extremely appreciative of your support, particularly during uncertain times. If there are any questions I have failed to answer above, please call Doreen, Alex, Ashley or myself.

Sincerely,
William A. Ackman

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The Mother of All Bear Market Rallies?

Wednesday, November 26th, 2008

Barton Biggs at Traxis Partners believes that equities could be setting up for ‘the mother of all bear market rallies.’

The piece, written Nov. 24 by Barton Biggs for the Financial Times, is timely - Here are some excerpts:

… there is compelling evidence that investors, hedge funds, pension and mutual funds, and the public are not just talking bearish, they have raised astounding amounts of cash.

… I’ve never seen capitulation and despair like this. We must be pretty close to maximum bearishness.

… Second, valuations are cheap. There’s no point in going into an elaborate dissertation; it’s an inexact science.

… If emerging market equities, where the growth is, at six to eight times earnings are not cheap I don’t know what is.

… History shows that even in enduring, secular bear markets there are not just 20 per cent bounces but usually one 30 to 50 per cent rally. We should be due.

… I would like to see the credit markets unclog and spreads come in more. At the bottom of a panic, the news doesn’t have to be good for stocks to rally, it just has to be less bad than what has already been discounted.

Go to Article

Tags: Barton Biggs, Bear Market, Bear Markets, Bounces, Capitulation, Compelling Evidence, Credit, Credit Market, Credit Markets, Despair, Dissertation, Earnings, Eight Times, Emerging Market, Excerpts, Financial Times, FT.com, Hedge Fund, Hedge Funds, Inexact Science, Markets, Mutual Funds, Rally, spreads, Traxis Partners, Valuations
Posted in Credit Markets, Emerging Markets, Markets | 1 Comment »

McCulley: The Paradox of Deleveraging will be Broken

Monday, November 24th, 2008

Paul McCulley, Managing Director and Portfolio Manager, PIMCO, earlier this year wrote a landmark discussion piece titled, “The Paradox of Deleveraging,” in which he postulated that the deleveraging of the credit market would have a profoundly negative impact that only a government sponsored plan could subdue, as no other party could be big enough to slay the affliction of credit abuse in the housing, investment and banking industries. Here is the follow up:

I’ve only written this essay once since the Kansas City Fed’s annual symposium in late August.1 But it hasn’t been because I’ve been lazy. Rather, I’ve been working virtually around the clock ever since, in my day job as head of PIMCO’s Money Market and Funding Desk. On Wall Street, this desk is frequently viewed as a backwater, a temporary home for new MBAs getting their feet wet before moving on to higher-value-added desks, or a retirement home for those with more senior moments than fresh ideas.

That’s never the case here at PIMCO, even though a number of now PIMCO partners spent their first days trafficking in the money markets and I, of ever-graying hair, still make my home here in the early hours of the day. Money markets frequently are a backwater, except when they are not, in which case they are cascading rapids. Liquidity pressures inevitably are the precursor of solvency and/or going-concern problems. Just ask Wall Street’s independent investment banks.

We here at PIMCO have always known this. Accordingly, we’ve always been conservative beyond conservative in our money market operations, on both sides of the balance sheet - no asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) for us, and no tri-party repo without regard to collateral types or haircuts either. Meat and potatoes only, no fancy garnishes necessary. But the meat and potatoes must be cooked properly.

Hence, the work load of PIMCO’s money market and funding desk. My new deputy, Jerome Schneider, hit the ground running in early August, a most propitious time, just before the global money markets became not just cascading rapids, but roaring waterfalls. The financial world will never be the same after the U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve’s fateful decision of the weekend of September 13-14 to stand aside as Lehman Brothers plummeted to death on the rocks below.

Whether that decision was the right one or not, we will never know. Yes, I know that many are quick to take the Treasury and the Federal Reserve to task, maintaining that the on-going global financial crisis - and, thus, growth crisis - would not be nearly so severe if Lehman had been tossed a life line. I simply don’t know. What I do know is that the global financial system was fundamentally broken long before Lehman’s watery death.

Thus, I believe the powerful, systemic policy responses that have unfolded in the post-Lehman world were destined to come about. Lehman was but the unfortunate tipping point. My heart still aches for the pain suffered by my many friends there. Fate is not always fair and at times, is arbitrary and capricious.

But what ailed Lehman was but a manifestation of what ailed, and ails the global financial intermediary system: the presumption that grossly levered positions in illiquid assets can always be funded, because those doing the funding will always assume the borrower is a going concern.

To understand the nature of this systemic malady, we need to return to first principles. Bear with me, please; this is going to be a bit academic. But, I submit, it was the loss of understanding of first principles that lies at the heart of the on-going paradox of deleveraging, which is the proximate cause of the on-going downward spiral of asset and debt deflation.

The Nature of Banking
When I studied the origins of banking in college, we started with the Medici Family of 15th century Italy. I’m quite sure banking existed long before then, just that I haven’t studied it. But regardless of the origins of banking, its founding premise has always been the same: In normal times, the public’s collective, ex ante demand for access to at-par, immediately-available bank money is always greater than the sum of the public’s individual, ex post demand for access to such liquidity.

Thus, the genius of banking, if you want to call it that, is simple: a bank can take more risk on the asset side of its balance sheet than the liability side can notionally support, because a goodly portion of the liability side, notably deposits, is de facto of perpetual maturity, although it is notionally of finite maturity, as short as one day in the case of demand deposits.

It’s the same alchemy that permits mutual funds to commit to next-day redemption at tonight’s NAV, even though all reasonable people know that a mutual fund - with the possible exception of a money market fund - could not possibly liquidate all assets on the wire tomorrow at tonight’s NAV marks. Systemically, it’s the illusion of liquidity, as so elegantly described by John Maynard Keynes:

“The spectacle of modern investment markets has sometimes moved me towards the conclusion that to make the purchase of an investment permanent and indissoluble, like marriage, except by reason of death or other grave cause, might be a useful remedy for our contemporary evils. For this would force the investor to direct his mind to the long-term prospects and to those only. But a little consideration of this expedient brings us up against a dilemma, and shows us how the liquidity of investment markets often facilitates, though it sometimes impedes, the course of new investment.

For the fact that each individual investor flatters himself that his commitment is ‘liquid’ (though this cannot be true for all investors collectively) calms his nerves and makes him much more willing to run a risk. If individual purchases of investments were rendered illiquid, this might seriously impede new investment, so long as alternative ways in which to hold his savings are available to the individual. This is the dilemma.

So long as it is open to the individual to employ his wealth in hoarding or lending money, the alternative of purchasing actual capital assets cannot be rendered sufficiently attractive (especially to the man who does not manage the capital assets and knows very little about them), except by organizing markets wherein these assets can be easily realized for money.”2

Yes, liquidity for all at last night’s marks is an illusion. But for banks, unlike mutual funds, it’s not so much an illusion after all, for two simple reasons: banks have access to deposit insurance underwritten by fiscal authorities and to a discount window underwritten by the monetary authority (and one step removed, the fiscal authority). Thus, banks are unique institutions, providing a “public good:”

*
Liquidity on demand at par for their depositors, because of the safety net underwritten by the sovereign, yet
*
The ability to invest in longer-dated, more risky, not-always-at-par loans and securities, because the existence and credibility of the public safety net systemically renders the public’s ex post demand for liquidity at par below the public’s ex ante demand.

Yes, banking with a sovereign safety net against deposit runs is a really cool business. Indeed, the difference between the public’s ex post and ex ante demand for at-par liquidity could be called the banking system’s “float,” similar to that of a Buffet-style insurance company.

But since it’s a really cool business and since the sovereign providing the liquidity safety net is a de facto equity partner in the business, the sovereign quite rationally wants a say in how the business is run - the degree of leverage, corporate governance, risk management controls, etc. Kinda like I do when I pay the insurance premium on my 19-year old son’s car. Jonnie doesn’t like it, and neither do bankers. Or would-be bankers.

Thus, both bankers and would-be bankers have, from time immemorial, sought to get the benefits of the sovereign’s liquidity safety net without shouldering the associated regulator nuisance. And I’m sure that 19-year old sons and daughters, too, have been doing the same for just as long.

Over the last three decades or so, the growth of “banking” outside formal, sovereign-regulated banking, has exploded, in something that I dubbed the Shadow Banking System.3 Loosely defined, a Shadow Bank is a levered-up financial intermediary whose liabilities are broadly perceived as of similar money-goodness and liquidity as conventional bank deposits. These liabilities could be shares of money market mutual funds; or the commercial paper of Finance Companies, Conduits and Structured Investment Vehicles; or the repo borrowings of stand-alone Investment Banks and Hedge Funds; or the senior tranches of Collateralized Debt Obligations; or a host of other similar funding instruments.

The bottom line is simple: Shadow Banks use funding instruments that are not just as good as old-fashioned sovereign-protected deposits. But it was a great gig so long as the public bought the notion that such funding instruments were “just as good” as bank deposits - more leverage, less regulation and more asset freedom were a path to (much) higher returns on equity in Shadow Banks than conventional banks.

And why did the public buy such instruments as though they were “just as good” as bank deposits? There are a host of reasons, not the least of which was lust for yield. But most fundamentally, Keynes again gives us the systemic answer (his italics, not mine):

“In practice we have tacitly agreed, as a rule, to fall back on what is, in truth, a convention. The essence of this convention - though it does not, of course, work out quite so simply - lies in assuming that the existing state of affairs will continue indefinitely, except in so far as we have specific reasons to expect a change. This does not mean that we really believe that the existing state of affairs will continue indefinitely. We know from extensive experience that this is most unlikely.

The actual results of an investment over a long term of years very seldom agree with the initial expectation. Nor can we rationalize our behavior by arguing that to a man in a state of ignorance errors in either direction are equally probable, so that there remains a mean actuarial expectation based on equi-probabilities. For it can easily be shown that the assumption of arithmetically equal probabilities based on a state of ignorance leads to absurdities.

We are assuming, in effect, that the existing market valuation, however arrived at, is uniquely correct in relation to our existing knowledge of the facts which will influence the yield of the investment, and that it will only change in proportion to changes in this knowledge; though, philosophically speaking, it cannot be uniquely correct, since our existing knowledge does not provide a sufficient basis for a calculated mathematical expectation. In point of fact, all sorts of considerations enter into the market valuations which are in no way relevant to the prospective yield. Nevertheless the above conventional method of calculation will be compatible with a considerable measure of continuity and stability in our affairs, so long as we can rely on the maintenance of the convention.

For if there exist organized investment markets and if we can rely on the maintenance of the convention, an investor can legitimately encourage himself with the idea that the only risk he runs is that of a genuine change in the news over the near future, as to the likelihood of which he can attempt to form his own judgment, and which is unlikely to be very large. For, assuming that the convention holds good, it is only these changes which can affect the value of his investment, and he need not lose his sleep merely because he has not any notion what his investment will be worth ten years hence.

Thus investment becomes reasonably “safe” for the individual investor over short periods, and hence over a succession of short periods however many, if he can fairly rely on there being no breakdown in the convention and on his therefore having an opportunity to revise his judgment and change his investment, before there has been time for much to happen. Investments which are “fixed” for the community are thus made “liquid” for the individual.

It has been, I am sure, on the basis of some such procedure as this that our leading investment markets have been developed. But it is not surprising that a convention, in an absolute view of things so arbitrary, should have its weak points. It is its precariousness which creates no small part of our contemporary problem of securing sufficient investment.”4

And so, Keynes provides the essential - and existential - answer as to why the Shadow Banking System became so large, the unraveling of which lies at the root of the current global financial system crisis. It was a belief in a convention, undergirded by the length of time it held: Shadow Bank liabilities were viewed as “just as good” as conventional bank deposits not because they are, but because they had been. And the power of this conventional thinking was aided and abetted by both the sovereign and the sovereign-blessed rating agencies.

Until, of course, convention was turned on its head, starting with a run on the ABCP market in August 2007, the near death of Bear Stearns in March 2008, the de facto nationalization of Fannie and Freddie in July, and the actual death of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Maybe, just maybe, there was and is something special about a real bank, as opposed to a Shadow Bank!

And indeed that is unambiguously the case, as evidenced by the on-going partial re-intermediation of the Shadow Banking System back into the sovereign-supported conventional banking system, as well as the mad scramble by remaining Shadow Banks to convert themselves into conventional banks, so as to eat at the same sovereign-subsidized capital and liquidity cafeteria as their former stodgy brethren.

The new conventional wisdom: levered capitalism is good, and made even better with a bit of socialism to protect the downside.

Well Maybe
I’m quite sure that last sentence is not going to sit well with some of you. It’s not supposed to sit well. It doesn’t sit well with me, I must acknowledge, nay confess. Like most of us, I’ve always had a separation in my mind between strictly capitalist activities and strictly public activities. Not that the demarcation is always clean. But it’s a useful way of thinking.

As far as I know, the place where I buy my fishing tackle is a capitalist outfit. If we customers don’t buy enough rods and reels, the owner will go broke; his operation is simply not systemically important enough to be bailed out by the taxpayers, including my neighbors who don’t fish. In contrast, the local Department of Motor Vehicles, sometimes called the DMV, is unambiguously not a capitalist outfit, but a public outfit. It cannot go broke, as evidenced by our tolerance of its fluctuating service level, because it provides a public service that the private sector can’t provide. To be sure, AAA can get you new plates for your car, but you can’t renew your driver’s license at the AAA; for that, you have got to go to the monopoly called the DMV.

Well actually, that’s not entirely true, either. The DMV is actually an oligopoly, with offices in many surrounding neighborhoods. And rumor has it here that the service is a lot quicker at the San Clemente office than the Costa Mesa office, which serves Newport Beach. So the consumer does have the choice of driving to San Clemente, a form of time arbitrage versus going to the Costa Mesa office. However, rumor also has it that this rumored better service in San Clemente is so widespread that, as Yogi Berra might say, the San Clemente office has become so popular nobody goes there anymore.

But you get the point: there is private enterprise and there is public enterprise. And then there is banking, a hybrid of the two. There is no way ‘round this, for good or bad, because fractional reserve banking depends upon the sovereign’s safety net against liability runs, a safety net that the private sector definitionally can’t universally supply. In this sense, the safety net is like national defense: we all need it, but since nobody individually has the incentive to pay for it, we collectively tax ourselves to pay for it.

Yes, sometimes we collectively end up paying $800 for military toilet seats, as was the case about 25 years ago. But that doesn’t change the proposition that public goods do exist, and a stable system of intermediation of private savings into private investment is indeed a public good. The maturity transformation power of a fractional reserve banking system provides an unambiguous benefit to society and as such, must be underwritten by society.

Bottom Line
I could regale you yet again about the power of the analytical thinking of Hyman Minsky, complete with his Forward Journey turning into his Moment, followed by his Reverse Journey.5 But I don’t need to do that any more: we’ve collectively lived it and are now caught in the debt-deflationary pathologies of “the paradox of deleveraging.”6 Not everybody in the private sector can delever at the same time without creating a depression. Accordingly, the sovereign must go the other way, levering up the public balance sheet. And Washington has finally started to do so with appropriate vigor and enthusiasm.

It’s not a pretty picture. In fact, it’s repugnant, giving proof to the proposition that breaking the paradox of deleveraging does involve socializing the downside of previously profitable private sector activities. In a recent speech, I called it “creeping socialism” and was interrupted by an irate, older man in the back of the room bellowing, “It ain’t creeping socialism, it’s galloping socialism!” I really didn’t have a soothing come back, noting that many things are what they are only in the eye of the beholder. But his point wasn’t lost on me or anybody else in the room.

And it is not lost on Washington, DC either, I can assure you. If the sovereign must backstop a private sector activity that produces a public good, then the sovereign will, at least in a democracy, rightfully demand both bottom-up and macro-prudential rules to harness the greed that lubricates the invisible hand of capitalism. Yes, the visible fist of government and the invisible hand are presently engaged in a massive arm wrestling contest in the provision of financial services. And the fist is winning.

At least for now. Capitalism, and especially financial market capitalism, brought this outcome upon itself through greed and hubris. Capitalism is now re-grouping and learning how to play by new rules, which are still being written. And ultimately, I’m sure, capitalistic bankers will once again bend those rules in the pursuit of higher profitability. And that’s okay, I think. In the end, we really don’t want to turn our banking system into the DMV. At the same time, we also don’t want our banking system to be nothing more than a betting parlor.

Or, in the famous words of Keynes again:

“Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. But the position is serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation. When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done.”

Paul A. McCulley
Managing Director
November 13, 2008

You can download a complete PDF here.

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Posted in Credit Markets, Markets, Oil and Gas | No Comments »

The Devil’s Dictionary for Financial Markets

Monday, September 1st, 2008

The Devil’s Dictionary, was originally published by Ambrose Bierce. Think of him as the forgotten brother of Mark Twain. Both had remarkably similar lives, were good friends, and lived in San Francisco around the same time. Bierce, however, followed a different path than Twain. While both had similar humour, and were equals in their genius, Bierce clearly was the better when it came to wit. Public figures quaked in fear of his satirical pen, and newspapers sales soared when he was published. Over the years, many of his jabs at the establishment appeared in local newspapers and were later collected into The Devil’s Dictionary, one of the greatest works of satire of the 19th century.

We present you with Norgate Investors’ Services version of the Devils Dictionary for financial markets.

Analyst recommendations: –
Strong Buy – Buy
Buy - Hold
Hold – Sell
Sell – It’s too late.

Arbitrageurs: – large traders who feed on plankton.

Averaging down: - lowering the average price of entry by adding to a losing position.
Averaging down should only be attempted when you are really angry at a market.

Back–testing: – the art of adjusting trading system parameters so as to ensure maximum profit in the past and zero profit in the future.

Black-box system: – a trading system that is available for sale, but is so good that its rules can’t be disclosed. Black-box systems are generally only available for sale because the vendors have a sense of philanthropy.

Cancel-if-close: - a limit order that is cancelled if it appears likely to be hit. Some brokers do not accept cancel-if-close orders.

Carbon credits: - A scheme developed by brokers requiring traders to purchase millions of dollars of carbon credits at the end of each financial year to offset the printing of their contract notes.

Charting: - “join-the-dots” for adults.

Central Banks: - big market players, with no stop-losses. The Bank of Thailand once bet 40% of its foreign reserves in a day. It lost.

Computerised system testing: - torturing the data until it confesses. See: back-testing

Contrary opinion: - the idea that when the market dumps a security, you should look to buy it. The trick appears to be to make sure that the market has finished doing the dumping, and is not just waiting for you to buy so that it can really start dumping. See: Institutional investor.

Cycle analysis: - a method of analysis that allows losing trades to be organised into regular patterns.

Derivatives: – securities that are identified by acronyms - CHIPS, COBRAS, LEAPS, PERQS, STEERS, TRIPS, ZEPOS – all of these things are derivatives. Unfortunately, little else is known about them.

Daytrading: - an activity that takes place in between meaningful periods of employment.

Dot.com bubble: - tulip-mania for the X-generation.

Dow Jones Industrial Average: – a widely reported stock index that was designed in the late 11th century and has stood the test of time.

Drawdown: - A figure that immediately grows when a trading system transitions from paper trading to real trading.

Eurodollars: - U.S. Dollars, of course.

False Break: – an actual break of a trendline that triggers a losing trade. False breaks confirm the usefulness of trendline analysis. Only those breaks that are false cause problems, and those breaks don’t count, because they are false.

Fast market: - an official market condition, during which floor brokers may scalp you with impunity. At other times, they have to be careful about it. See: slippage

Figures: - market-sensitive measures of economic activity, such as “Non-Farm Payrolls” and “Durable Goods Orders”, that are published every day in the U.S., much to the annoyance of players on the other side of the world, who can’t get to sleep.

Float (initial public offering): - stock that is offered to you because other people have turned it down. The guiding principle in relation to floats is as follows: “never participate in a float that you are able to participate in.”

Forex market: - a private casino, which is run by large international banks, mainly so that they can have some fun.

Fundmental analysis: – a method of analysis that provides compelling reasons for why a stock shouldn’t fall in price when it does.

“Fundamentally sound”: - the condition in which an economy finds itself immediately after a stock market collapse.

Gold carry trade: - in the gold carry trade, institutions called gold banks borrow gold from the central bank at the gold lease rate, which may be 1%. They can then sell this gold and invest the proceeds in Treasury Bills, which may yield 4%. The central bank keeps the gold on its books, figuring that it can trust a gold bank. Of course, the gold bank is “short” the gold until it pays it back, and it must take care that the gold price doesn’t get away from it. This may, or may not, explain a lot about the gold market of the 1990s.

Greeks, the: - Delta, Gamma, Rho, Theta and Vega. In option pricing models, the Greeks are partial derivatives that express local sensitivities. Just remember the names of about three of them, and then slip them into the conversation occasionally. No one will pick you up on it.

Hedge Fund: - a fund that pools money from rich investors, in order to play with it. Hedge Funds are private concerns, which means that they can play wherever they like. Mutual Funds, on the other hand, accept money from the public, and can only play where they are supervised.

Hedger: - a guy you can’t beat when you’re playing him at futures. When a hedger loses a bet in the futures market, he makes up for it in the cash market. When a speculator loses a bet in the futures market, he really loses it.

Index Funds: – funds with no sense of fun.

In-house analyst: – an employee of a broking house who dresses mutton up as lamb and advertises it on special.

Institutional investor: - someone who dumps a stock big-time, a day or two after you’ve bought it, for no apparent reason.

Limit moves: - An unexpected but welcome holiday for pit traders invariably caused by fat-finger-syndrome-suffering Japanese traders.

Live feed: - a technology that enables the instant incorporation of bad ticks into a charting program.

Long Term Capital Management: - a large hedge fund, whose capital only managed to last for a short time.

Lunch: – when you ring your broker on a Friday afternoon to be told he’s still at lunch, it means he’s still drinking.

Market Depth: - a trading screen that shows orders queued up on both sides of a market. Unfortunately, it doesn’t show the orders belonging to people who don’t like to queue.

Market report: - a concise explanation of why a market traded up or down. 99% of market reports are drawn from other market reports. The remainder are whimsical.

Maximum Adverse Exeuction: - The employment status of a trader at Société Générale in January 2008 after losing the bank €4.9 billion.

Money-management: - the art of hiding trading losses from a spouse.

Non–executive Director: – a person who’s job it is to fill a chair at a Board meeting, so that no chairs are empty.

Option Pricing Model: - a mathematical model, that can calculate the fair price of an option. If the market price differs from the fair price, you can bet accordingly. If the market price then moves further away from the fair price, you can say: “Hey, that’s not fair!”

Over-bought: – a market is considered to be in an over-bought condition when everyone else appears to have bought it, but you haven’t.

Peak oil: - The point in time at which your highly leveraged long crude oil position enters an impossibly steep downtrend.

Personal computer: - an indispensable aid to the modern investor. Investors who are new to computers should consider the following advice:
Always approach your P.C. in a confident manner. Computers can sense fear and indecision. Remember – you are in charge! You can always shut the thing down (unless you’re using Win98).

Position trade: - a short-term trade that is in deficit, and will be closed out as soon as it breaks even, however long that takes.

Price/Earnings Ratio: - a ratio that indicates whether the price of a stock is attractive in relation to last year’s earnings. A low number indicates a bargain. However a low number can also indicate a lemon. If a company starts going down the tube, its stock price will appear very attractive in relation to last year’s earnings. The P/E Ratio is a versatile indicator.

Random Walk Theory: – the theory that market prices follow a random walk, much like that of a drunken sailor. The weakness of the theory lies in the fact that little scientific research has been done into drunken sailors.

Rumours: - the time-honoured basis for the making of trading decisions. Rumours about stocks tend to get thicker as they are spread.

Seasonal analysis: - the assumption that other people who trade Heating Oil Futures know nothing about winter.

Slippage: - the difference between the price at which you expect a market order to be filled and the price at which it is actually filled. See: Orange Juice Futures.

Stochastics: – a technical indicator so-named because the name sounds technical.

Stop-loss: – the trader’s equivalent of a condom. It’s something you know you should have used after it’s too late.

Support: - a line drawn on a chart, the breaking of which is deemed extremely significant, even if the only people trading the stock at the time are two of three ladies at the tennis club.

Support/Resistance: - supposed allies that flee at the first sign of trouble.

Tankan Index: - a closely watched figure, that measures the extent to which the Japanese economy is tanking.

Technical analysis: – subjective analysis of the markets dressed up in a lab coat.

Technical indicator: – a transformation of a price series that contains less information than the series itself. Different technical indicators throw away information in different ways.

Tech wreck: - the end of the dot.com bubble. Surprisingly enough, many observers predicted the wreck accurately. As time goes on, more and more of these observers come forward.

They: - the members of a powerful international conspiracy who target small, private traders in order to make their lives miserable. For instance, “they ran the market to my stop and then turned it around.”

Trading floor: - the traditional venue for the negotiation of securities, now made redundant by screen trading. Trading floors that remain open serve a valuable purpose as colorful backdrops to market reports on television.

Trading genius: - a reckless spirit in a bull market.

Trendline analysis: – a form of analysis that works best on a computer screen, where lines can be erased and re-drawn without trace.

Zero-sum game: – a game in which the players slug it out and the broker wins.

Tags: Banks, Brokers, Carry Trade, Central Banks, Chart, Collapse, Credit, Crude Oil, Derivatives, Dollar, Earnings, Economic Activity, Economy, energy, Euro, Gold, Hedge Fund, Hedge Funds, humour, Information, International, Japan, Long Term Capital, Long Term Capital Management, Markets, Mutual Funds, oil, P/E, Php, Rally, risk, Technical Analysis, Trading, Treasury Bills
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Chart: US M3 Money Supply Growth

Wednesday, May 7th, 2008

May 7, 2008 -  Courtesy: Nick Barisheff, The Bullion Buzz Newsletter, Bullion Management Group Inc.

US M3 Money Supply Growth

M3, which is no longer published by the US Federal Reserve, is the broadest measure of money supply. It includes M2, as well as certain accounts held by banks and thrift institutions (including balances in money market mutual funds held by institutional investors). Since March 2006, M3b, a reconstructed version of M3, has grown by nearly $4 trillion, from approximately $10.5 trillion to about $14.2 trillion. To put this in perspective, total M3 in 1971, when the US cut the dollar’s link to gold, was less than $800 billion. The current annualized rate of increase is now about 20%. Since the classical definition of inflation is an increase in money supply that leads to an increase in goods and services, the price increases we are now experiencing are destined to accelerate. Given these inflation realities, portfolios need to be rebalanced to ensure that purchasing power is preserved. As precious metals are proven hedges for inflation, portfolio holdings should be rebalanced to ensure adequate allocations are held.

http://www.nowandfutures.com/key_stats.html

Tags: Banks, Barisheff, Bullion, Chart, Currency, Dollar, Economy, Fed, Federal Reserve, Gold, inflation, M3, M3 Money Supply Growth, Metals, Mutual Funds, precious metals, risk, Trillion
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Stagflation Threat Requires Strategy

Wednesday, February 20th, 2008

Feb. 20, 2008 - Stagflation is a threat that is best defended against with commodities and Treasury Inflation Protected Securities or TIPS as they are commonly referred to.

A recent article by John Wasik, Bloomberg describes a few ways that investors protect against stagflation:

Several investments come to mind: commodities and Treasury inflation-protected securities, or TIPS.

 

…One refuge in inflationary times has been gold. Held in huge quantities by large banks and the favorite commodity of inflation speculators, it has been in demand over the past year.

 

You are better off buffering the ravages of inflation on your portfolio.

That means finding investments that combine income and price appreciation, and rise with inflation expectations.

Two investments come to mind: commodities and Treasury inflation-protected securities, or TIPS. A deft combination of TIPS and commodities can be found in the PIMCO Commodity Real Return Strategy Fund. It returned 23 percent last year. This is my portfolio’s key inflation buffer.

Whatever stagflation strategy you adopt, remember that overconcentrating in any of the inflation-fighting vehicles will add unnecessary risk to your portfolio.

 

Inflation is an often-unpredictable ogre that creeps up slowly. You will need a number of weapons to do the job.

 

Canadian investors seeking to invest in inflation protected securities and commodities may look at any of a number of Real Return Bond and diversified commodity products. Some of these include:

ETFs 

iShares Real Return Bond ETF (XRB)

 

Claymore Global Agriculture (COW)

 

Canadian Mutual Funds 

TD Real Return Bond Fund A (TDB755)

Investors Real Return Bond Fund (IGI491)

 

Don Coxe’s January 2008 recommendations include this particular paragraph:

Bond investors face two risks: inflation and credit. Nominal Treasury bond yields are far too low, and quality corporates are too rare – with 71% of corporate debt junk-rated. Buy inflation-hedged sovereign bonds – preferably in major foreign currencies. Simplicity is good: avoid complex products that are subject to drastic rating writedowns.

George Soros discusses the circumstances under which the Fed might be rendered impotent at macroeconomic control:

Credit expansion must now be followed by a period of contraction, because some of the new credit instruments and practices are unsound and unsustainable. The ability of the financial authorities to stimulate the economy is constrained by the unwillingness of the rest of the world to accumulate additional dollar reserves. Until recently, investors were hoping that the US Federal Reserve would do whatever it takes to avoid a recession, because that is what it did on previous occasions. Now they will have to realise that the Fed may no longer be in a position to do so. With oil, food and other commodities firm, and the renminbi appreciating somewhat faster, the Fed also has to worry about inflation. If federal funds were lowered beyond a certain point, the dollar would come under renewed pressure and long-term bonds would actually go up in yield. Where that point is, is impossible to determine. When it is reached, the ability of the Fed to stimulate the economy comes to an end.

Caution: One thing to remember is that TIPS or Real Return Bonds in a mutual fund do not provide investors with the same degree of risk management where date-driven spending plans are concerned. The maturity date of any bond is a guarantee the face value will be paid at an exact time in the future. Bond mutual funds, unlike the underlying security, do not provide any fixed maturity date or guranteed sum. Ideally, if you can get your hands on the bonds, then do so. 

…leaves you wondering just how far the Fed may or will have to go with rate cutting in order to get the economy going again, and in the process, provide enormous [inflationary] stimulus to the rest of the world. This is truly a mixed blessing.

Tags: Agriculture, Banks, Blog, Bloomberg, Canada, Commodities, Commodity, Credit, Credit Market, Desc, Dollar, Don Coxe, Economy, ETF, Fed, Federal Reserve, FT.com, Gold, inflation, Investment, Investment Strategy, Markets, Mutual Funds, oil, PIMCO, Recession, stagflation, Term Bond, Value
Posted in Bonds, Commodities, Gold, Markets, Oil and Gas | No Comments »

12 Ways to Make Your Kids Financially Saavy

Tuesday, January 8th, 2008

January-08-08, 11:07:05 AM | GreenLight Advisor   A great WSJ.com article by Jonathan Clement recently provided some ideas on how we can make our kids more aware of finance and the value of money so they are better prepared in life. As he says, you may or may not agree with all of his tips, so you decide what they are worth. They are definitely worth sharing. Here are Jonathan Clement’s 12 Ways to make your kids financially saavy: 

1. WAITING UNTIL LATER If children are to grow up to be successful savers and investors, they need to learn two key skills: How to delay gratification and how to take risks prudently. The first is easily the most important. 

Indeed, the self-control needed to delay gratification is associated not only with good saving habits, but also with things like succeeding in school and coping better with frustration and stress. Yet this isn’t an easy skill to teach. Henry and Hannah grew up spending their parents’ cash, so they didn’t have much incentive to curb their desires. My response? Make them feel like they’re spending their own money. 

One of my early tricks was the soda game, which I learned about from a reader. When my children were young and we went to restaurants, I would give them a choice: They could have a soda or they could have $1. Henry and Hannah ended up drinking a lot of water. 

  2. ASKING THEMSELVES 

Emboldened by the soda game’s success, I looked for other ways to apply the same notion. The breakthrough came when Hannah was 14 and Henry was 10. That was when I opened a savings account for each of them. The accounts came with a cash-machine card. Every three months since then, I have deposited pocket money for them in their savings accounts and, as they have grown older, their clothing allowance as well. That way, they’ve had to learn to budget for a three-month period. More important, they no longer ask me for money. 

Instead, if they want to buy something, they have to ask themselves. The effect has been startling. Henry and Hannah almost immediately became more careful spenders. Sound manipulative? You’d better believe it. But I also think of it as financial self-defense. Suppose Henry and Hannah don’t learn good money skills and grow up to be financial deadbeats. If they ended up deeply in debt, I can’t imagine not helping — at which point their financial problems would be mine. 

  3. TALKING THE TALK 

I haven’t just molded Henry and Hannah with financial incentives. I have also used family stories. Values are passed down to our children in the stories we tell. My children may live in an affluent household in an affluent town. But I want them to know that their mother and I struggled financially, and that they will likely have their own struggles. 

So I talk about the mouse- and cockroach-infested Brooklyn apartment where we all lived while their mother worked on her Ph.D. and we squeaked by on a junior reporter’s salary. I tell them about the beaten-up ‘76 Camaro that used to stall if the traffic light stayed red too long. I recount taking them as toddlers to the “toy museum,” otherwise known as FAO Schwarz, where we would play with the dolls and the trains but never buy. Instead of regaling my children with these tales, I could simply lecture them about the virtues of thrift. But the stories pack far more punch. 

  4. SCOFFING AT WEALTH 

I have also encouraged my kids to be suspicious of displays of opulence, whether it’s the big house, the fancy car or the designer clothes. The fact is, this sort of spending doesn’t lead to lasting happiness, but it can create a heap of financial stress. In belittling conspicuous consumption, I may be a little too strident, but there’s a reason. Henry and Hannah may have grown up hearing about the dilapidated Brooklyn apartment. But I grew up hearing a far more powerful story, about my maternal grandfather and his four siblings, who in the 1940s each inherited what today would be millions of dollars. My grandfather’s siblings quickly blew the money on fast cars and high living. My grandfather blew his money more slowly, on horses and cattle farming. Either way, the great family fortune was gone, and reckless spending was largely to blame. 

  5. COMPOUNDING FOR DECADES 

When my children were young, I opened a variable annuity for each of them. This isn’t a product I particularly like, because many have outrageously high annual expenses and charge back-end sales commissions if you sell within, say, the first seven years. Still, there are a few no-load variable annuities with low annual expenses, notably the offerings from Fidelity Investments and Vanguard Group. Moreover, unlike with an individual retirement account, you don’t need earned income to fund a variable annuity, so you can open an account for a toddler. Today, my kids’ low-cost variable annuities are each worth some $37,000. 

I have long been captivated by the idea of starting Henry and Hannah on the road to retirement. Think about it: The dollars I invested when they were youngsters might enjoy six decades of tax-deferred compounding. That’s enough to turn $1 into over $100, assuming an 8% annual return. And thanks to the tax penalty on early withdrawals, my children will be discouraged from touching the money before they are 59½.   

6. GROWING FREE There are far better investment vehicles than a variable annuity, and my chance came a few years ago. Hannah got a job at a local restaurant, which meant she had earned income. That allowed me to open a Roth individual retirement account for her, which will give Hannah tax-free growth. 

Instead, I could have funded a regular IRA, where withdrawals are taxable but you get an initial tax deduction. That tax deduction, however, wouldn’t have been worth much, given Hannah’s low tax rate, so the Roth seemed like a better bet. The money I’ve stashed in my kids’ variable annuities and in Hannah’s Roth IRA won’t be nearly enough to pay for their retirement, especially once you figure in inflation. But fully funding their retirement was never my aim. Rather, the accounts are intended to be a powerful example, showing my children how money will grow if they are willing to sit quietly with a diverse collection of low-cost funds. 

  7. HEADING HOME 

When I bought my first home, my parents helped me financially, and I want to do the same for my kids. To that end, I have invested $15,000 for each of them. Even with a decade or more of growth, that $15,000 probably won’t be nearly enough for a 20% down payment. But it will give them something to build on. 

I stashed Hannah’s $15,000 in a target-date mutual fund that’s geared toward 2010, while Henry’s money is in a 2015 fund. I bought those funds knowing my kids probably won’t buy homes until five or 10 years after those dates. My thinking: Target-date funds typically have around half their money in stocks as of their target date, and then they continue to become more conservative in the years that follow. By the time my kids need their down-payment money, their target-date funds should be largely invested in bonds. 

  8. KEEPING SCORE 

When my kids buy a house, they won’t just need a down payment. They will also want to have a good credit score. With that in mind, I listed Hannah as a joint account holder on my Visa card earlier this year. That meant the card’s credit history was added to her previously blank credit report. 

Suddenly, she looked like a model financial citizen. That allowed her, a few months later, to apply for a Discover card on her own. I now have her on a strict regimen, where she charges a small sum each month and dutifully pays it off, thus slowly building up a good credit score. When Henry reaches college age, I will go through the same nonsense with him. This, alas, is necessary nonsense. The reality is, a good credit score will help my kids get a lower mortgage rate, lower insurance premiums and a host of other financial benefits. 

  9. VOWING TO HELP 

Full disclosure: I am divorced. But even before my marriage broke up, I was horrified by the way many families blow $20,000 or $30,000 on a single day of celebration for a wedding. To put such spending in context, consider this: According to the Federal Reserve’s 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances, more than 96% of households headed by someone 65 to 74 had some savings — but the median value of these financial assets, including things like checking accounts, stocks and mutual funds, was just $36,100. 

Spending $30,000 on a party is not one of my values, and I’ve made sure my kids know it. I have told them I will give them $5,000 toward a wedding or at age 30, whichever comes first. What if they want the $30,000 wedding? They can ask their mother.   

10. LENDING A HAND While an expensive wedding is low on my list of priorities, a good education ranks near the top. My ex-wife and I long ago agreed that we would pay the full cost of our children’s undergraduate education. Again, this was something my parents did for me, and we all tend to be heavily influenced by our parents’ behavior. 

There is, however, a limit to my generosity. I have told Henry and Hannah that, if they want to go on to graduate school, they will have to take out loans. I may relent somewhat when the time comes. But I think that there should be some cost to staying in school, so I am not inclined to continue footing the full tab.   

11. SETTING EXPECTATIONS As you might gather, I have talked to my kids a fair amount about money. They know they will graduate college debt-free, they will get some help toward a house down payment and they will receive just $5,000 toward a wedding. They know about the retirement accounts. I have also promised them $5,000 upon graduating college, to get them started in the world. 

No doubt some folks will think I’m overly generous, while others might consider me cheap. Many will question my priorities. For instance, folks have told me that they would have skipped the retirement accounts and allocated more toward a house down payment. But, frankly, the precise sums aren’t that important. Instead, what I am striving to do is set expectations. By detailing everything to Henry and Hannah, I have made it clear where I think my financial responsibility ends and where theirs will begin. 

  12. GETTING EDUCATED 

Along the way, I have also endeavored to teach my kids about sensible investing. It’s been a slow process. For instance, earlier this decade, I tried a family investment contest. We all picked a mutual fund, I invested $50 a month in each and then we tracked who fared best. I thought the competition would grab their interest, but it wasn’t a great success. Maybe Henry and Hannah were too young. 

Indeed, I have continued to show them their mutual-fund statements as they arrive in the mail, and my kids have grown more interested as they have grown older. They have also become more curious about the financial markets, and I can now chat about investing for at least 30 seconds before they reach for their iPods.  I hope enough of this will stick, and they will grow up to be prudent managers of their own money. The potential savings are huge. A financial adviser might charge 1% of a portfolio’s value each year, and then recommend mutual funds that cost another 1%. What if my children learn to build their own index-fund portfolios that cost a mere 0.2% a year? When their portfolios hit $1 million, they will pay just $2,000 a year in investment costs, instead of the $20,000 they would be paying if they used an adviser. And, with any luck, they will remember whom to thank. 

Source: WSJ.com, 12 Ways to make your kids financially saavy, Jonathan Clement, December 17, 2007, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119764562207829505.html 

Tags: Blog, Breakthrough, Clothing Allowance, Consumption, Credit, Desires, Dollar, EUM, Fed, Federal Reserve, Frustration, Gratification, Greenlight, Hannah, inflation, Information, Investment, Jonathan, Key Skills, Lot Of Water, Markets, Miscellaneous, Mortgage, Mutual Funds, Notion, Pocket Money, REW, risk, saa, Savings Account, Savings Accounts, Self Control, Soda, Succeeding In School, Three Months, Value, Value Of Money, Water, Wsj
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