Posts Tagged ‘Juxtaposition’
Bill Gross: From Feast to Fast - July 2009 Outlook
Friday, July 3rd, 2009
Bill Gross, the “Bond King” is going to great lengths to get us to understand that the world is in a state of reversion to what he and El-Erian, his co-chief at PIMCO coined as the “New Normal” 3 months ago, in his latest missive - “Bon” or “Non” Appétit?.
Our economy which once feasted, no, binged, unable to stop itself, on debt and leverage, and on the basis that home and other asset prices would rise to the sky, is now fasting, cleansing itself of the fat that accumulated, and it is a long-term process that will take many years to complete.
Click Play to Listen to Bill Gross’ Investment Outlook:
Audio clip: Adobe Flash Player (version 9 or above) is required to play this audio clip. Download the latest version here. You also need to have JavaScript enabled in your browser.
Here are some of the highlights from the letter, which you may download here:
Gross re-iterates the “New Normal” - Its starting to sound a lot like “The Emperor’s New Clothes“:
Our economy’s lights, if not switched off in a rehash of the 1930s Depression, have certainly been dimmed in a 21st century version likely to be labeled the Great Recession. Much like John McSherry, U.S. and many global consumers gorged themselves on Big Macs of all varieties: burgers to be sure, but also McHouses, McHummers, and McFlatscreens, all financed with excessive amounts of McCredit created under the mistaken assumption that the asset prices securitizing them could never go down. What a colossal McStake that turned out to be. Now, however, with financial markets seemingly calmed and an inventory-based recovery in store for the balance of 2009, there is a developing optimism that we can go back to the lifestyle of yesteryear. PIMCO’s driving thesis however, if not a juxtaposition, is succinctly described as a “new normal” where growth is slower, profit margins are narrower, and asset returns are smaller than in decades past based upon the delevering and reregulating of the global economy, which in turn should substantially inhibit the “gorging” of goods and services that we grew used to in decades past.
Forecasts based on econometric models inevitably miss these secular/structural breaks in historical patterns because it is impossible to quantify human behavior, and long-term trends involving risk-taking and in turn derisking are decidedly human in their origin. Bell-shaped curves with Gaussian/random distributions fail to anticipate that human beings do not make decisions by chance or independently of each other, but in many cases in reaction to one another. Humanity’s personal and social computers appear to be programmed that way. And so, instead of “normal” distributions, economists and investors must learn to be on the lookout for “black swans,” and if not, then certainly “fat tails,” which differ from the measurement of natural phenomena accepted in science. “New normals,” flatter-shaped bell curves, and structural shifts in previously accepted standards become not only possible, but probable as human nature reacts to itself and its prior behavior. The efficient market hypothesis was always dead from the get-go, but academic tenure and Nobel prizes were food for the unwilling or perhaps unthinking.
Others are starting to wonder about the emperors new clothes, the “green shoots”:
I was impressed this weekend by an article in the Op-Ed section of The New York Times by staff writer Bob Herbert. “No Recovery in Sight” was the heading and his opening sentence asked, “How do you put together a consumer economy that works when the consumers are out of work?” That is really all one needs to ask when divining our economy’s future fortune. Unless an optimist can prescribe how to put Humpty Dumpty back together again and shuffle him/her back to work then there can be no return to an “old normal.” As unemployment approaches 10%, what is less well publicized is that the number of “underutilized” workers in the U.S. has increased dramatically from 15 to 30 million. Those without jobs, as well as those individuals who only work part-time and have become discouraged and stopped looking, total 30 MILLION people. The number is staggering. Commonsensically, one has to know that many or most of these are untrained for the demands of a green-oriented, goods-producing future economy. Imagine a welding rod in the hands of an investment banker or mortgage broker and you’ll understand the implications quicker than any economist using an econometric model.
Fifteen Words to describe the era that led us to our current economic crisis:
The supersizing of financial leverage and consumer spending in concert with the politicizing of deregulation describes in fifteen words our most recent brush with irrational behavior and inefficient markets. Greed will come again. But for now, the trend is the other way and it promises to persist for a generation at a minimum. The fact is that American consumers have suffered a collapse in wealth of at least $15 trillion since early 2007. Global estimates are less reliable, but certainly in multiples of that figure. And when potential spenders feel less rich by that much, the only model one can use to forecast the future is a commonsensical one that predicts higher savings, lower consumption, and an economic growth rate that staggers forward at a new normal closer to 2 as opposed to 3½%. There’s no magic in that number, and no model to back it up, just a lot of commonsense that says this is how people and economic societies behave when stressed and stretched to a near breaking point.
Where do we go from here:
Investors who stuffed themselves on a constant diet of asset appreciation for the past quarter-century will now be enclosed in a cage featuring government-mandated, consumer-oriented fasting. “Non Appétit,” not Bon Appétit, will become the apt description for the American consumer, and significant parts of the global economy, including the U.S. Because this is so, short-term policy rates will be kept low for longer than cyclical norms, and the outlook for risk assets - stocks, high yield bonds, and commercial and residential real estate will involve just that - risk. Investors should stress secure income offered by bonds and stable dividend-paying equities. Consumer Cuisinart consumption is a relic of the past.
Tags: Asset Prices, Asset Returns, Bill Gross, Burgers, Econometric Models, Excessive Amounts, Financial Markets, Global Consumers, Global Economy, Great Lengths, Gross Investment, Investment Outlook, John Mcsherry, Juxtaposition, Missive, Mistaken Assumption, PIMCO, Profit Margins, Recession, Reversion, Yesteryear
Posted in Emerging Markets, Markets | No Comments »
Does the Yield Curve Predict Markets?
Friday, May 15th, 2009
Econompic provides an interesting analysis this week on the use of the yield curve as a forecasting tool for the equity markets. Caroline Baum, a highly respected Bloomberg columnist, weighed in on this subject this week, as did Eddy Elfenbein (Crossing Wall Street Blog). Econompic’s Jake weighed in too.
Interesting article in Bloomberg about the yield curve accurately forecasting economic conditions:
- First, it’s a leading economic indicator, officially added to the index designed to predict the economy’s ebbs and flows in 1996. It was a leader well before that, even though it was unofficial.
- Second, what you see is what you get. The spread is never revised, always available and in no way proprietary.
- Third, and most curious, the majority of economists don’t get it. They see rising bond yields in isolation — without paying attention to what that price-setter, the Fed, is doing at the front end of the curve.
- It’s the juxtaposition of short and long rates, not their level, that conveys information about monetary policy.
Crossing Wall Street makes the case that the yield curve can also help predict the stock market:
Two years ago, I looked at the impact of the yield curve on the stock market and I was stunned to find:
Probably the most fascinating stat is that all of the stock market’s net capital gains have come when the 10-year yield is 65 or more basis points above the 90-day yield (that happens about 70% of the time). The yield curve hasn’t been that positive in 15 months.
Anything less than 65 basis points, including a negative yield curve, works out to a net equity return of a Blutarsky. Zero Point Zero.
Today the spread is out to nearly 300 basis points.
Yes, over the past 25 years (all the data I was able to pull) a flat yield curve did equate to a poor performing equity market over the subsequent two year period. However, a high spread between the 10 year and 90 day yield did not necessarily mean strong returns were on the horizon (see 1992 and 2002 noting that the red line indicate the two year FORWARD return).
What did? Sustained periods of a steep yield curve.
So the question becomes, what type of economic conditions usually persist in order to have SUSTAINED periods of a steep yield curve? My quick answer… expectations of higher growth for an extended period that is reinforced by a rebound in the economy (allowing long rates to STAY higher than short term rates).
My concern this time around isn’t around short-term rates (they will likely stay low), but long term rates may now be influenced not only by expectations of economic growth, but by issuance and inflation expectations.
Econompic makes some interesting points especially if you agree that the operating environment has changed in favour of deleveraging and government partnering. Either way, you decide. The yield curve, for all intents and purposes, has been a reliable tool historically for providing direction in the equity market. We could all use more tools.
Source: Econompic Data
Tags: 15 Months, Basis Points, Bloomberg, Bond Yields, Capital Gains, Caroline Baum, Columnist, Economic Conditions, Economists, Elfenbein, Equity Return, Isolation, Juxtaposition, Leading Economic Indicator, Monetary Policy, Paying Attention, Point Zero, Price Setter, Stock Market, Yield Curve
Posted in Bonds, Economy, Markets, Outlook | No Comments »



