How You Finance Goldman Sachs’ Profits - a Goldman insider’s view

Friday, July 31st, 2009

By Nomi Prins, via Mother Jones

July 28, 2009 — This is perhaps the most important thing I learned over my years working on Wall Street, including as a managing director at Goldman Sachs: Numbers lie. In a normal time, the fact that the numbers generated by the nation’s biggest banks can’t be trusted might not matter very much to the rest of us. But since the record bank profits we’re now hearing about are essentially created by massive federal funding, perhaps it behooves us to dig beneath their data. On July 27, 10 congressmen, led by Rep. Alan Grayson (D-Fla.), did just that, writing a letter to Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke questioning the Fed’s role in Goldman’s rapid return to the top of Wall Street.

To understand this particular giveaway, look back to September 21, 2008. It was a frenzied night for Goldman Sachs and the only other remaining major investment bank, Morgan Stanley. Their three main competitors were gone. Bear Stearns had been taken over by JPMorgan Chase in March, 2008, Lehman Brothers had just declared bankruptcy due to lack of capital, and Bank of America had been pushed to acquire Merrill Lynch because the firm didn’t have enough cash to survive on its own. Anxious to avoid a similar fate, hat in hand, they came to the Fed for access to desperately needed capital. All they had to do was become bank holding companies to get it. So, without so much as clearing the standard five-day antitrust waiting period for such a change, the Fed granted their wish.

Bank holding companies (which all the biggest financial firms now are) come under the regulatory purview of the Fed, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the FDIC. The capital they keep in reserve in case of emergency (like, say, toxic assets hemorrhaging on their books, or credit derivatives trades not being paid) is supposed to be greater than investment banks’. That’s the trade-off. You get access to federal assistance, you pony up more capital, and you take less risk.

Goldman didn’t like the last part. It makes most of its money speculating, or trading. So it asked the Fed to be exempt from what’s called the Market Risk Rules that bank holding companies adhere to when computing their risk.

Keep in mind that by virtue of becoming a bank holding company, Goldman received a total of $63.6 billion in federal subsidies (that we know about—probably more if the Fed were ever forced to disclose its $7.6 trillion of borrower details). There was the $10 billion it got from TARP (which it repaid), the $12.9 billion it grabbed from AIG’s spoils—even though Goldman had stated beforehand that it was protected from losses incurred by AIG’s free fall, and if that were the case, would not have needed that money, let alone deserved it. Then, there’s the $29.7 billion it’s used so far out of the $35 billion it has available, backed by the FDIC’s Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, and finally, there’s the $11 billion available under the Fed’s Commercial Paper Funding Facility.

Tactically, after bagging this bounty, Goldman asked the Fed, its new regulator, if it could use its old risk model to determine capital reserves. It wanted to use the model that its old investment bank regulator, the SEC, was fine with, called VaR, or value at risk. VaR pretty much allows banks to plug in their own parameters, and based on these, calculate how much risk they have, and thus how much capital they need to hold against it. VaR was the same lax SEC-approved risk model that investment banks such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers used, with the aforementioned results.

On February 5, 2009, the Fed granted Goldman’s request. This meant that not only was Goldman getting big federal subsidies, but also that it could keep betting big without saving aside as much capital as the other banks. Using VaR gave Goldman more leeway to, well, accentuate the positive. Yes, Goldman is a more risk-prone firm now than it was before it got to play with our money.

Which brings us back to these recent quarterly earnings. Goldman posted record profits of $3.4 billion on revenues of $13.76 billion. More than 78 precent of those revenues came from its most risky division, the one that requires the most capital to operate, Trading and Principal Investments. Of those, the Fixed Income, Currency and Commodities (FICC) area within that division brought in a record $6.8 billion in revenues. That’s the division, by the way, that I worked in and that Lloyd Blankfein managed on his way up the Goldman totem pole. (It’s also the division that would stand to gain the most if Waxman’s cap-and-trade bill passes.)

Since Goldman is trading big with our money, why not also use it to pay big bonuses? It’s not like there are any strings attached. For the first half of 2009, Goldman set aside $11.4 billion for compensation—34 percent more than for the first half of 2008, keeping them on target for a record bonus year—even though they still owe the federal government $53.6 billion, a sum more than four times that bonus amount.

But capital is still key. Capital is the lifeblood that pumps through a financial organization. You can’t trade without it. As of June 26, 2009, Goldman’s total capital was $254 billion, but that included $191 billion in unsecured long-term borrowing (meaning money it had borrowed without putting up any collateral for it). On November 28, 2008 (4Q 2008), it had only $168 billion in unsecured long-term borrowing. Thus, its long-term unsecured debt jumped 14 percent. Though Goldman doesn’t disclose exactly where all this debt comes from, given the $23 billion jump, we can only wonder whether some of it has come from government subsidies or the Fed’s secret facilities.

Not only that, by virtue of how it’s set up, most of Goldman’s unsecured funding comes in through its parent company, Group Inc. (Think the top point of an umbrella with each spoke being a subsidiary.) This parent parcels that money out to Goldman’s subsidiaries, some of which are regulated, some of which aren’t. This means that even though Goldman is supposed to be regulated by the Fed and other agencies, it has unregulated elements receiving unsecured funding—just like before the crisis, but with more of our money involved.

As for JPMorgan Chase, its profit of $2.7 billion was up 36 percent for the second quarter of 2009 vs. the same quarter last year, but a lot of that also came from trading revenues, meaning its speculative endeavors are driving its profits. Over on the consumer side, the firm had to set aside nearly $30 billion in reserve for credit-related losses. Riding on its trading laurels, when its consumer business is still in deterioration mode, is not a recipe for stability, no matter how much cheering JPMorgan Chase’s results got from Wall Street. Betting is betting.

Let’s pause for some reflection: The bank “stars” made most of their money on speculation, got nearly $124 billion in government guarantees and subsidies between them over the past year and a half, yet saw continued losses in the credit products most affected by consumer credit problems. Both are setting aside top-dollar bonuses. JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon mentioned that he’s concerned about attracting talent, a translation for wanting to pay investment bankers big bucks—because, after all, they suffered so terribly last year, and he needs to stay competitive with his friends at Goldman. This doesn’t add up to a really healthy scenario. It’s more like bad déjà vu.

As a recent New York Times article (and many other publications in different words) said, “For the most part, the worst of the financial crisis seems to be over.” Sure, the crisis may appear to be over because the major banks of Wall Street are speculating well with government subsidies. But that’s a dangerous conclusion. It doesn’t mean that finance firms could thrive without the artificial, public-funded assistance. And it certainly doesn’t mean that consumers are any better off than they were before the crisis emerged. It’s just that they didn’t get the same generous subsidies.

Additional research by Clark Merrefield.

Nomi Prins is an economist and frequent contributor for Mother Jones. Her most recent book is It Takes a Pillage: Behind the Bailouts, Bonuses, and Backroom Deals from Washington to Wall Street. To read more articles by Nomi Prins, click here

Source:  Mother Jones

Tags: Alan Grayson, Bank Holding Companies, Bank Of America, Bank Profits, Bear Stearns, Biggest Banks, Commodities, Comptroller Of The Currency, Credit Derivatives, Federal Assistance, Federal Reserve Chairman, Goldman Sachs, Investment Banks, Jpmorgan Chase, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Mother Jones, Office Of The Comptroller Of The Currency, oil, Rapid Return, Writing A Letter
Posted in Gold, Markets | No Comments »

Jim Chanos: Reckless Bank Execs Should be Prosecuted

Friday, May 15th, 2009

According to Forbes, Jim Chanos, renowned short seller and the activist hedge fund manager, best known for outing Enron on its accounting practice spoke out at a conference Wednesday night, that bank executives should be prosecuted for their roles in the banking system crisis:

James Chanos, a well-known short seller and hedge fund manager, said banks knowingly booked inflated earnings when selling the financial products that led to their downfall and the government bailout. The earnings wound up in bonus pools and banker’s pockets.

“It’s the heart of one of the greatest heists of all time,” he said, without naming specific banks. Their executives probably won’t be prosecuted because explaining how investment banks created and sold collateralized debt obligations and other structured financial products would test a jury’s attention span. “The jury’s eyes would glaze over.”

The top underwriters of collateralized debt obligations from 2005 to 2007 were Bank of America-Merrill Lynch and Citigroup with $237 billion of the $724 billion sold during that period. Representatives from both banks either didn’t return calls or declined to comment.

Read the rest of this story here.

The fury against the culprits of this decade’s market meltdown is coming to a boil as more and more information about the causes of the credit debacle percolate in the market, and around the judicial system, about who’s to blame. A few days ago,  we covered what appears to be an organized comeback by Eliot Spitzer, former governor of New York.

Sptizer appears as a familiar face from the past, but with a fresh new voice, and if you listen and watch closely, you can see that the re-invigorated Spitzer is on a mission, or rather a new crusade, though this time, it is not as a lawmaker. Yet.

So is it any wonder that the N.Y. Fed has been complicit in the single greatest bailout of poorly managed banks in history? Any wonder that it has given—with virtually no strings attached—practically the entire contents of the Treasury to the very banks whose inability to manage risk has brought our economy to its knees? Any wonder that not a single CEO or senior executive of a major bank has been removed as a condition of hundreds of billions of direct cash and guarantees? Any wonder that, despite its fundamental responsibility to preserve the integrity of the banking system, it sat quietly on the sidelines as the leverage beneath the banks exploded and the capital underlying their investments shrank?

Read more here, The Former Sheriff of New York.

Sources:
Forbes.com

Slate.com

Tags: Accounting Practice, Attention Span, Bailout, Bank Executives, Bank Of America, Collateralized Debt Obligations, Culprits, Eliot Spitzer, Enron Accounting, Familiar Face, Former Governor Of New York, Governor Of New York, Greatest Heists, Hedge Fund Manager, Investment Banks, Jim Chanos, Market Meltdown, Merrill Lynch, New Crusade, Rogue Bank, S Market, Structured Financial Products
Posted in Markets | 1 Comment »

Bill Gross: Investment Outlook - BEEP BEEP!

Wednesday, February 4th, 2009

Bill Gross, Co-CEO, PIMCO, has published his latest (February) investment outlook, titled BEEP BEEP!

Here are some highlights:

…PIMCO’s thesis for several years has held that the levered global economy long ago morphed from a banking-dominated regime to one that hid behind securitized lending and structures resembling a “shadow banking” system. SIVs, hedge funds, CDOs and increasingly levered mortgage and investment banks fueled asset appreciation in all investment markets, which in turn propelled real economic growth and employment to unsustainable levels. But, with U.S. housing prices as its trigger, the delevering process did a Wile E. Coyote and headed over the cliff in mid-year 2007, dragging down almost all asset prices except government bonds. The real economy followed shortly thereafter, not just in the U.S., but globally, proving that linkages work on the “down” as well as the upside. To PIMCO, the remedy for this deflationary delevering and mini-depression is simple and almost axiomatic: stop the decline in asset prices. If that can be done, the real economy will level out as well. When home prices stop going down, newly created households will be more willing to take a chance on ownership as opposed to renting. If stock prices consolidate, recently burned investors will be more willing to invest, as opposed to stuffing their 401(k) mattresses with Treasury bills. Business investment, jobs, and profits should follow quickly behind.

The simplicity of the solution, however, is not easily achieved once deflationary momentum takes hold. Animal spirits, once dampened, are hard to reignite; “fear of fear itself” dominates greed. Under such circumstances, the benevolent hand of government is required and Keynes is reincarnated in an attempt to plug the dike via fiscal spending and imaginative monetary policies that support asset prices. PIMCO has recently been contracted to assist in several publically announced programs which have helped in that effort: the CPFF, which has benefitted commercial paper yields, and the Federal Reserve’s purchase program for agency-backed mortgage loans, which has lowered 30-year mortgage rates to 4.5% and fostered the affordability of new and secondary housing prices. These two programs, in our opinion, have been the major policy successes to date – not because of our involvement – but because they have supported and increased asset prices whose decline has been the major deflationary thrust behind the real economy. Stop asset prices from going down and with a 12-month lag, unemployment will stop going up, and President Obama’s targeted three million new jobs will have a fighting chance of being achieved.

…Rather, asset prices securitizing commercial real estate and credit card receivables, as well as plain old-fashioned municipal bonds, must stop going down if the real economy has any chance to revive by 2010.

Example: CMBS or commercial real estate mortgage-backed securities are now priced to yield over 12% vs. 5% in recent years. As real estate financing comes due and rolls over in the next few years, it is imperative these yields return to mid-single digits if shopping centers, retail malls, and office buildings are to remain viable. How best to bring those yields down is debatable: another CPFF-like structure with self-insurance and contributed fees as its equity backstop? A generous portion of remaining TARP billions providing a reserve cushion for Federal Reserve funding? A good bank, bad (aggregator) bank structure? All three are being debated by policymakers and we should have clarity within a week’s time. But one thing is certain: an economic recovery is dependent upon commercial real estate prices stabilizing and most retail stores staying open for business in the months and years ahead.

Read the complete newsletter here.

Tags: Animal Spirits, Asset Appreciation, Asset Prices, Banking System, Beep Beep, Bill Gross, Business Investment, Dike, Fear Of Fear, Global Economy, Government Bonds, Gross Co, Gross Investment, Investment Banks, Investment Markets, Investment Outlook, Monetary Policies, PIMCO, Stock Prices, Treasury Bills, Wile E Coyote
Posted in Bonds, Credit Markets, Economy, Markets, Outlook | No Comments »

Treasury Bills - Is This The Low?

Tuesday, January 13th, 2009

This post is a guest contribution by Bennet Sedacca*, President of Atlantic Advisors Asset Management

In the chart below, please note the very simple channel in long bond futures going back to the beginning of the bull market. Prices seem to top every 5 years and, right on schedule, they’ve topped again.

Click here or on the chart below for a larger image.

The usual correction is in the 18-25% range if it revisits the lower end of the channel. From the top, at roughly 142, a 25% move would be to 106 or so, which is still a whopping 4.4%. I think is far too low considering a) what actually now sits in the Treasury and b) the sheer amount of global supply that is forthcoming. Even in a slow economy, I think foreigners will need to be sellers. I am finishing up my Mortgage Backed Securities program today and heading to more cash.

One more thing. The secular bull market in stocks, in my opinion, ran from 1974 to 2000. Twenty-six years. The bull market in bonds looks like it ran from 1982-2008, also twenty-six years and exactly the length of time I have been at this. With the “blow-off” move we just had, my guess is that the top is in, perhaps for a very long time … like a decade.

Using a Fibonacci analysis leads us to targets that are … well, nauseating and could be a 50% retracement of the whole move. So buyers of long bonds beware. And if you want to refinance, and can actually find a good program, I wouldn’t hesitate. That goes for individuals and corporations alike. Why the Treasury is BUYING bonds at these levels instead of selling long Treasuries is beyond me.

Click here or on the chart below for a larger image.

* President of Atlantic Advisors Asset Management, Bennet Sedacca brings with him more than 26 years of securities industry experience. From 1981 to 1997 he worked for several major investment banks, specializing in high-grade fixed-income securities marketing, trading and portfolio management. In 1997 he formed Sedacca Capital Management focusing on portfolio management for high-net worth individuals and small to mid-sized institutions.

Tags: Asset Management, Bond Futures, Buying Bonds, Fibonacci Analysis, Fixed Income, Foreigners, Global Supply, Income Securities, Industry Experience, Investment Banks, Length Of Time, Mortgage Backed Securities, Portfolio Management, Retracement, Secular Bull Market, Securities Industry, Slow Economy, Treasuries, Treasury Bills, Treasury Bonds
Posted in Bonds, Economy, Markets | No Comments »

Paul Krugman: Lest We Forget

Monday, December 1st, 2008

Paul Krugman opines that financial reform and regulation of the shadow banking system cannot wait:

Paul Robin Krugman (pronounced /ˈkɹuːɡmən/; born February 28, 1953) is an American economist, columnist, author and intellectual.[2] He is a professor of economics and international affairs at Princeton University, and a columnist for The New York Times. In 2008, Krugman won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences “for his analysis of trade patterns and location of economic activity”. Krugman is well-known in academia for his work in international economics, including trade theory, economic geography, and international finance.

Lest We Forget, by Paul Krugman, Commentary, NY Times: A few months ago I found myself at a meeting of economists and finance officials, discussing — what else? — the crisis. There was a lot of soul-searching going on. One senior policy maker asked, “Why didn’t we see this coming?”

There was, of course, only one thing to say…: “What do you mean ‘we,’ white man?”

Seriously, though, the official had a point. Some people say that the current crisis is unprecedented, but … there were plenty of precedents… Yet these precedents were ignored. And the story of how “we” failed to see this coming has a clear policy implication — namely, that financial market reform … shouldn’t wait until the crisis is resolved. …

Why did so many observers dismiss the obvious signs of a housing bubble, even though the 1990s dot-com bubble was fresh in our memories?

Why did so many people insist that our financial system was “resilient,” as Alan Greenspan put it, when in 1998 the collapse of a single hedge fund, Long-Term Capital Management, temporarily paralyzed credit markets around the world?

Why did almost everyone believe in the omnipotence of the Federal Reserve when its counterpart, the Bank of Japan, spent a decade trying and failing to jump-start a stalled economy?

One answer … is that nobody likes a party pooper. While the housing bubble was still inflating, lenders[, investment banks, and money managers] were making lots of money… Who wanted to hear from dismal economists warning that the whole thing was, in effect, a giant Ponzi scheme?

There’s also another reason the economic policy establishment failed to see the current crisis coming. … [T]he crisis of 1997-98… showed that the modern financial system, with its deregulated markets, highly leveraged players and global capital flows, was becoming dangerously fragile. But when the crisis abated, the order of the day was triumphalism, not soul-searching.

Time magazine famously named Mr. Greenspan, Robert Rubin and Lawrence Summers “The Committee to Save the World”… who “prevented a global meltdown.” In effect, everyone declared … victory…, while forgetting to ask how we got so close to the brink in the first place.

In fact, both the crisis of 1997-98 and the bursting of the dot-com bubble probably had the perverse effect of making both investors and public officials more, not less, complacent. Because neither crisis quite lived up to our worst fears,… investors came to believe that Mr. Greenspan had the magical power to solve all problems — and so, one suspects, did Mr. Greenspan himself, who opposed … prudential regulation of the financial system.

Now we’re in the midst of another crisis, the worst since the 1930s. For the moment, all eyes are on the immediate response to that crisis. … And because we’re all so worried about the current crisis, it’s hard to focus on the longer-term issues — on reining in our out-of-control financial system, so as to prevent or at least limit the next crisis. Yet the experience of the last decade suggests that we should be … regulating the “shadow banking system” at the heart of the current mess, sooner rather than later.

For once the economy is on the road to recovery, the wheeler-dealers will be making easy money again — and will lobby hard against anyone who tries to limit their bottom lines. Moreover, the success of recovery efforts will come to seem preordained, even though it wasn’t, and the urgency of action will be lost.

So here’s my plea: even though the incoming administration’s agenda is already very full, it should not put off financial reform. The time to start preventing the next crisis is now.

Go to Source

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Posted in Credit Markets, Economy, Markets | No Comments »

Bill Ackman: Pershing Square Q3 2008 Letter

Thursday, November 27th, 2008

Pershing Square Q3 2008 Investor Letter
by Bill Ackman, November 15, 2008 at 11:44 pm

These are extraordinary times particularly for active participants in the capital markets. While I do not normally choose to write about macro and regulatory events, I thought it would be useful for you to understand how we think about recent events and their impact on our portfolio.

We are currently witnessing the greatest deleveraging event in history. What began as a credit bubble bursting has now spread to the equity markets as banks, investment banks, hedge funds, structured products, mutual funds, pension funds, endowments and other leveraged and unleveraged market participants have been forced to liquidate assets by their counterparties, leverage providers, redeeming clients, and as a result of downgrades, other debts or other commitments that need to be funded.

These actions have led to forced and indiscriminate selling in security markets around the world, which in turn has caused other investors to panic or simply to sell, to get out of the way of other forced sellers.

As a fund which is generally substantially more long than short, we have also suffered large mark-to-market declines in our long investments. Year to date, however, our performance has substantially exceeded that of the broader equity markets, which at this writing have seen a more than 34% decline. Our outperformance is largely due to large gains on our investments in Longs Drugs and Wachovia Corporation as well as profits on our credit default swap and other short exposures. Our market losses have been further mitigated because we operate unleveraged and have substantial cash balances. Currently, we have cash and near-cash (Longs Drugs and Wachovia/Wells Fargo long/short) equal to approximately 39% of our capital.

When, you might ask, will the selling end? While I don’t proclaim to be a market prognosticator, I will make a few observations. Unlike the deleveraging that takes place when banks and other financial institutions sell assets to meet regulatory requirements, which is typically a longer term process, the forced deleveraging that is now taking place in the equity markets is being implemented largely by the prime brokerage firms and margin account managers at broker dealers around the world. Prime brokers are not known to be laggardly in their approach to liquidating an account that no longer meets margin requirements. This is likely to be even more true in the current environment. As such, it may be reasonable to conclude that the forced liquidation that is now taking place may not be a prolonged process.

Security prices around the world have come down tremendously. In the larger capitalization U.S. markets, which are the focus of our strategy, the reductions have been substantial. As of the market close on October 31st, the S&P 500 is down 34.0%, year to date, and down by 37.5% from its high on October 31, 2007; and this is after last week’s rally in which the S&P 500 rose more than 12% from the lows. Unlike the bear market of 1973 and 1974, in which stocks declined by 45% from the highs, this bear market was not preceded by the “Nifty 50″ bubble in which large capitalization growth stocks traded at extraordinary valuations. While valuations were not cheap one year ago, in a long-term historical context, the market as a whole (particularly if one were to exclude financials) was not particularly expensive either.

As such, in today’s market, we are finding extraordinary bargains, the kinds of opportunities that are normally associated with market bottoms. While there are still weak and poorly capitalized businesses that are likely still overvalued, the high quality, well-capitalized, larger capitalization businesses which are the focus of our strategy look very cheap to us.

While this means that now is likely to be a much better time to be a buyer rather than a seller, it does not mean that the market will not continue to decline, even substantially, from current levels, particularly in the short term. In fact, because of tax-loss selling over the next 60 or so days, there will likely be additional selling pressure. At some point, however, the forced selling will come to an end. Large amounts of cash are sitting on the sidelines waiting to be deployed when investors feel the coast is clear. In the event the market were to start to rise again, it would not be a surprise to see institutional, retail, and hedge fund investors rapidly deploy capital so as not to miss a, perhaps, explosive market rally.

What does this all mean for Pershing Square? Despite the fact that we occasionally have an opinion, we spend little time trying to outguess market prognosticators about the short-term future of the markets or the economy for the purpose of deciding whether or not to invest. Since we believe that short-term market and economic prognostication is largely a fool’s errand, we invest according to a strategy that makes the need to rely on short-term market or economic assessments largely irrelevant.

Our strategy is to seek to identify businesses and occasionally collections of assets which trade in the public markets for which we can predict with a high degree of confidence their future cash flows - not precisely, but within a reasonable band of outcomes. We seek to identify companies which offer a high degree of predictability in their businesses and are relatively immune to extrinsic factors like fluctuations in commodity prices, interest rates, and the economic cycle. Often, we are not capable of predicting a business’ earnings power over an extended period of time. These investments typically end up in the “Don’t Know” pile.

Because we cannot predict the economic cycles with precision, we look for businesses which are capitalized to withstand difficult economic times or even the normal ups and downs of any business. If we can find such a business and it trades at a deep discount to our estimate of fair value, we have found a potential investment for the portfolio. Next we look for the factors that have led to the business’ undervaluation, and judge - based on our assessment of the company’s governance structure, management team, ownership, and other factors - whether we can effectuate change in order to unlock value. When the price is right, the business is high quality, the management is excellent, and there are no changes to be made, we are willing to make a passive investment.

Our assessment of the short-term supply and demand for securities plays almost no role in our determining whether to invest capital, long or short. If we believed that it was possible to accurately predict short-term market or individual stock price movements and we had the capability to do so ourselves, we might have a different approach. Below I quote Warren Buffett in his 1994 Letter to shareholders where he perhaps says it best:

We will continue to ignore political and economic forecasts, which are an expensive distraction for many investors and businessmen. Thirty years ago, no one could have foreseen the huge expansion of the Vietnam War, wage and price controls, two oil shocks, the resignation of a president, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a one-day drop in the Dow of 508 points, or treasury bill yields fluctuating between 2.8% and 17.4%.

But, surprise - none of these blockbuster events made the slightest dent in Ben Graham’s investment principles. Nor did they render unsound the negotiated purchases of fine businesses at sensible prices. Imagine the cost to us, then, if we had let a fear of unknowns cause us to defer or alter the deployment of capital. Indeed, we have usually made our best purchases when apprehensions about some macro event were at a peak. Fear is the foe of the faddist, but the friend of the fundamentalist.

A different set of major shocks is sure to occur in the next 30 years. We will neither try to predict these nor to profit from them. If we can identify businesses similar to those we have purchased in the past, external surprises will have little effect on our long-term results…

Stock prices will continue to fluctuate - sometimes sharply - and the economy will have its ups and down. Over time, however, we believe it is highly probable that the sort of businesses we own will continue to increase in value at a satisfactory rate.

I believe we will look at the current U.S. stock market valuations for high quality mid and large capitalization businesses as presenting perhaps the best investment opportunities of our lifetimes.

Portfolio Update

The last quarter and, in particular, the last few weeks have been an extraordinarily busy and productive time for Pershing Square. During this time, we have made considerably more buy and sell decisions than usual, taking advantage of the liquidity of our holdings, the enormous volatility of the market, and new opportunities that have presented themselves in recent weeks.

In the third quarter, we disposed of our investments Cadbury PLC, Canadian Tire, and Austrian Post at prices generally higher than current levels. We also disposed of the substantial majority of our investment in Sears Holdings. We hold a residual interest in Sears (which represents approximately 1.5% of fund capital) as its price declined to a level at which it made no sense to continue to sell. We redeployed the capital from these sales into Wachovia Corporation, which I will discuss further below, as well as a new investment in which we are in the process of accumulating a position.

We sold these positions not because we thought they would be poor investments, but rather because we believed that we could redeploy the capital in investments that offered a more attractive risk-reward profile. As we have often stated, we are always willing to sell an existing holding at a profit or a loss, if we can find a better use for the funds. For our taxable investors, sales at a loss have the additional benefit of offsetting taxable gains.

Our sales were also motivated by the fact that three of the above companies - Sears, Canadian Tire, and Austrian Post - each have a controlling shareholder. Because we believe that one of our important competitive advantages is our ability to effectuate change at companies in our portfolio, other than in special circumstances, we do not expect to make investments in controlled companies in the future.

As a result of recent changes in the portfolio and strategic developments with respect to Longs Drugs and Wachovia Corporation, our long portfolio is now comprised of higher quality, more economically resilient businesses, companies for which we can be a catalyst to create value, and a large amount of cash and soon-to-be cash that we can redeploy in new opportunities.

On the short side of the portfolio, we have been opportunistic in unwinding single-name credit default swaps in cases where spreads have increased significantly, and have covered certain short positions where stocks have declined substantially as a result of company-specific as well as market-related events. We recently repurchased CDS on the investment grade credit index as certain technical factors have made this investment/hedge attractive once again.

Longs Drugs

In last quarter’s letter, I alluded to a new position on which we expected to file a Schedule 13D shortly. That position was Longs Drugs, a West Coast based drugstore retailer. While Longs’ was valued in the market as an underperforming drug store retailer, we valued the business based on its component parts which included: (1) owned and long-term, below-market, leasehold real estate, (2) RxAmerica, a rapidly growing pharmacy benefit manager (”PBM”) which generated more than 20% of the company’s trailing operating income, and (3) an underperforming, low-margin drugstore retailer. At our cost, we believed that Longs real estate value alone more than covered our purchase price and we were getting the PBM and the retailer for less than free. We estimated the fair market value of the company to be $85 to $95 per share assuming each of the company’s assets was sold to the buyer who could pay the highest price.

Unlike many of our previous active investments, we concluded that Longs had reached the end of its strategic life and should be sold to one of its larger competitors, namely CVS or Walgreens. While it has been rare for us to buy a stake in the company with a view that a strategic sale was the right exit opportunity, we have done so in the past. For example, our original investment in Sears Roebuck & Company was predicated on a strategic outcome at the company which was ultimately achieved when it was acquired by Kmart.

In the current weak (to use a euphemism) credit environment, we are particularly wary of investments which are predicated on a sale. However, in this case, we were comforted by the fact that Longs Drugs would be a must-have acquisition for CVS and Walgreens and that both companies, which are many times the size of Longs, could easily finance the acquisition. Even in the event a sale did not go through, we had purchased Longs at an attractive price which offered a substantial margin of safety against a permanent loss of capital.

Within one week of our 13D filing, Longs announced that it had entered into a transaction to be sold to CVS for $71.50 per share in a cash tender offer, an approximately 44% premium to our average cost. While we were happy with the deal, we were somewhat unhappy with the purchase price, particularly when we learned that the company had not run a competitive auction. Thereafter, we hired the Blackstone Group with whom we have worked successfully in past transactions in an attempt to achieve a better outcome for all shareholders.

We and Blackstone were successful in attracting a bid of $75 per share from Walgreens; however, the greater regulatory risk and potential time delay in a transaction with Walgreens led Longs’ board to reject the transaction in favor of the CVS offer. Walgreens subsequently withdrew its offer citing market conditions, and a day later, the CEO of Walgreens stepped down. We anticipate that we will be fully cashed out of our investment in Longs’ by the close of trading today.

Wachovia Corporation

Wachovia is a good example of the types of opportunities that have emerged in the current highly volatile environment. On Monday morning September 29th, Wachovia Corporation announced that it had entered into an agreement in principle to sell its banking subsidiaries to Citigroup. The transaction was structured in an unusual manner. In the deal, Citi was paying $2.1 billion of its own stock to Wachovia Corporation (the publicly traded holding company for the Wachovia banking subsidiaries) and assuming $53 billion of senior and subordinate holding company debt in addition to the debt and other liabilities of the Wachovia banking subsidiaries. The description of the transaction was limited to a several paragraph press release and a conference call presentation by Citigroup that morning. Wachovia stock opened later Monday afternoon at approximately $1.80 per share, down 82% from Friday’s close.

The market’s reaction to the Citi transaction was severe, particularly as the transaction was announced only four days after Washington Mutual’s subsidiary banks were seized by regulators and sold to J.P. Morgan. In that transaction, WaMu’s holding company filed for bankruptcy, wiping out shareholders and materially impairing holding company creditors.

The Wachovia transaction, however, was structured in a materially different manner from the WaMu seizure. It appears that the government, in order to protect bank holding company bondholders from losing their investment and perhaps to avoid triggering a CDS credit event, structured this deal so that Citi would assume the holding company debts. Interestingly, as part of the Citi transaction the government provided an excess-of-loss guarantee on Wachovia mortgages to protect Citi, which the government could likely have avoided if it had not required Citi to assume $53 billion of holding company debt. It appears that the government had concluded that additional bank holding company debt defaults would create systemic risk or reduce the ability for bank holding companies to access this important source of capital, and therefore chose to protect the Wachovia banking subsidiary and the holding company bondholders.

The unusual structure of the transaction created an interesting investment opportunity. By removing the holding company debts, Wachovia Corporation, now orphaned from its bank subsidiaries was left with some very attractive assets. Based on our reading of the public filings, conference call transcripts, and internet research over the course of Monday morning and afternoon, we estimated that Wachovia was left with the following assets: approximately $2 billion or more of cash, $2.1 billion of Citigroup Stock, the Wachovia Securities wealth management operation, A.G. Edwards (which had been purchased one year ago for approximately $7 billion), Evergreen Asset Management (a mutual fund manager with $245 billion in assets under management), Wachovia Insurance Services, and other ancillary assets.

In light of the Citi debt assumption, the only material liability of Wachovia Corporation was $9.8 billion of non-cumulative, perpetual preferred stock. Because this preferred is both non-cumulative and perpetual, Wachovia has no obligation to ever pay a dividend on these securities making these liabilities effectively a free form of equity financing. These types of preferred securities are typically structured to qualify as an attractive form of bank holding company equity which gets favorable regulatory and rating agency treatment. Now that they were orphaned by the transaction, at best these liabilities were worth less than 50 cents on the dollar.

We also determined that the structure of the transaction would create a large tax asset for the holding company. By selling the bank subsidiaries for less than their net tangible asset value, we estimated that a $26 billion tax loss would be created. This tax loss could by carried back two years enabling the holding company to recover approximately $7.5 billion of cash taxes that had previously been paid.

Our conservative estimate of value of New Wachovia was in excess of $8 per share even assuming that the preferred stock was redeemed or valued at par. We began buying the stock shortly after it opened on Monday afternoon. My instructions to our traders Ramy Saad and Erika Kreyssig were to buy every share we possibly could, including pre- and post-market trading. They did a superb job.

Between Monday afternoon and late Thursday we acquired 178 million shares, or approximately 8.3% of the company, at an average price of $3.15. On Friday morning before the open, Wells Fargo announced a definitive agreement to acquire Wachovia for 0.1991 shares of Wells common stock, or more than $7.00 per share based on Friday’s trading price. We began selling our Wachovia stock on Friday. We could not, however, hedge the Wells Fargo stock price because the short selling ban was still in effect.

Citi, which thought it had an exclusive to complete the transaction with Wachovia, brought litigation later that Friday to enjoin the Wells Fargo deal. By late the following week, Citi, likely as a result of pressure from the government, had agreed to allow the Wells transaction to go forward while retaining their lawsuit for damages against Wells Fargo.

As of this date, we have hedged 100% of our exposure to Wells Fargo shares, and have been opportunistic in unwinding a substantial portion of the position. Assuming we waited until transaction closure and taking into consideration Wachovia shares already sold, we have locked in a 67% profit on this $560 million investment.

The government and all of the parties appear to be doing everything they can to consummate the transaction promptly. The transaction received HSR approval in one day and the Treasury and banking authority approvals over the following weekend. Wells has been issued 39% of the voting stock of Wachovia and transaction closure is anticipated by year end. The transaction requires the recently filed form S-4 to be approved by the SEC and the completion of the mechanics of the shareholder meeting in order to be consummated. It is an excellent deal for Wells Fargo and for Pershing Square.

A Mistake

While most of our long investments are comprised of great businesses or assets at fair prices with a catalyst to create value, we occasionally are willing to invest a small amount of fund capital in situations which offer the potential for a many-fold profit at the risk of a large or near-total loss of capital invested. I typically call these investments mispriced options. Our CDS investments fit this profile. While not all mispriced options will be profitable for the funds, I expect our collective experience in these commitments to be quite favorable over time.

We purchased stock in American International Group, Inc. (AIG) after the announcement of the government bailout. In summary, we did so because at the price paid, we purchased AIG at a substantial discount to book value, and we believed that book value was a conservative estimation of the value of AIG’s underlying businesses net of derivative losses. We also believed that there was the potential for a renegotiation of the government’s extremely harsh financing commitment to AIG which provided for 80% dilution, enormous commitment fees, and a high interest rate.

In particular, we believed that if AIG could pay back the government promptly through a combination of asset sales, termination of certain CDS contracts at potentially less than fair market value, and equity investments from existing and potentially other investors, that there was a chance to renegotiate the 80% zero-strike warrant package to the government. If the warrant dilution could be mitigated, it would be possible for AIG shareholders to make a many-fold return on investment. Initially, we believed that the potential for return outweighed the risk of loss. Because of the inherent leverage of AIG, the risk of a permanent loss of capital on this investment was material. As such, we limited the size of our investment to 2.5% of fund capital.

After acquiring our position, we met with other large holders, policymakers and contacted Berkshire Hathaway and other potential investors about a proposed recapitalization of AIG. Unfortunately, the collection of shareholders that were attempting to restructure the government deal was exceedingly disorganized and some large holders were conflicted by a desire to buy certain assets from the company.

We ultimately concluded that the return on invested brain damage from this investment exceeded the probability-weighted opportunity for profit, and we decided to fold the tent. We sold our stock and incurred a modest loss to the funds.

Our Business Model

In order to achieve long-term success, Pershing Square must make good investments and operate with a robust business model. With much media attention focused on hedge fund failures, I thought it would be worthwhile reviewing the characteristics of our business model and explaining why we will withstand industry-specific and overall environmental threats to the investment and hedge fund businesses. The principle factors which contribute to the robustness of our business model are as follows:

* Our portfolio management approach is inherently low risk (where risk is defined as the probability of a permanent loss of capital), particularly when compared with other hedge fund business models. An important distinguishing factor about Pershing Square compared to most other hedge funds is that we do not generally use margin leverage in our investment strategy. The lawyers prefer that I put in the word “generally” to give us the flexibility to use margin to manage short-term capital flows, but, to-date, we have not used any but an immaterial amount of margin, and only for a brief period of time, and we have no intention of changing this approach,
* We generally invest in higher quality businesses with dominant and defensive market positions that generate predictable free cash flow streams and that have modestly or negatively leveraged (cash in excess of debt) balance sheets. We buy these businesses at deep discounts to our estimate of intrinsic value giving us a margin of safety against a permanent impairment of capital. I say “generally” again here because we do make exceptions in certain limited circumstances; that is, we may buy a more leveraged or lower quality business if we believe the price paid sufficiently discounts the risk.
* We often seek investments where we can effectuate positive change to catalyze the realization of value. This serves to accelerate the recognition of value, helps us avoid “dead money” situations, and protects us somewhat from managerial actions which can destroy value.
* We are diversified to an adequate but not excessive extent. This has further benefits for risk and operational management which I will discuss below.
* There is an inherent balance to our long/short investment approach. Historically, when equity or credit markets weaken, our shorts become more valuable, and occasionally materially more valuable, offsetting somewhat the mark-to-market declines in our long portfolio. If we choose to unwind these short positions during market downturns, we can generate capital to invest in a now less expensive market. These short investments generally stand on their own in that they do not typically require a stock market or credit market decline to be successful. That said, they have served as a useful hedging tool during periods of dramatic market declines.
* We have been paranoid about counterparty risk since the inception of the firm. First, we trade with counterparties which we believe to be creditworthy. Second, we have negotiated ISDA agreements which provide us with daily mark-to-market cash and U.S. Treasurys equal to the previous day’s market value of our derivative contracts. In cases where we are required to post initial margin and therefore have some exposure beyond the market value of our derivative contracts, we have typically purchased CDS on our counterparties to further mitigate counterparty risk. While our approach to counterparty risk has protected us from any counterparty losses to date, please be forewarned there is no perfect approach to avoiding counterparty risk.

Our simple approach to investing also allows us to avoid complicated approaches to risk management. Our investment strategy does not require us to open offices all over the globe. As such, we don’t need traders working around the clock. We can go to sleep at night and sleep. Our weekends are largely our own (Ok. I admit it. I am writing this letter in the office on Sunday.) Our risk management approach is to: (1) put our eggs in a few very sturdy baskets, (2) store those baskets in very safe places where they cannot be taken away from us and sold at precisely the wrong time due to margin calls, and (3) to know and track those baskets and their contents very carefully. We call this approach the sleep-at-night approach to risk management. If I can’t, we won’t.

I am extremely skeptical of more automated, algorithmic, Value at Risk, and other business school sanctioned approaches to risk management. None of these approaches saved Lehman, Bear Stearns, Fannie, Freddie, AIG, WaMu, Wachovia or any of the other institutions that used these and other ostensibly more sophisticated risk management strategies.

Our investment strategy and approach to counterparty risk serves to limit the risks inherent in our individual investment selections, our counterparty risk, and the portfolio as a whole. There are, however, other important risks to our business, principally operational, reputational, and regulatory risk.

Operational Risk

Our investment approach is largely straightforward and relatively simple. This, coupled with the concentrated nature of the portfolio, allows us to run our business with a limited number of personnel. We have five senior investment professionals including myself. Shane Dinneen, still officially a junior investment professional, is fast earning his stripes as an eventual senior member of the team.

We could manage our portfolio with less human talent than we have. For members of the investment team reading this letter, don’t be concerned because I have no intention of shrinking the team, but I make the point nonetheless. Simplicity in our investment approach allows for a simpler back office and a smaller overall staff. We have 31 people total at Pershing Square. It could be fewer, but one of Tim Barefield’s (our COO) important risk management principles provides for back-up talent for every role in the firm.

Our Noah’s Ark approach to personnel duplication makes for a good analogy for the ship we have designed. We have worked hard to build a business that can withstand the Great Deluge, and this goes beyond counterparty risk. For example, it is not yet clear this year whether there will be any incentive allocation to be shared at the firm. That said, whether or not the funds’ finish the year in the black, it will be extremely unlikely that a member of our team leaves by choice, and I have no intentions of letting anyone go. This is due to several factors:

* Pershing Square’s large amount of assets under management per investment principal and per overall employee are important ratios to consider when evaluating the sustainability of Pershing Square or any hedge fund for that matter. The economics of a high Asset per Employee ratio attract and allow for the retention of top talent. Our team can be compensated appropriately even in times of short-term underperformance. Hedge funds which barely (or don’t even) cover their costs with management fees are inherently unstable enterprises because in an unprofitable year they cannot pay their people and are likely to lose their most talented professionals to other firms.
* Pershing Square is a nice place to work. While this sounds like an obvious approach to retaining talent, many and perhaps most hedge funds don’t fit this description. We are big believers in taking care of our team not just financially and with attractive benefits, and we have those in spades. We consider every employee at the firm a member of our extended family, and we treat and care for them appropriately. We do this not for business reasons, but it has important long-term business benefits.
* Pershing Square is an extremely exciting place to work. We believe our work creates value beyond the profits we historically have generated for our investors. Our approach to value creation at businesses has created enormous value for investors who happened to own companies to which we contributed to the creation of value. Similarly, investors and counterparties who listened to our views on the bond insurers, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, etc. saved themselves from large losses or perhaps profited by short sales. The fact that our work creates value for the markets as a whole provides additional motivation to the team.

Bottom line, we are built to last, and we will continue to work hard to deserve your continued support.

Reputational and Regulatory Risk

Reputational risk is one of the key risk factors for a business that is subject to a high degree of regulatory scrutiny in an industry that seems to generate considerable public scorn. Our approach to assessing reputational risk is to apply the New York Times test. We ask ourselves whether we would be comfortable having our family and friends read a front page New York Times story about actions taken by Pershing Square written by a knowledgeable and intelligent reporter who has access to all of the facts. If we are comfortable with such an article being read by our close friends, our families, and the public at large, our action passes the test. If not, we reconsider our potential action.

More recently, I have decided to participate in the public dialogue about hedge funds, agreeing to occasional appearances on television or otherwise talking to the press, speaking at industry events, meeting with Congressman, Senators, and other officials. I do so not for any desire for public recognition, but rather because I believe that it is important for the hedge fund industry to come out of the shadows and defend the importance of our work. If we and others (that includes hedge fund investors in addition to the managers) don’t do so, the industry, in my view, is at even greater risk of further regulatory, tax, and other legal changes that will materially harm our business models and industry.

One does not need to look further than the recent short selling ban which was an extremely ill-advised regulatory change that contributed to market turmoil and the recent market decline. By imposing a ban on an investment approach that has been legal for generations with no warning or opportunity for public debate, the SEC caused a short squeeze and subsequent market disarray that wiped out large amounts of hedge fund capital, caused forced selling as long/short, market neutral, quantitative, and other managers had to sell long positions to rebalance their books. More significantly, it cost the U.S. capital markets its highly respected position as an exemplar free marketplace where the rule of law prevailed. It also contributed to hedge fund underperformance, thereby leading to investor redemptions, further reducing industry capital.

I believe the short selling ban also contributed to continued market declines since the ban was put into place. In that hedge funds are among the most opportunistic investors in the world, destroying large amounts of hedge fund capital likely contributed to market declines because of a dearth of opportunistic hedge fund buyers who would normally step in and purchase the compelling values created by falling markets.

Even though the restriction on short selling has been eliminated, the longer-term consequences of populist regulatory actions will continue to be felt by the markets and its participants until such time as our securities regulator makes clear that the U.S. will never again change the rules of the game mid play.

Specifically, the short selling ban was harmful to Pershing Square because we lost the opportunity to lock in even greater gains on our Wachovia investment by not initially being able to hedge our Wells Fargo exposure. I estimate this loss at approximately 3% to 4% of fund performance. This loss was somewhat offset by our ability to sell certain investments into the short squeeze at higher than anticipated prices. We were otherwise not materially affected because short selling equities has not been a material part of our investment program, although we did cover one large equity short at a loss which is now trading at a more than 40% lower price, another 4% to 5% potential loss of profit assuming we had not covered at higher prices.

Hedge fund investors - the pension funds, state plans, charitable, healthcare and other institutions and the individuals who invest in hedge funds - are a much more appealing constituency to defend the industry than the managers themselves. I encourage you to consider becoming part of the public debate on the industry. We collectively need one another’s support.

Investor Risk

The stability of a hedge fund’s capital base is critical to its long-term success. We have endeavored to attract high quality investors who have a deep understanding of our investment approach. We do our best to continually inform you of the progress of our holdings and business, and remind you of the inherently volatile nature of our concentrated strategy. Our investment strategy is also transparent. The nature of our approach requires most of our holdings to eventually be disclosed publicly. As such, it is easier for you to understand how we have made and lost money over the years, and to assess our ability to replicate our historic strategy and performance.

Over the last nearly five years, we have delivered very little of the volatility that investors are concerned about, that is, downward volatility. As such and with strong historical performance, we have not “tested” our investor base. We hope never to “test” our investor base.

While we have considered a longer-term lock-up structure, we chose not to modify our existing liquidity terms because we did not want our terms to be overly burdensome to investors and to present a hurdle to the reinvestment of capital, particularly during a period of temporary underperformance. Year to date, we have had minimal redemptions. New commitments have exceeded our redemption requests by approximately 3 to 1. We have a pipeline of new prospects that are in the process of completing their due diligence. That said, the continuity of our investor base is a long-term success factor for the funds and for this we are relying on you.

Is Now a Good Time to Invest in Pershing Square?

I have never before suggested that one time or another would be a better time to invest in Pershing Square. I am going to take the risk of doing so now. At the risk of sounding promotional, I believe that now is perhaps the best time in our history to increase your investment in Pershing Square. A few thoughts to consider:

When one invests in Pershing Square today, with respect to our current portfolio and potential opportunities in the market, the spread between price and value is the widest it has been since the inception of Pershing Square and likely over the last 30 or more years in our opinion. Investments like Target Corporation which we purchased initially in the mid to high $50s per share now sell at approximately $40 per share and there has been no meaningful diminution in the per-share value of Target since our initial purchase 18 months ago. In fact, the probability of Target and other Pershing Square holdings implementing a value-creating transaction are higher today than before because of management and shareholder frustration with current share price levels. Consider that Target management options are nearly all out of the money, and a meaningful number of vested options will soon likely expire worthless if there is no change in the status quo.

An additional investment in Pershing Square today also purchases a pro rata interest in our cash and near-cash investments. While purchasing cash indirectly is not an inherently attractive proposition, we are currently analyzing a number of long and short investments that appear extremely interesting, and subject to completion of our due diligence, may become large new commitments. While for the first nearly five years of our business, we found only a limited number of interesting opportunities, albeit a sufficient number to generate attractive returns, we are now presented with tens of intriguing situations that are worthy of careful review. One could reasonably conclude that the greater spread between price and value and a wider selection of attractively priced opportunities will lead to higher rates of return on these commitments than during previous periods of greater market efficiency which characterized the first four years of the funds’ existence.

While many have portrayed the current environment as a highly risky time to invest, these individuals are likely confusing risk with volatility. We believe risk should be determined based on the probability that an investor will incur a permanent loss of capital. As market values have declined substantially, this risk has actually diminished rather than increased. Risk is high now for the leveraged short-term investor, but actually much lower for the unleveraged, long-term investor in high quality, mid and large capitalization, modestly leveraged businesses.

Unlike levered hedge funds whose risk increases as NAV declines, Pershing Square’s risk has declined with the recent decline in the value of our portfolio. Why? This is due to the fact that a leveraged manager’s probability of being sold out by its prime broker increases as its portfolio’s equity declines. Many hedge fund strategies are confidence and credit sensitive because they require continued access to low-cost financing. Recent declines may also require leveraged hedge funds to post additional collateral on trades which did not require an initial down payment. Because our investment strategy does not require leverage to operate, recent increases in financing costs and reductions in leverage afforded to hedge funds have no impact on our current or future prospects. In our case, the margin of safety of our investments actually increases, the greater the decline in our holdings’ share prices. We, of course, also have no margin leverage creating the risk of a forced sale. So yes, I believe now is a good time.

Pershing Square Advisory Board Addition

Matt Paull joined the Pershing Square Advisory Board on September 1st. For some of you, Matt’s name may be familiar for he was formerly the CFO of McDonald’s Corporation before his retirement earlier this year. I have known Matt for about 10 years, and interacted with him intensively in mid to late 2005 and in early 2006 when Pershing was advocating for change at McDonald’s.

As CFO of McDonald’s, Matt was one of the most highly regarded public company CFOs in the country. Shareholders were the beneficiaries of superb capital allocation and strong share price appreciation during his tenure as CFO. I consider it one of Pershing Square’s greatest accomplishments that we were able to garner Matt’s respect and friendship even though there were occasionally contentious moments during our engagement with McDonald’s.

Matt has already proved enormously helpful in our interactions with Target Corporation. As a former CFO, particularly one that has been on the other side of one of Pershing Square’s most significant engagements, Matt brings a uniquely valuable perspective to the firm and to the management teams of our portfolio companies.

In addition to his Pershing Square advisory role, Matt is currently serving on the business school faculty of University of San Diego.

Organizational Update

We completed our move to the 42nd floor of 888 Seventh Avenue in August. The second time round, we really got it right. The space is beautiful, promotes communication, and is extraordinarily well organized and efficient.

After the move, we made several additions to the team. Courtney Leonardo and David Robinson joined the IR team in administrative roles, roles which had previously been filled by temporary employees. Alex Song joined us from Goldman Sachs as the newest junior member of the investment team. Amy Stern joined the Finance and Accounting team from Tiger Global, and will focus her efforts on management company accounting. Amy is also attending the NYU Stern School of Business where she is working on a business school degree. Jill Skousen replaced Whitney Stodtmeister as the administrative assistant for the investment team after Whitney moved to Santa Barbara. Helena Tunner joined us to work with Dianna Baitinger at front desk reception.

On other news, Alex Kaufmann of our IR team will be attending Columbia University’s Executive MBA program on Fridays and weekends. We are big believers in continuing education for our personnel.

As always, we are extremely appreciative of your support, particularly during uncertain times. If there are any questions I have failed to answer above, please call Doreen, Alex, Ashley or myself.

Sincerely,
William A. Ackman

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McCulley: The Paradox of Deleveraging will be Broken

Monday, November 24th, 2008

Paul McCulley, Managing Director and Portfolio Manager, PIMCO, earlier this year wrote a landmark discussion piece titled, “The Paradox of Deleveraging,” in which he postulated that the deleveraging of the credit market would have a profoundly negative impact that only a government sponsored plan could subdue, as no other party could be big enough to slay the affliction of credit abuse in the housing, investment and banking industries. Here is the follow up:

I’ve only written this essay once since the Kansas City Fed’s annual symposium in late August.1 But it hasn’t been because I’ve been lazy. Rather, I’ve been working virtually around the clock ever since, in my day job as head of PIMCO’s Money Market and Funding Desk. On Wall Street, this desk is frequently viewed as a backwater, a temporary home for new MBAs getting their feet wet before moving on to higher-value-added desks, or a retirement home for those with more senior moments than fresh ideas.

That’s never the case here at PIMCO, even though a number of now PIMCO partners spent their first days trafficking in the money markets and I, of ever-graying hair, still make my home here in the early hours of the day. Money markets frequently are a backwater, except when they are not, in which case they are cascading rapids. Liquidity pressures inevitably are the precursor of solvency and/or going-concern problems. Just ask Wall Street’s independent investment banks.

We here at PIMCO have always known this. Accordingly, we’ve always been conservative beyond conservative in our money market operations, on both sides of the balance sheet - no asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) for us, and no tri-party repo without regard to collateral types or haircuts either. Meat and potatoes only, no fancy garnishes necessary. But the meat and potatoes must be cooked properly.

Hence, the work load of PIMCO’s money market and funding desk. My new deputy, Jerome Schneider, hit the ground running in early August, a most propitious time, just before the global money markets became not just cascading rapids, but roaring waterfalls. The financial world will never be the same after the U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve’s fateful decision of the weekend of September 13-14 to stand aside as Lehman Brothers plummeted to death on the rocks below.

Whether that decision was the right one or not, we will never know. Yes, I know that many are quick to take the Treasury and the Federal Reserve to task, maintaining that the on-going global financial crisis - and, thus, growth crisis - would not be nearly so severe if Lehman had been tossed a life line. I simply don’t know. What I do know is that the global financial system was fundamentally broken long before Lehman’s watery death.

Thus, I believe the powerful, systemic policy responses that have unfolded in the post-Lehman world were destined to come about. Lehman was but the unfortunate tipping point. My heart still aches for the pain suffered by my many friends there. Fate is not always fair and at times, is arbitrary and capricious.

But what ailed Lehman was but a manifestation of what ailed, and ails the global financial intermediary system: the presumption that grossly levered positions in illiquid assets can always be funded, because those doing the funding will always assume the borrower is a going concern.

To understand the nature of this systemic malady, we need to return to first principles. Bear with me, please; this is going to be a bit academic. But, I submit, it was the loss of understanding of first principles that lies at the heart of the on-going paradox of deleveraging, which is the proximate cause of the on-going downward spiral of asset and debt deflation.

The Nature of Banking
When I studied the origins of banking in college, we started with the Medici Family of 15th century Italy. I’m quite sure banking existed long before then, just that I haven’t studied it. But regardless of the origins of banking, its founding premise has always been the same: In normal times, the public’s collective, ex ante demand for access to at-par, immediately-available bank money is always greater than the sum of the public’s individual, ex post demand for access to such liquidity.

Thus, the genius of banking, if you want to call it that, is simple: a bank can take more risk on the asset side of its balance sheet than the liability side can notionally support, because a goodly portion of the liability side, notably deposits, is de facto of perpetual maturity, although it is notionally of finite maturity, as short as one day in the case of demand deposits.

It’s the same alchemy that permits mutual funds to commit to next-day redemption at tonight’s NAV, even though all reasonable people know that a mutual fund - with the possible exception of a money market fund - could not possibly liquidate all assets on the wire tomorrow at tonight’s NAV marks. Systemically, it’s the illusion of liquidity, as so elegantly described by John Maynard Keynes:

“The spectacle of modern investment markets has sometimes moved me towards the conclusion that to make the purchase of an investment permanent and indissoluble, like marriage, except by reason of death or other grave cause, might be a useful remedy for our contemporary evils. For this would force the investor to direct his mind to the long-term prospects and to those only. But a little consideration of this expedient brings us up against a dilemma, and shows us how the liquidity of investment markets often facilitates, though it sometimes impedes, the course of new investment.

For the fact that each individual investor flatters himself that his commitment is ‘liquid’ (though this cannot be true for all investors collectively) calms his nerves and makes him much more willing to run a risk. If individual purchases of investments were rendered illiquid, this might seriously impede new investment, so long as alternative ways in which to hold his savings are available to the individual. This is the dilemma.

So long as it is open to the individual to employ his wealth in hoarding or lending money, the alternative of purchasing actual capital assets cannot be rendered sufficiently attractive (especially to the man who does not manage the capital assets and knows very little about them), except by organizing markets wherein these assets can be easily realized for money.”2

Yes, liquidity for all at last night’s marks is an illusion. But for banks, unlike mutual funds, it’s not so much an illusion after all, for two simple reasons: banks have access to deposit insurance underwritten by fiscal authorities and to a discount window underwritten by the monetary authority (and one step removed, the fiscal authority). Thus, banks are unique institutions, providing a “public good:”

*
Liquidity on demand at par for their depositors, because of the safety net underwritten by the sovereign, yet
*
The ability to invest in longer-dated, more risky, not-always-at-par loans and securities, because the existence and credibility of the public safety net systemically renders the public’s ex post demand for liquidity at par below the public’s ex ante demand.

Yes, banking with a sovereign safety net against deposit runs is a really cool business. Indeed, the difference between the public’s ex post and ex ante demand for at-par liquidity could be called the banking system’s “float,” similar to that of a Buffet-style insurance company.

But since it’s a really cool business and since the sovereign providing the liquidity safety net is a de facto equity partner in the business, the sovereign quite rationally wants a say in how the business is run - the degree of leverage, corporate governance, risk management controls, etc. Kinda like I do when I pay the insurance premium on my 19-year old son’s car. Jonnie doesn’t like it, and neither do bankers. Or would-be bankers.

Thus, both bankers and would-be bankers have, from time immemorial, sought to get the benefits of the sovereign’s liquidity safety net without shouldering the associated regulator nuisance. And I’m sure that 19-year old sons and daughters, too, have been doing the same for just as long.

Over the last three decades or so, the growth of “banking” outside formal, sovereign-regulated banking, has exploded, in something that I dubbed the Shadow Banking System.3 Loosely defined, a Shadow Bank is a levered-up financial intermediary whose liabilities are broadly perceived as of similar money-goodness and liquidity as conventional bank deposits. These liabilities could be shares of money market mutual funds; or the commercial paper of Finance Companies, Conduits and Structured Investment Vehicles; or the repo borrowings of stand-alone Investment Banks and Hedge Funds; or the senior tranches of Collateralized Debt Obligations; or a host of other similar funding instruments.

The bottom line is simple: Shadow Banks use funding instruments that are not just as good as old-fashioned sovereign-protected deposits. But it was a great gig so long as the public bought the notion that such funding instruments were “just as good” as bank deposits - more leverage, less regulation and more asset freedom were a path to (much) higher returns on equity in Shadow Banks than conventional banks.

And why did the public buy such instruments as though they were “just as good” as bank deposits? There are a host of reasons, not the least of which was lust for yield. But most fundamentally, Keynes again gives us the systemic answer (his italics, not mine):

“In practice we have tacitly agreed, as a rule, to fall back on what is, in truth, a convention. The essence of this convention - though it does not, of course, work out quite so simply - lies in assuming that the existing state of affairs will continue indefinitely, except in so far as we have specific reasons to expect a change. This does not mean that we really believe that the existing state of affairs will continue indefinitely. We know from extensive experience that this is most unlikely.

The actual results of an investment over a long term of years very seldom agree with the initial expectation. Nor can we rationalize our behavior by arguing that to a man in a state of ignorance errors in either direction are equally probable, so that there remains a mean actuarial expectation based on equi-probabilities. For it can easily be shown that the assumption of arithmetically equal probabilities based on a state of ignorance leads to absurdities.

We are assuming, in effect, that the existing market valuation, however arrived at, is uniquely correct in relation to our existing knowledge of the facts which will influence the yield of the investment, and that it will only change in proportion to changes in this knowledge; though, philosophically speaking, it cannot be uniquely correct, since our existing knowledge does not provide a sufficient basis for a calculated mathematical expectation. In point of fact, all sorts of considerations enter into the market valuations which are in no way relevant to the prospective yield. Nevertheless the above conventional method of calculation will be compatible with a considerable measure of continuity and stability in our affairs, so long as we can rely on the maintenance of the convention.

For if there exist organized investment markets and if we can rely on the maintenance of the convention, an investor can legitimately encourage himself with the idea that the only risk he runs is that of a genuine change in the news over the near future, as to the likelihood of which he can attempt to form his own judgment, and which is unlikely to be very large. For, assuming that the convention holds good, it is only these changes which can affect the value of his investment, and he need not lose his sleep merely because he has not any notion what his investment will be worth ten years hence.

Thus investment becomes reasonably “safe” for the individual investor over short periods, and hence over a succession of short periods however many, if he can fairly rely on there being no breakdown in the convention and on his therefore having an opportunity to revise his judgment and change his investment, before there has been time for much to happen. Investments which are “fixed” for the community are thus made “liquid” for the individual.

It has been, I am sure, on the basis of some such procedure as this that our leading investment markets have been developed. But it is not surprising that a convention, in an absolute view of things so arbitrary, should have its weak points. It is its precariousness which creates no small part of our contemporary problem of securing sufficient investment.”4

And so, Keynes provides the essential - and existential - answer as to why the Shadow Banking System became so large, the unraveling of which lies at the root of the current global financial system crisis. It was a belief in a convention, undergirded by the length of time it held: Shadow Bank liabilities were viewed as “just as good” as conventional bank deposits not because they are, but because they had been. And the power of this conventional thinking was aided and abetted by both the sovereign and the sovereign-blessed rating agencies.

Until, of course, convention was turned on its head, starting with a run on the ABCP market in August 2007, the near death of Bear Stearns in March 2008, the de facto nationalization of Fannie and Freddie in July, and the actual death of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Maybe, just maybe, there was and is something special about a real bank, as opposed to a Shadow Bank!

And indeed that is unambiguously the case, as evidenced by the on-going partial re-intermediation of the Shadow Banking System back into the sovereign-supported conventional banking system, as well as the mad scramble by remaining Shadow Banks to convert themselves into conventional banks, so as to eat at the same sovereign-subsidized capital and liquidity cafeteria as their former stodgy brethren.

The new conventional wisdom: levered capitalism is good, and made even better with a bit of socialism to protect the downside.

Well Maybe
I’m quite sure that last sentence is not going to sit well with some of you. It’s not supposed to sit well. It doesn’t sit well with me, I must acknowledge, nay confess. Like most of us, I’ve always had a separation in my mind between strictly capitalist activities and strictly public activities. Not that the demarcation is always clean. But it’s a useful way of thinking.

As far as I know, the place where I buy my fishing tackle is a capitalist outfit. If we customers don’t buy enough rods and reels, the owner will go broke; his operation is simply not systemically important enough to be bailed out by the taxpayers, including my neighbors who don’t fish. In contrast, the local Department of Motor Vehicles, sometimes called the DMV, is unambiguously not a capitalist outfit, but a public outfit. It cannot go broke, as evidenced by our tolerance of its fluctuating service level, because it provides a public service that the private sector can’t provide. To be sure, AAA can get you new plates for your car, but you can’t renew your driver’s license at the AAA; for that, you have got to go to the monopoly called the DMV.

Well actually, that’s not entirely true, either. The DMV is actually an oligopoly, with offices in many surrounding neighborhoods. And rumor has it here that the service is a lot quicker at the San Clemente office than the Costa Mesa office, which serves Newport Beach. So the consumer does have the choice of driving to San Clemente, a form of time arbitrage versus going to the Costa Mesa office. However, rumor also has it that this rumored better service in San Clemente is so widespread that, as Yogi Berra might say, the San Clemente office has become so popular nobody goes there anymore.

But you get the point: there is private enterprise and there is public enterprise. And then there is banking, a hybrid of the two. There is no way ‘round this, for good or bad, because fractional reserve banking depends upon the sovereign’s safety net against liability runs, a safety net that the private sector definitionally can’t universally supply. In this sense, the safety net is like national defense: we all need it, but since nobody individually has the incentive to pay for it, we collectively tax ourselves to pay for it.

Yes, sometimes we collectively end up paying $800 for military toilet seats, as was the case about 25 years ago. But that doesn’t change the proposition that public goods do exist, and a stable system of intermediation of private savings into private investment is indeed a public good. The maturity transformation power of a fractional reserve banking system provides an unambiguous benefit to society and as such, must be underwritten by society.

Bottom Line
I could regale you yet again about the power of the analytical thinking of Hyman Minsky, complete with his Forward Journey turning into his Moment, followed by his Reverse Journey.5 But I don’t need to do that any more: we’ve collectively lived it and are now caught in the debt-deflationary pathologies of “the paradox of deleveraging.”6 Not everybody in the private sector can delever at the same time without creating a depression. Accordingly, the sovereign must go the other way, levering up the public balance sheet. And Washington has finally started to do so with appropriate vigor and enthusiasm.

It’s not a pretty picture. In fact, it’s repugnant, giving proof to the proposition that breaking the paradox of deleveraging does involve socializing the downside of previously profitable private sector activities. In a recent speech, I called it “creeping socialism” and was interrupted by an irate, older man in the back of the room bellowing, “It ain’t creeping socialism, it’s galloping socialism!” I really didn’t have a soothing come back, noting that many things are what they are only in the eye of the beholder. But his point wasn’t lost on me or anybody else in the room.

And it is not lost on Washington, DC either, I can assure you. If the sovereign must backstop a private sector activity that produces a public good, then the sovereign will, at least in a democracy, rightfully demand both bottom-up and macro-prudential rules to harness the greed that lubricates the invisible hand of capitalism. Yes, the visible fist of government and the invisible hand are presently engaged in a massive arm wrestling contest in the provision of financial services. And the fist is winning.

At least for now. Capitalism, and especially financial market capitalism, brought this outcome upon itself through greed and hubris. Capitalism is now re-grouping and learning how to play by new rules, which are still being written. And ultimately, I’m sure, capitalistic bankers will once again bend those rules in the pursuit of higher profitability. And that’s okay, I think. In the end, we really don’t want to turn our banking system into the DMV. At the same time, we also don’t want our banking system to be nothing more than a betting parlor.

Or, in the famous words of Keynes again:

“Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. But the position is serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation. When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done.”

Paul A. McCulley
Managing Director
November 13, 2008

You can download a complete PDF here.

Tags: Banking System, Banks, Bear Stearns, Blog, BRIC, capitalism, Credit, Credit Market, Desc, Fed, Federal Reserve, Focus, Hedge Fund, Hedge Funds, Investment Banks, Italy, Journey, Lehman Brothers, liquidity, Market Cap, Markets, Mutual Funds, oil, Paul McCulley, PIMCO, risk, Valuations, Value, Wall Street, Water, wisdom
Posted in Credit Markets, Markets, Oil and Gas | No Comments »

Cramer: Dow 8300, Oil $50, Obama

Wednesday, October 8th, 2008

From Jim Cramer in New York magazine:

What will New York look like a year from now? The answer: bad and probably worse, and perhaps downright catastrophic. Three degrees of awful. The first step was passing the bank-bailout legislation. Now that it’s done—and if it didn’t get done we would have been looking at a guaranteed economic collapse—the critical issue will be presidential leadership. And while any president will be an improvement over the current one, there is a growing belief on Wall Street that Barack Obama has the capacity to lead us out of this wilderness while John McCain does not. I’ll go a step further: Obama is a recession. McCain is a depression…

At this time next year, I could see the Dow as low as 8,300. That’s more than 40 percent off its October 2007 high of 14,164. On Main Street, that means a further slowdown in consumer spending, as buyers feel poorer, and another hit for 401(k) and college savings accounts. For Wall Street, it means more bank closures and mergers and still more layoffs. The two remaining independent commercial banks–née–investment banks, Goldman Sachs (GS) and Morgan Stanley (MS), will have to fight mightily to remain independent. The bet here is that Goldman makes it but Morgan Stanley succumbs to one of the four emerging megabanks — Citigroup (C), JPMorgan (JPM), Bank of America (BAC), and Wells Fargo (WFC)…

In terms of investing between now and next fall, I’d buy the stocks of only companies you can’t not use—Kellogg’s (K), General Mills (GIS), Kraft (KFT), P&G (PG). You can’t trust anything to do with financial paper — there’s still too much uncertainty (if a bailout bill does pass, at what price will the toxic bonds be marked?). And commodities have been bid up too high — demand soared as investors sought shelter from stocks — to buy for some time. Oil’s going to $50 on weaker demand; when it gets there, we can revisit the oil stocks.

Tags: Bailout, Banks, Barack Obama, Citigroup, Collapse, Commercial Banks, Commodities, energy, Gold, Investment Banks, Obama, oil, oil stocks, Recession, Slowdown, Wall Street, Wells Fargo
Posted in Bonds, Commodities, Gold, Markets, Oil and Gas | No Comments »

Is There a Bull Market Somewhere?

Wednesday, September 24th, 2008

Not likely, according to PIMCO’s Bill Gross. In his most recent Investment Outlook, Gross, reasons and opposes (for now) the idea that in the very different worlds of Louis Rukeyser, Jim Cramer, and Jim Grant, “There’s always a bull market somewhere!”

While he does agree that there are always stocks, bonds, and currencies that can be found to be going up, while markets are going down, Gross cautions:

So the lesson must be to go forth and find the bull market, wherever it is. Almost always – but NOT NOW, because in a global financial marketplace in the process of delevering, assets that go up in price are rare diamonds as opposed to grains of sand. For the past several months our PIMCO Investment Committee blackboard has continued to display the following lesson plan:

What Happens During Delevering

1. Risk spreads, liquidity spreads, volatility, term premiums – they all go up.
2. Delevering slows/stops when assets have been liquidated and/or sufficient capital has been raised to produce an equilibrium.
3. The raising of sufficient capital now depends on the entrance of new balance sheets. Absent that, prices of almost all assets will go down.

Essentially, Gross’ thesis is that as the GSEs, banks, investment banks and global hedge funds delever their balance sheets, they also lower the prices of all securities that can be arbitraged within the marketplace. 

The 10% year over year decline in prices has not been witnessed since the great depression, and that is a red flag.

a 10% aggregate asset price decline does more than make us all 10% less wealthy. Because many of these assets are leveraged and margined, the more they decline, the more frequent and frenzied the margin calls, and if the additional cash flow is not provided, not only an asset liquidation but a debt liquidation follows. It is the debt liquidation that potentially turns a stagnant/recessionary economy into something much worse.

This rare event of systematic debt liquidation is the central issue in both the US and globally. If central bankers are unable to take effective measures, the campfire could turn into a forest fire, and a mild asset bear market could turn into a destructive financial tsunami. Gross points out that even they and their SWF and central bank counterparts who have been doing their part to stem the tide, and in some cases bought into debt issues too early, only to see those issues now priced “underwater,” are now reluctant to make additional commitments.

Paulson and Bernanke have consulted PIMCO regularly throughout the credit market debacle, and have apparently acted on some of that advice as well as that of others like Pershing Square’s Bill Ackman, who floated a Frannie bailout plan prior to the Fed’s that was eerily similar.

Paul McCulley stated in late July, that the only thing that was viable given the delevering of the market that was well underway, was for government to lever up its balance sheet, much the way it is proposing to this week, with the $700-billion TARP plan.

Tags: Bailout, Banks, Bear Market, Bernanke, Bill Ackman, Bill Gross, Blog, Chart, Credit, Credit Market, Economy, Fed, Grain, GSE, Hedge Fund, Hedge Funds, Investment Banks, liquidity, Markets, Paul McCulley, Paulson, Pershing Square, PIMCO, Recession, risk, spreads, Thesis, UK, Water
Posted in Bonds, Credit Markets, Economy, Markets, Outlook | No Comments »

Credit Crisis Observations

Tuesday, September 23rd, 2008

Niels Jensen and Jan Wilhelmsen of Absolute Return Partners (www.arpllp.com) produced an informative analysis of the credit crisis and provide the following observations. Here is our summary:

Loans and Mortgages are getting much harder to come by on average, globally.

This has bold and negative implications for property prices everywhere.

Observation # 1

It all began with housing and it will end with housing.

The current overhang caused by the tightness of credit (mortgages) will take years not months to unwind and housing prices will not begin to rise again until this occurs.

Observation# 2

Don’t trust central banks to always do the right thing.

Evidence suggests that while their intent seems to be genuine, central banks around the world have not been very effective at taming inflation. For example, simply raising interest rates in the underlevered economies of the BRIC countries has been futile, since most consumers and companies do not employ credit to the extent that those of us in the west do.

In the case of the BRIC countries, it appears the problem does not consist of sustaining growth, but rather containing growth. China, for instance, has a record of under-reporting both real and nominal GDP growth, and may have only recently more accurately stated inflation owing to the fact that they could not hide from skyrocketing oil and food prices.

Observation # 3

Policy mistakes are likely to be repeated.

The US is currently at risk of making the same policy making mistakes Japan made 10-15 years ago. US residential property prices have risen more during 2000-2006 boom than did the Japanese during the late 80s boom.

Japan too, though more rapidly, reduced the cost of money dramatically to fend off its crisis.

Japan bailed out many of its institutions and used taxpayers money to fund the activity of fixing the ‘unfixable,’ and this could have profound implications for the US GDP growth in years to come.

Observation # 4

The golden era of investment banks is over.

The biggest independent investment banks have just become banks. The US investment banking business is becoming more like Canada’s where the business is dominated by the large schedule “A” chartered banks and America’s “free” market just became a little more socialist. How ironic…The folding of GS and MS into banks also has valuation considerations for the venerated firms as their revenues and earnings are sure to decline under the auspices of Fed regulation. Further de-levering also has negative implications for the market as it entails more liquidation. Hopefully this will be done in an orderly fashion now that the conversion is underway.

Observation # 5

The final shoe hasn’t dropped yet.

There is more to come. For instance, the financial system has yet to deal with $1-trillion in Alt-A securities and further degradation of the CDS market and counter-party risks.

Absolute Return Partners states that the commodity bull is just the final leg of the liquidity super-cycle: take a look the Economist’s VAR-VAR-Voom chart.

Observation # 6

Leverage is ‘dead’ but capital is not.

Global savings rates now exceed 20%, except in the US, and while this is a positive for global stability, the question remains about whether investors are willing to invest money where it is most needed, the shore up the world’s banks. Failing that, property prices will need to stabilize before we can expect better times.

Observation # 7

The end of the crisis looks further away than it did a year ago.

Its complicated, very complicated.

Commodity price induced inflation has made it hard for policy makers to reduce interest rates. Despite this, interest rate cuts may not be the magic bullet and in 20 of the 36 countries recently surveyed by Morgan Stanley, real short-term interest rates are currently negative.

At this point the $700-billion Treasury/Fed proposal appears to be a solid response, as does the stimulus injections of cash into markets around the world.

This problem remains possibly years away from being done with.

Observation # 8

Traditional risk management has lost its way.

Paul McCulley of Pimco touched on the subject in the July 2008 issue of Global Central Bank Focus:

“[...] every levered financial institution - banks and shadow banks alike - decided individually that it was time to delever their balance sheets. At the individual level, that made perfect sense. At the collective level, however, it has given us the paradox of deleveraging: when we all try to do it at the same time, we actually do less of it, because we collectively create deflation in the assets from which leverage is being removed.”

In fact, while it is known that PIMCO was regularly consulted by Secretary Paulson, it was Paul McCulley who rightly proposed in his newsletter during the summer, that the only real solution would consist of the formation of a new government agency to create a market to thaw frozen or cemented assets.  This would be the only viable long term solution.

Conclusion

Where is the opportunity? According to Absolute Return Partners, real value is to be found in credit instruments. This is where the most damage has been inflicted and it is where the biggest bargains are to be found in today’s markets.

What would you rather own? Equities which trade at 15-20 times earnings or credit instruments trading at a fraction of that cost? Deutsche Bank estimates that senior secured loans are trading at an implied PE ratio of 5-less than a third of the cost of equities.

You may read the full original version, at Observations on a Crisis, Courtesy John Mauldin

Tags: Banks, Blog, BRIC, BRICs, Canada, CDS, Central Banks, Chart, China, Commodity, Credit, Credit Crisis, Earnings, energy, Fed, Focus, Food prices, GDP, GDP Growth, Gold, inflation, interest rates, Investment Banks, Japan, John Mauldin, liquidity, Markets, Mortgage, oil, Paul McCulley, Paulson, PIMCO, risk, Savings Rate, Trading, Trillion, Value
Posted in Credit Markets, Gold, Markets, Oil and Gas | 1 Comment »

The Bonfire of the Vanities, the Sequel

Thursday, June 26th, 2008

June 26, 2008 - Andrew Ross Sorkin, of the New York Times, writes about how prophetic Tom Wolfe’s declaration was on the day of the Blackstone debut: “We may be witnessing the end of capitalism as we know it.”

When you get to the end of an era, marking the timeline with watershed events is always therapeutic. Here are some excerpts from Sorkin’s NYTimes article:

… Mr. Wolfe must be in attendance — was that the Blackstone Group, the big private equity firm, was minutes away from going public, the largest initial public offering in the United States since 2002. (At the time, he told The New York Observer that a friend was giving him a tour.)

Just then, a CNBC reporter pulled Mr. Wolfe aside to ask him what he made of all the hubbub. Mr. Wolfe paused for a moment to contemplate his answer.

And then, with a wry smile, he delivered a prophetic declaration: “We may be witnessing the end of capitalism as we know it.”

 

One year later …

Blackstone’s stock has gone nowhere but down since it went public, dropping nearly 50 percent from its high the day it started trading. But that’s the least of it.

The once mighty Wall Street investment banks have been brought to their knees, sending out pink slips to more than 83,000 employees worldwide, racking up billions of dollars in losses as a results of their foolish forays into subprime mortgages. Bear Stearns all but went out of business before being “saved.” Some hedge funds have gone belly up.

Those lords of private equity, many of which were preparing to follow Blackstone into the public markets, have been put on semipermanent hiatus. (Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Company refuses to withdraw its I.P.O filing, almost a year after submitting it, with no immediate hope in sight.) Their deal-making has all but stopped.

As Mr. Wolfe nicely put it, “It sounds like even the firms that aren’t in trouble are in trouble.”

And, what of credit …

And yet, there has been a perverse, and misguided, optimism that somehow the situation will improve in the second half of 2008. How? Sure, the big banks may take fewer write-downs — but there is no way of knowing that. The news a few days ago that the big bond insurers were being downgraded will create new havoc — and losses — for holders of toxic subprime debt. Indeed, the bigger issue is what kind of business is going to generate any return for its investors. When you can’t lend or trade — and you can’t invest with the leverage that juiced returns to support seven- and eight-figure bonuses — how exactly are you going to make money?

“It has always interested me that the word ‘credit’ comes from the word ‘credere,’ which means ‘to believe,’ ” Mr. Wolfe said. “It only works if people believe in it.” He’s right, of course: one reason the credit markets have tanked is that people don’t believe anymore.

Complete Article:

A “Bonfire” Returns as Heartburn, Andrew Ross Sorkin, NYTimes, June 24, 2008

Tags: Andrew Ross Sorkin, Banks, Bear Stearns, Blackstone, capitalism, Credit, Credit Market, Credit Markets, Dealbook, Dollar, Excerpts, Financials, Hedge Fund, Hedge Funds, Investment Banks, Markets, Mortgage, New York Times, REW, risk, SMI, Tom Wolfe, Trading, Wall Street, Water
Posted in Bonds, Credit Markets, Markets | No Comments »

Jim Rogers: Long agricultural commodities, RMB, Short investment banks

Sunday, March 30th, 2008

March 30, 2008 - On March 12, 2008, Jim Rogers appeared for a live interview on CNBC Europe. If you missed it, just click on the link below.

Just watched it… It is a must watch. In his usual candour, Mr. Rogers tells it like it is. If he woke up in Bernanke’s place, he would quit, and then abolish the Fed for providing t”socialism for the rich.”

His calls - Invest in agricutural commodities (in his opinion, this will be the most profitable trade for the next 2 to 5 years), long the Renminbi, short the investment banks.

http://www.cnbc.com/id/15840232?video=682734828&play=1

Even if you don’t like the guy, its a good interview with one seriously interesting and knowledgeable person.

Thank you Mr. Rogers.

Tags: Agricultural commodities, Agriculture, Banks, Bernanke, Commodities, Currency, Euro, Fed, interview, Investment, Investment Banks, Investment Strategy, Jim Rogers, Markets, RMB, Video
Posted in Commodities, Markets | No Comments »