In Praise of Emerging Markets

Thursday, October 8th, 2009

This post is a guest contribution by John Derrick, Director of Research at US Global Investors.

We believe global growth is the most powerful investment theme now and for the foreseeable future. You can see this playing out as countries like China, India and Brazil grow in economic stature. As we saw in Pittsburgh last week, the G-7 is being supplanted by the more inclusive G-20 when it comes to global economic decision-making.

Emerging market stocks were hit especially hard during the financial crisis but have been among the best performers during the rebound. We are currently in the midst of a synchronized global recovery, and with aggressive government stimulus, strong balance sheets and an ever-growing share of global GDP, emerging markets are likely to outperform the developed markets due to strong domestic consumption and forward-looking infrastructure investments.

The chart below from Goldman Sachs on consumer spending illustrates that point.

Goldman estimates that consumer spending in China will increase by about 10 percent in 2010, while India and Brazil will be in the 4 percent to 6 percent range. At the same time, negative growth is expected in Spain, Britain and Italy, and the forecast for the United States is flat. Industrial production in emerging markets has recovered to roughly where it was when the recession began; in developed markets, IP is still down nearly 20 percent.

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This second chart, also from Goldman Sachs, compares the operating margins in developed and emerging markets for the companies in Europe’s Dow Jones Stoxx 600 Index. The analysis going back to the early 1990s found that the emerging-market operations of these companies have consistently yielded higher margins, and oftentimes the spreads have been significant.

US Global Investors recently hosted a global outlook webcast that featured Dr. Marc Faber, the well-known investor based in Hong Kong. In the course of that webcast, Dr. Faber addressed the developed-versus-emerging issue:

If you look at the next 10 to 20 years in the West, I don’t see how the lifestyle of the average person will improve meaningfully. On the other hand, if you look at a country like Vietnam, they have a GDP per capita annually of $800 which may go to $3,000 over the next 15-20 years.

The same is true for China and India. You suddenly have a middle class of 230 million people in India who will be buying cars like the $2,500 Nano and other goods.

Once a family moves from the bicycle to the motorcycle, it’s an improvement in their standard of living. But when you move to the car and drive your children to school in your car, it’s a huge increase in your standard of living and your social class.

Global growth has been a tremendous benefit for commodities, with the key driver being strong demand from China. And as we pointed out in a recent webcast focused on China, that use of commodities is less to fuel export growth and more to satisfy domestic demand as income levels rise. Increasing demand for commodities and the corresponding rise in prices has positive knock-on effects for much of the developing world.

The increasing importance of emerging countries in the world order also argues for their currencies to strengthen relative to the dollar. International stock markets outperformed the US market during the 1970s and much of the 1980s, with much of that outperformance relating to relative currency strength.

A continuation of the dollar’s decline in the face of slow growth and yawning budget deficits - nearly $11 trillion between 2009 and 2019, according to White House estimates - would provide a significant tailwind for globally-minded investors.

Source: John Derrick, US Global Investors - Investor Alert, October 2, 2009.

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The Road to Depression

Monday, December 1st, 2008

Brad DeLong says two big mistakes made the crisis worse:

James Bradford DeLong (b. June 24, 1960, Boston) commonly known as Brad DeLong, is a professor of economics at the University of California, Berkeley and a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of the United States Department of the Treasury in the Clinton Administration. He is also a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research, and is a visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.

The Road to Depression, by Brad DeLong, Project Syndicate: For 15 months, the United States Federal Reserve, assisted by the financial regulators of the US Treasury, have been trying…,

above all, to avoid a deep depression.

They have also had three subsidiary objectives:

• Keep as much economic activity as possible under private-sector control, in order to ensure that what is produced is what consumers really want.
• Prevent the princes of Wall Street … from profiting from the systemic risk that they created.
• Ensure that homeowners and small investors do not absorb too much loss, for their only “crime” was to accept bad risks, which they would not have done in a world of properly diversified portfolios.

Now it is clear that the Fed and the Treasury have lost the game. If a depression is to be avoided, it will have to be the work of other arms of the government, with other tools and powers.

The failure to contain the crisis will ultimately be traced, I think, to excessive concern with the first two subsidiary objectives: reining in Wall Street princes and keeping economic decision-making private. Had the Fed and the Treasury given those two objectives their proper - subsidiary - weight, I suspect that we would not now be in this mess…

The desire to prevent the princes of Wall Street from profiting from the crisis was reflected in the Fed-Treasury decision to let Lehman Brothers collapse… The logic behind that decision was that, previously in the crisis, equity shareholders had been severely punished…

But this was not true of bondholders and counterparties, who were paid in full. The Fed and Treasury feared that the lesson being taught in the last half of 2007 and the first half of 2008 was that the US government guaranteed all the debt and transactions of every bank and bank-like entity that was regarded as too big to fail. That, the Fed and the Treasury believed, could not be healthy.

Lenders to very large overleveraged institutions had to have some incentive to calculate the risks. But that required, at some point, allowing some bank to fail…

In retrospect, this was a major mistake. … With that guarantee broken by Lehman Brothers’ collapse, every financial institution immediately sought to acquire a much greater capital cushion…,

but found it impossible to do so.

The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy created an extraordinary and immediate demand for additional bank capital, which the private sector could not supply.

It was at this point that the Treasury made the second mistake. Because it tried to keep the private sector private, it sought to avoid partial or full nationalization of the components of the banking system deemed too big to fail. In retrospect, the Treasury should have identified all such entities and started buying common stock in them - whether they liked it or not - until the crisis passed.

Yes, this is what might be called “lemon socialism,” creating grave dangers for corporate control, posing a threat of large-scale corruption, and establishing a precedent for intervention that could be very dangerous down the road.

But would that have been worse than what we face now? The failure to sacrifice the subsidiary objective of keeping the private sector private meant that the Fed and the Treasury lost their opportunity to attain the principal objective of avoiding depression.

Of course, hindsight is always easy. But if depression is to be avoided, it will be through old-fashioned Keynesian fiscal policy: the government must take a direct hand in boosting spending and deciding what goods and services will be in demand.

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