ia Peter Tchir of TF Mar­ket Advi­sors,

Mar­kets have become far less volatile than last year, but many investors remain focused on the Credit Mar­kets for signs and cues as to the next move. With so many peo­ple look­ing to moves in credit mar­kets and try­ing to deter­mine how suc­cess­ful an auc­tion has been, I thought it would make sense to go through some exam­ples of how credit trades. At one extreme you have a real mar­ket like for the E-mini S&P futures. That trades from Sun­day at 6pm EST until Fri­day at 4:15 EST. It is vir­tu­ally con­tin­u­ous and at any given time you can see the bids and offers of the entire mar­ket. Then you have credit trad­ing, which has almost noth­ing in com­mon with ES futures and their incred­i­ble liq­uid­ity and transparency.

I will look at some exam­ples of how Euro­pean CDX Indices trade, a Sin­gle Name CDS trades, what an Invest­ment Grade Bond New Issue looks like, and how a block trade in High Yield bonds work. These exam­ples aren’t quite meant to be the norm, but in spite of being sim­pli­fied with some slight embell­ish­ments, they aren’t atyp­i­cal either.

This is a work of fic­tion and none of the banks or peo­ple men­tioned rep­re­sent real banks or indi­vid­u­als (even if you know who you are).

An hour in the life of the MAIN CDX index in Europe

Cast of Characters

· MAIN CDX Index

o This is a CDS index with 125 Ref­er­ence Enti­ties. They are all Euro­pean Invest­ment Grade Cred­its – a mix of cor­po­rate and financials.

· Mar­ket Makers

o Big Axed Bank: This bank is a major dealer and for some rea­son (posi­tion­ing or client flows) is cur­rently an “axed” buyer of MAIN

o Big Bank 2: A strong mar­ket maker and liq­uid­ity provider in MAIN but cur­rently indif­fer­ent on the market

o Weak Bank: A mar­ginal player in the mar­ket try­ing to retain a pres­ence because they feel they need to be in the business

o Inter­dealer Bro­ker: Not really a mar­ket maker, but not really a client either, they only trade with mar­ket mak­ers, and mar­ket mak­ers only trade with each other through an inter­dealer broker

· Clients

o Aggres­sive Hedge Fund: Looks for oppor­tu­ni­ties to push the mar­ket and profit from mak­ing the mar­ket “more efficient”

o Fast Momo Fund: A fund that is very momen­tum dri­ven and is fast to react for quick small trades

o Slow Momo Fund: Looks for trends to develop a bit longer before mak­ing deci­sions, espe­cially in credit where they have less experience

o Caught Short Fund: This fund is posi­tioned short the mar­ket with tight stops

o Bank Hedger: This is the desk respon­si­ble for hedg­ing a bank’s expo­sure to credit across all products

Ini­tial Runs or Prices

Each dealer sends out runs via Bloomberg and updates their “screens” for clients.

Big Axed Bank goes out 155.5/156.5 and updates their client screen with that price. They also put up 155/157 on the Inter­dealer Bro­ker screen just to get some­thing going “in the street”.

Big Bank 2 goes out 155/156. They hear that it is bet­ter bid away, but with stocks sta­ble, and if any­thing, tick­ing up a bit in spite of mediocre data, they think there are more likely to be sell­ers than buy­ers. They decide to join the bid on the Bro­ker screen mostly because they are bored and doubt they will get hit since they are sec­ond bid, but fig­ure it will mess up the bet­ter bid that is out there.

Weak Bank also goes out 155/156. They checked with some of their “run mon­keys” and got colour on where every­one else was. With the sta­bil­ity in stocks they think 155/156 is far safer than going out 155.5/156.5 though they are a bit scared that if they get lifted they can’t imme­di­ately cover in the street.

The First Trade

Aggres­sive hedge fund sees all three screens. He is curi­ous why Big Axed Bank is so well bid. It seems a bit aggres­sive, espe­cially with stocks tick­ing up a bit in spite of weak data. He gets on the phone with his sales­per­son at Big Axed Bank:

Aggres­sive Hedge Fund (AHF): Hey, how’s it going? You guys seem axed to buy MAIN, any­thing going on?

Big Axed Bank Sales (BABS): Nah, I was already checked by some­one else. Trader wants to clean up a small posi­tion. Thinks it might go tighter but just wants to book some profits.

AHF: How much is he look­ing for?

BABS: I can ask, how much are you look­ing to do?

AHF: I’m just check­ing some other posi­tions, but prob­a­bly not too much if I have any­thing to do.

BABS: Trader said he was really look­ing for 100 MM, but would take 250 MM for you if he had to.

AHF: I’m not sure I have 250 to go, but what size would take him out? Last thing I want to do is hit him and have him leave it bid.

BABS: 150 would take him out.

AHF: Done, I sell you 150 MM at 155.5.

BABS: Done, thanks for the trade.

The Next Trade

Big Axed Bank refreshes their screen 155/156 and sends out a run post­ing the trade and refresh­ing the mar­ket via Bloomberg as well. While this is occur­ring, AHF is quickly hit­ting the 155 bid Weak Bank had up on their screens. The screen only worked for 100 MM, but AHF sells 100MM at 155 elec­tron­i­cally. This leads to a quick call from Weak Bank Sales­per­son to thank them for the trade and con­firm it is done. A junior trader at AHF asks the senior trader why he didn’t sell more at 155.5 to Big Axed Bank or why he didn’t hit Big Bank 2 at 155 since they do a lot more busi­ness with them than Weak Bank. The senior trader just rolls his eyes and explains that he knows Weak Bank has no tol­er­ance for risk and would imme­di­ately offer it out in an attempt for a quick profit. Although Big Axed Bank had told him that they were out of the axe, he didn’t think sell­ing them much more at 155.5 or even 155 would have scared them at all. Big Bank 2 also has enough strength it might have taken a lot of size to move them off their bid, but Weak Bank is already scram­bling to cover.

Sure enough, Weak Bank imme­di­ately refreshes their screens at 154.5/155.5 and updates their Bloomberg dis­tri­b­u­tion with the post that it traded down. They also put in a 156.5 offer on the Bro­ker screen. The Bro­ker screen had been 155/157 with 2 guys on the bid. Weak Bank gives them the 156.5 offer (which is higher than where they are offer­ing it to clients) in the hopes one of the bids steps up to 155.5.

Now It Gets Interesting

Both Big Axed Bank and Big Bank 2 are imme­di­ately posted by friendly clients that it traded down at 155 away. Big Bank 2 imme­di­ately refreshes his price as 154.5/155.5 for clients and pulls his “street” bid on Bro­ker Screen from 155 to 154 since he really doesn’t want to get hit by another dealer.

The trader at Big Axed Bank puts all his skills to work. While scream­ing at the sales­per­son who cov­ers AHF and ask­ing the heck is going on and if it’s his client spray­ing the street, he is send­ing out a fresh price of 154.5/155.5 and yanks his bid from Bro­ker screen in dis­gust. The sales­per­son who cov­ers AHF comes over and qui­etly explains to the trader that there is no way AHF is spray­ing the street, that’s not how that account behaves, and that even if they did, they would never do it to us since we are mates. We were out last week at that new restau­rant, he loves us, he was just try­ing to throw us some biz. If any­thing he was just help­ing out since you were axed, so relax. It def­i­nitely isn’t our guy out there screw­ing around, besides stocks are tick­ing up a bit so some­one else prob­a­bly decided to sell some here too.

Weak Bank is get­ting a bit ner­vous now. The “street pic­ture” went from 155/157 with two guys on the bid, and now it’s 154/156.5, his offer and only one bid. He picks up the phone to talk to his bro­ker at Inter­dealer Broker.

Weak Bank Trader (WBT): What the hell is going on, where did the bids go?

Bro­ker 1: Hey mate, how are you? What you think­ing here?

WBT: What am I think­ing? I’m think­ing you had two bids that you lost and why the hell should I ever use you guys if you can’t keep your mar­kets together.

Bro­ker 1: C’mon mate, you know how hard it is with these screens, let me give em a ring and see if we can get them back, I’m sure we can.

WBT: Fine, just do it. (hangs up the line)

Bro­ker 1 (turns to the other guys on the desk): C’mon you bunch of wankers, get those MAIN bids back. We haven’t done a trade all day, and I can smell this one. I can tell the guy at WBT got hit and has to get out. His boss is already prob­a­bly freak­ing out on him since he’s had the posi­tion for 12 sec­onds (laughs and shakes head), so let’s get those bids back and make us some money.

The bro­kers call their traders at the two big banks see­ing if they can’t get their bids back. The trader at Big Axed Bank is mad at him­self for leav­ing money on table and just to share the mis­ery decides to pull his bid com­pletely at bro­ker and actu­ally put up a 156 offer, under­cut­ting the other offer for no rea­son other than he is annoyed at him­self for pay­ing 155.5 when sud­denly the mar­ket feels well offered. He leaves his price 154.5/155.5 for retail.

Big Bank 2 sees the street sud­denly go offered and decides to play it safe. He refreshes his price to retail as 154/155.

Another Player Gets Involved

Fast Momo Fund has seen stocks tick up and seen 155.5 and 155 get hit in MAIN. He watches stocks con­tinue to tick up and is think­ing that sell­ing MAIN could be a good trade. Then his screen flashes as Big Bank 2 pulls back to 154/155. He reacts quickly and hits Big Axed Bank at 154.5 before that bid dis­ap­pears. As he con­firms with the sales­per­son that his trade is done, he smiles as he notices Weak Bank had already refreshed as 154/155 (what a joke, he thinks to himself).

So now Big Axed Bank paid 155.5 for some to cover an axe and is short at 154.5. Weak Bank is short at 155 and thinks it may have traded tighter than that, and can’t find a decent street bid to get out of his posi­tion. Aggres­sive Hedge Fund got a block off at 155.5 and another piece at 155 and knows it just went down at 154.5 so is feel­ing good about his trades. Fast Momo Fund is long at 154.5.

Price Action and Weak Hands

Each dealer is now out 154/155 to their clients. Big Axed Bank had started the day well, is annoyed for leav­ing money on the table, but isn’t par­tic­u­larly wor­ried about hav­ing being hit at 154.5. Big Bank 2 hasn’t done a trade and is kind of happy, and still doesn’t really have a strong view, but his think­ing that he will be a buyer soon. Weak Bank trader is freak­ing out a bit. His best case now is break­ing even if he can get lifted at 155. Inter­dealer bro­ker is hav­ing a rough day. Some­how it went from two bids and a chance of a trade to total bul­locks. They now have 2 guys sit­ting on 156 offers with­out a bid, and they know that Weak Bank would improve their offer if they could get a good bid.

Slow Momo Fund can’t help but notice the price action. They call each of the 3 mar­ket mak­ers and see if any­one will step up and pay them 154.5 for MAIN. All of the deal­ers just repeat their 154 bid and ask for orders. He doesn’t feel like leav­ing an order (since if it starts going wider, his whole momen­tum trade is point­less). He is think­ing about hold­ing off for now, but then sees S&P futures tick up 1 point and decides he bet­ter smack a bid in case the US comes in and takes every­thing higher and tighter. Since he had been on the phone, he calls back Weak Bank and tries to sell them 154’s on MAIN. They flake, the sales­per­son claims they are 153.5 bid best now, and the trader at Slow Momo Fund winces as he sees the Weak Bank Screen refresh as 153.5/155. He quickly hits the 154 screen bid at Big Bank 2 and won­ders why the hell he ever tries to deal with that flake at Weak Bank.

Weak Bank is in panic mode. They are call­ing all poten­tial buy­ers of MAIN to see if they can get out of this trade. They are will­ing to sell at 154.5, think­ing that is an extremely good offer and think­ing los­ing a ½ bp isn’t the worst thing in the world espe­cially as they are get­ting some good flows and inquiry.

The Caught Short Fund is get­ting a bit ner­vous. They had it marked at 155.5 and now it just went down at 154. Worse than that, it seems like sud­denly every­one is a seller. Maybe they should cut the loss and reload later? They are going to hold off for a bit, but are seri­ously con­sid­er­ing cutting.

The trader at the bank hedg­ing desk gets the call from Weak Bank. She is think­ing that 154.5 sounds like a decent offer and that she might even be able to get the offer down a bit with the mar­ket feel­ing so strong. They are a bit under hedged so this seems like a good oppor­tu­nity to take off some risk. Just as she is con­sid­er­ing the trade, her boss rings her up and explains that the mar­ket feels good and he is wor­ried about losses on the hedges. Exas­per­ated, she tries to point out that if any­thing they are under­hedged, so this move tighter is a good oppor­tu­nity for them, and that so far the move seems iso­lated to the indices as nei­ther sin­gle name CDS nor the cash mar­kets seem par­tic­u­larly strong. The all know­ing man­ager sit­ting in the cor­ner office insists that the mar­ket is turn­ing and that soon there will be some great bids for their pre­cious bond and loan inven­tory and that he wants her to take some hedges off in advance of that. She is embar­rassed and out of cour­tesy calls Weak Bank back and explains that not only is she not a buyer of MAIN right now, she would be look­ing to sell some, and asks Weak Bank if they want some at 154?

Not only does Weak Bank not want any at 154, they are start­ing to panic. That small 155 trade from the morn­ing is start­ing to look a bit ugly. They can’t afford to let Bank Hedger trade away though, that would com­pletely mess up their posi­tion so they basi­cally beg her to leave an order with them. They point out that they are a seller them­selves and if they get lifted, they will sell some along for her. She doesn’t have a good feel about this but decides to leave Weak Bank with an order at 154.25.

The Capit­u­la­tion

Big Axed Bank and Big Bank 2 are both 153.5/154.5 now. The Bro­ker is now 155 offered (Big Axed Bank cut his own offer in fur­ther frus­tra­tion at his dumb first trade at 155.5). The bro­kers are “dis­cussing” how to get a decent bid back (“dis­cussing” involves sit­ting around and call­ing each other a bunch of wankers and say­ing the mar­ket and the job is total bul­locks while lament­ing that all the mar­ket mak­ers are ungrate­ful sods).

Weak Bank sends out a Bloomberg mes­sage stat­ing that they are an axed seller and have a block to go at 154.25. They fig­ure that is best offer by a ¼ bp and if they get lifted they can prob­a­bly con­vince Bank Hedger to trade at 154, so they lose ¾ bp on their orig­i­nal trade, but make back a ¼ bp on the order. Not good but not horrible.

The Caught Short Fund sees the axed seller mes­sage from Weak Bank. He knows how weak the Weak Bank is and has this gut feel that they are going to have to puke out of a posi­tion soon. He knows that if he calls either of the Big Banks they are likely to flake, so he hits Big Axed Bank on the screens at 153.5. He’s not happy, but thinks it’s the pru­dent thing to do as mar­ket feels so strong and he will be able to reload later.

Bank Hedger sees the 153.5 trade print and gives Weak Bank a fill or kill on her order. They can’t fill her and worse than that, they won’t even pro­vide her with a bid! And sure enough the boss is call­ing, no doubt to see if she had sold any MAIN. Both of the Big Banks have refreshed their screens as 153/154, but she knows Big Bank 2 hadn’t been hit, so calls them and sees if they will match the trade away and take some at 153.5. Big Bank 2’s trader thinks about it and decides that the move is a bit over­done, so doesn’t mind buy­ing some MAIN here and Bank Hedger is a good and fair client so sure, he will pay 153.5 for some. Bank Hedger is happy. Well happy isn’t exactly the right word, she thinks her boss is clue­less and they should have been adding to their hedge on this move rather than sell­ing into it, but c’est la vie.

Big Bank 2 is feel­ing good about his trades. He owns MAIN down at 153.75 on aver­age and doesn’t see any­thing in the cash mar­kets to jus­tify such a big move. He is get­ting colour that Weak Bank needs to get out of a posi­tion so decides to mess around with him, plus he is annoyed with his Inter­dealer Bro­ker con­stantly bug­ging him for a bid. He decides to “fix” that prob­lem and gives the Bro­ker screens at 151/154 mar­ket. The bro­ker kindly thanks him for the two sided mar­ket, know­ing that the bid sucks and the rest of the desk is going to be pissed off about the improved offer.

Weak Bank sees the street go 151/154. They hear it is 153/154 away at both Big Banks but can’t get that bid. They know Bank Hedger sold some away, they don’t know what level, but fig­ure some­one has an axe. Damn, they wish they had just bought more from her, this is really screw­ing up their picture.

Aggres­sive Hedge Fund has seen almost no fol­low through in stocks, bonds, or sin­gle name CDS. The mar­ket is okay, but noth­ing spe­cial. He can see that Big Banks are both 153/154 and that Weak Bank is 152.5/154 right now. He saw their plea to find a buyer at 154.25 and decides the time is right and calls Weak Bank’s salesperson.

AHF: Hey, what you think of mar­ket here?

Weak Banks Sales (WBS): Feels strong, looks like lots of sell­ers of MAIN (then in a whis­per) I don’t think our trader is too happy about that trade ear­lier, we can’t find any buyers.

AHF: Tell you what, since we did that trade I shifted some other posi­tions around (total lie) and could actu­ally buy back the MAIN I sold earlier.

WBS: Really?

AHF: Yeah, where do you think you could get it done.

WBS: I checked, the trader would sell them at 154, and I might be able to get him down to 153.75.

AHF: Might? What they hell do you mean might? That is a crap offer. The guy who got hit at 153.5 is des­per­ate to get out of them (total lie) and I’m hear­ing it was a big seller who may have a lot more to go (total lie).

WBS: Crap, let me see what I can do. What’s your best?

AHF: I will pay 153.25. I’m pretty sure I can get that done away in a heart­beat if you don’t care, though I might hold off because it seems like this thing could run a lot tighter.

WBS: Fine, my trader can sell you at 153.25, but you have to keep us in the flows. This trade hurt, but I told him how impor­tant it was to see your flows and that you would work hard to make it up to us.

AHF: Sure, tell you what, I think I can source more of the bonds I’m buy­ing away (total lie), and could upsize the trade at 153.25. I have another block to buy, you want to sell those and increase size of the trade?

WBS: Sure, let me check…..yeah, that’s done. Thanks for the trades. We will do an unwind on our trade from this morn­ing, and is that a new trade on the other piece?

AHF: I think it might be an assign­ment, I have sold old hedges around, so let me fig­ure it out and give you a name you will face on that sec­ond piece.

WBS: Cool, thank a lot, appre­ci­ate the trade and keep us up. Glad we are get­ting busi­ness going.

As soon as he hangs up he strolls over to the trader to explain how wrong the trader was about the client and how well this rela­tion­ship is going to work. The trader can’t under­stand why the sales­per­son doesn’t think the 1 ¾ bp loss isn’t a big deal to him, and so far he hasn’t made money on the short he just put on at 153.25.

The Rever­sal

Weak Bank puts in a call to Bank Hedger let­ting them know that they can pay 153 now. Bank Hedger is start­ing to get a lit­tle annoyed with Weak Bank and “con­grat­u­lates” the sales­per­son for inform­ing her that Weak Bank now has a generic bid. Just to make her day extra spe­cial, she gets a call from the boss. Not only doesn’t it look like they are going to be able sell any of their cash inven­tory, but they are being asked to par­tic­i­pate in a new loan, so they need to put that hedge back on. Then a lit­tle sheep­ishly he explains that man­age­ment wants to run a com­pletely hedged book, so wants them to take advan­tage of the strength in the mar­ket to put on some addi­tional hedge. Typ­i­cal, she thinks, and then decides what to do. If Weak Bank is now a buyer she knows they won’t make a good offer since they don’t have the lim­its to take on much risk, let along print her on a dou­ble trade. She calls Big Bank 2 and tells them that her boss changed the mind, and she wants to buy back the MAIN she sold ear­lier and actu­ally wants to buy an addi­tional block. The sales­per­son is hop­ing the trader will do it all at 153.5 so that his client doesn’t lose money on the first trade. The trader laughs at that, explains that the mar­ket is doing noth­ing, and if any­thing it feels like buy­ers of MAIN are creep­ing out of the word­work and he is con­sid­er­ing mov­ing the mar­ket back to 153.5/154.5 but he would sell the entire piece at 154. Bank Hedger decides that is fair and is almost happy to lose a ½ bp on the boss’s dumb trade idea just so that he will keep his nose out of the day to day trad­ing which he seems so clue­less on.

A quick recap of what has gone on so far:

Aggres­sive Hedge Fund sold MAIN at 155.5 and 155 and cov­ered the entire piece at 153.25 for an aver­age profit of 2 bps on two pieces.

Fast Momo Fund is long at 154.5.

Slow Momo Fund is still long at 154.

Caught Short Fund closed the short at 153.5, but is get­ting a bit ner­vous that he cov­ered too early espe­cially since he HATES the market!!

Weak Bank bought 155 and cov­ered it at 153.25 for a loss of 1 ¾ bps and is now long at 153.25.

Bank Hedger lost a ½ bp on one block but now has added to the short on the day and is exactly where they want to be from a risk standpoint.

Big Bank 2, bought a piece at 154 and 153.5 and sold it all back at 154, so made a ¼ bp on aver­age and is back to flat.

Inter­dealer Bro­ker hasn’t done a trade and just got it shoved in his mush as Big Bank 2 pulled the 151/154 mar­ket and said they were going to lunch.

Big Axed Bank cov­ered their axe at 155.5, a trade for which the trader is kick­ing him­self and is short at 154.5 and got shorter at 153.5, which is annoy­ing, but not a par­tic­u­larly big con­cern yet since they did have buy­ers the pre­vi­ous day, giv­ing him the axe, but he def­i­nitely wants to sell some MAIN here rather than buy­ing more.

Back to Unchanged:

Big Bank 2 goes out 153.75/154.75 fresh. Still no strong view, and made a bit of money, but “for choice” would pre­fer to buy some more MAIN rather than sell­ing any here.

Big Axed Bank hears about the mar­ket away and guesses some­one just lifted 154 away, so goes out 153.5/154.5 fresh as they are now get­ting too short and wants to be an offer.

Weak Bank can’t believe they sold at 153.25 and now seem to be get­ting topped and turned. They call Inter­dealer Bro­ker and beg them to get 154 offer back. This time one of the bro­kers man­ages to con­vince Big Axed Bank to flash a 154.25 offer on the screen. Weak Bank lifts the 154.25, the bro­ker pounds his chest and calls the rest of the desk a bunch of losers, and has the guts to ask each of the banks if they want to leave some­thing on the fol­low. All he gets from Weak Bank is a click as the trader closes the line to think about what a mis­er­able day it’s been, and Big Axed Bank gives him the only order he cares about now, some nice curry for the desk.

While jok­ing around with the bro­ker Fast Momo lifts his 154.5 offer on the screen, tak­ing him out of another block.

Damn I hate these screens he mum­bles to him­self as he goes out 154/155 fresh. Big Bank 2 comes back from lunch and makes em 154/155 as well. Weak Bank goes out 153.75/155.25 and has no desire to sit there any longer. Caught Short regrets cov­er­ing since he hates the mar­ket so much and comes back to lift 155 from Big Axed Bank. Slow momen­tum is annoyed but decides to hold on for now, but the mar­ket is back to 154.5/155.5 after start­ing the day at 155/156 with a high print of 155.5 and a low print of 153.25.

What can we learn from this series of trades?

Main moved over 2 bps and not one sin­gle trade had any­thing to do with “val­u­a­tion” or “fun­da­men­tals”. Think­ing that all moves reflect a change in fun­da­men­tals or a large scale change in risk posi­tion­ing is just wrong in a mar­ket that is as illiq­uid as this – and MAIN is about as liq­uid as it gets in the credit markets.

Some clients are just as happy to keep CDS Indices off exchanges as the deal­ers are.

The sales­per­son at Weak Bank will be annoyed that the trader is los­ing money and drop­ping his clients because how will he get paid on the sale­s­cred­its and keep his great rela­tion­ships intact when the trader sucks so bad.

All mar­ket mak­ers will go home curs­ing the screens, won­der­ing why sales­peo­ple get any­thing when their clients just click on a screen, but will not see the irony of hat­ing indi­vid­ual screens and hat­ing the idea of an exchange.

The bro­ker who got the trade done will go home think­ing it’s bet­ter than the alter­na­tive ways of mak­ing a liv­ing and won­der­ing if he should take the trader to the Gun­ners match next week.

Aggres­sive Hedge Fund will go home won­der­ing when the Weak Banks will give up and won­der why other funds spend so much money on research when it is all so easy. Caught Short will go home promis­ing not to sec­ond guess him­self so quickly. Fast Momo fund will go home break­ing even, some­how feel­ing they could have done a bit bet­ter, but not too upset since it was all just a guess and hadn’t worked out badly. Slow Momo just wishes this mar­ket would go back to trend fol­low­ing, but has decided that the trade is actu­ally not so much a momen­tum trade, but a view that the mar­ket seemed so strong that fun­da­men­tals are bet­ter and he will keep the trade on since it should work out well over the next day or two.

Bank Hedger checks out the bank share price before head­ing home and can only think that if they didn’t leave the idiots in charge the bank would be in a lot bet­ter shape.

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